

JPRS-UMA-91-029
25 NOVEMBER 1991




JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

19980112 170



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 8

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INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Shaposhnikov on Stance During, After Coup
92UM0015A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 11 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov by G. Drugoveyko: "The Process of Democratization of the Army is Irreversible, Thinks USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov"]

[Text]

[Drugoveyko] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, I, a military pilot in the recent past, perfectly understand that if the Air Force—one squadron—had supported the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency], the fate of the White House and its defenders would have been predetermined. Therefore, your decision on the categorical rejection of the plot—was the deed! Is it not strange that it is simpler to deal with a military leader of this rank than with a passerby on the street.... Moreover, a professional military man who has spent his entire life maturing into an absolutely order-obeying man. How did you make your personal choice? What was the first impulse of your spirit which helped you to immediately stand on an unambiguous and uncompromising position?

[Shaposhnikov] The choice was not simple. Maybe it was due to the habit of a military man to blame himself—you have surely noted this. But you will agree that guilt and blind obedience are not one and the same thing. This is why the first impulse was rejection of the argumentation which accompanied the report on the creation of the GKChP. I assessed the announcement of the state of emergency as inappropriate and the introduction of troops into Moscow as utterly inadmissible and absurd. And so the decision was obvious: to prevent the Air Force's participation in any unconstitutional acts whatsoever and to do everything so that the Armed Forces as a whole would not become involved in illegal activities. Well, and when a decision has been made, it is uncompromisingly implemented. This is an axiom. Here, vacillation, looking back, and preparation of "reverse" moves is inappropriate. Yes and this is not in my nature!

I want to remind your readers. The Army manifested not only its organization and discipline but also its civic spirit in the most complex political situation. The absolute majority of our soldiers, officers, and generals confirmed through their deeds their adherence to the democratic transformations of life, their loyalty to the constitutional system and duty, and their devotion to their people.

[Drugoveyko] Yes, the army conducted itself democratically from the first hours of the putsch. I said during any disputes-conversations: a military coup is impossible in our country. There are sufficient arguments, I will not cite them. Well, anyway, in your opinion, what has thoroughly democratized the Armed Forces in the last few years? The unsettled state of everyday life and

disillusionment among the generals and generally among the highest command staff (dachas overshadowed combat readiness for some "military leaders"), the obvious and prolonged impersonality [bezlichnost] of the CPSU, or the emancipation of consciousness?

[Shaposhnikov] The answer seems to be obvious. Our army is part of the people. That says it all. The soldiers, officers, and generals—with the exception of the very few who were struck by the "dacha syndrome" that you mentioned—live the same life as the rest of the country. Those same joys which, unfortunately, fall to the lot of very few of us. Those same misfortunes and sorrows. Those same tribulations for the fate of the Homeland and the country's own history at this current critical point.

In this real and not artificial foundation of the deep democratization of our army that has been reinforced in its social composition and in the constitutional mission. In recent years, this foundation has been substantially cleared of the administrative-bureaucratic stratifications that have distorted the already corrupted popular nature of our army. Of course, this cleansing work is still far from completed. But the results of it are already incontrovertible—and the country became graphically convinced of this on August 19-21.

You mentioned the "disillusionment among the generals and among the highest command staff...." I think that this suggestion is unjustified. Can we really make a generalization based on single, albeit incontrovertible, facts? The generals—are the most professionally trained military cadres and the nucleus of the officer and the Armed Forces. They are people who have passed through all of the stages of military service and who continue to carry out, in a worthy manner, their very difficult duties in responsible positions. I personally know very many generals. I have served side by side with them and have seen them in action. Therefore, I highly respect both the generals and the great workers who have fallen in love with military service. Incidentally, when have you had the opportunity to observe the work day, say, of a division commander, a commander, a chief of staff, or a chief of a directorate at a central staff? All of them are generals. Few people know that they work 14-16 hours per day, practically without days off, and frequently—without leave. This is certainly incorrect in principle but that is the way it is for now. Only who knows about this? Of course, we the military must also assume part of the blame for the unjustified secrecy. Is that not why for some journalists the theme of "dachas" has overshadowed everything else in the coverage of army life and that they rarely see officers, generals, and command personnel engaged in vital, specific work. We are ready to assist the mass media in eliminating this gap.

As for the other factors you touched upon, each of them undoubtedly played its role in the process of democratization of the army. But the main thing nevertheless

consists of the fact that the Armed Forces—both soldiers, officers, and generals—are developing with all of society into a single renewing system of coordinates of civic spirit.

[Drugoveyko] Right now, the responsibility that has been entrusted to you is so enormous that it is even difficult to imagine its size. At the same time, your circle of coworkers, whom you have personally known for many years, is nevertheless all of the generals. Furthermore, it has turned out that there are various people in those structures who must provide you with reliable information about what is occurring in the troops. And various people serve at the most horrible buttons and at the most important military command and control facilities. What is the guarantee that nothing unexpected will occur, today, tomorrow, or a week from now? And is there such a guarantee?

[Shaposhnikov] I would provide my personal guarantee: while I am Minister of Defense, the Armed Forces will not conduct any "unexpected" actions against the people. But the matter is not only my word. A process of renewal of cadres is occurring which was artificially delayed. Everyone who has served the period prescribed by law and who has the right to a pension will be discharged from the Armed Forces. I have issued the appropriate orders. For example, the Ministry of Defense Collegium will be renewed by four-fifths. As for other command and control elements, a primitive "percentage" approach cannot be used here. Everything must be defined by law, the interests of the profession, expediency, an individual approach to people, and by an objective assessment of their professionalism, competence, and service potential. Of course, this assessment will be formulated with the direct participation of officer assemblies, permanently operating certification commissions, and other army and navy democratic institutions. At the same time, we will not unleash a "witch hunt," we will cut short attempts to sow enmity and suspicion in the officer environment, and we will do everything to insure the solidarity and controllability of military collectives.

The primary guarantee from unexpected developments is the irreversibility of the democratization process not only of society but also of the army. Right now we are taking the most decisive steps to accelerate the radical transformation of the Armed Forces. The essence of the transformations is being determined by the analysis of today's political realities and by a scientifically-based program to provide for the country's adequate and reliable defense.

[Drugoveyko] Just what is your understanding and notion of radical reform of the Armed Forces? Naturally, our readers are interested most of all in the problems of Armed Forces manning, the draft, and the nature of the army—professionalism or recruitment?

[Shaposhnikov] Reform of the Armed Forces is an integral part of overall military reform which encompasses the entire sphere of defense structural development. My notion of the primary parameters of the Armed Forces transformation are: professionalization, quality, democratization, and sufficiency.

The army must be manned according to the mixed manning principle. We propose reducing the term of service for soldiers and sergeants to 18 months. After mastering a military specialty at training subunits during the first six months of service, they can be offered the opportunity to conclude a five-year contract. During this time, we propose paying servicemen a salary whose sum will be determined upon completion of calculations being conducted right now. Naturally, clothing, food, and housing will be free of charge.

We are also examining variations for alternative service whose criteria also needs to be legally reinforced. I think that the principle of material self-interest in the payment of military labor must definitely be combined with the regulation of work time. Right now these and many other ideas that affect Armed Forces reform are undergoing a comprehensive scientific examination by experts.

An integrated concept of Armed Forces reform will be submitted for review and approval with the adoption of the package of legislative acts that define the place and role of the army in society, its functions, regulation and procedures for performing service and manning.

Col-Gen Gromov Interviewed on Coup

92UM0053A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 12 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, former commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan and Hero of the Soviet Union, by Sergey Doronin; place and date not given: "Cloudy Days in the Life of General Gromov. The August Putsch: Its Shock-wave Also Affected Some Honest People"]

[Text] It so happens that the former commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan, Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, whom our journalism almost placed on the pedestal of a national hero, has only once appeared in *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*, on 5 December last year. That was a short interview connected with his appointment to the post of Union deputy minister of internal affairs. At that time Boris Vsevolodovich talked about the kind of sharp turn of fate that is totally unexpected.

Today the conversation with him may be regarded as a continuation of that first interview. The more so since after August 1991 changes again occurred in his life. And by no means for the better...

However, everything in its proper order.

[Doronin] Returning to the past, why precisely did the president's choice fall on you?

[Gromov] To be frank, even to this day I do not finally understand what kind of springboard ejected me from the Armed Forces. Although I do now see many things differently.

What are we talking about? For several consecutive years following my return from Afghanistan, both our press and the foreign press "prepared" me for being among the "plotters." Gromov, they said, should if not accomplish then at least necessarily play one of the key roles in a future military coup. This kind of thing was said dozens of times.

On the one hand, to hear and read about oneself is amusing. But what of the other hand? Only I, and perhaps my family, know how nervous it made me.

I do not exclude the possibility that mutual relations with Yazov also influenced the appointment. No, I do not want to say that he was a worthless defense minister. That is not what we are talking about. It was simply that mutual relations were such that Yazov was reluctant to see that I told him what I thought probably more often than I had to.

So that was the "mechanics" of the thing. Someone decided on me, someone convinced Gorbachev... And the minister of defense, perhaps unwillingly but without any special opposition, sent me to the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] system. I was just presented with the fact.

Although my appointment—I am not a professional, but there was also another nonprofessional holding a top post in the MVD—could not be called a serious undertaking.

[Doronin] Nevertheless... You did have occasion to talk about this with the president, did you not?

[Gromov] By telephone. In 15 minutes Mikhail Sergeyevich convinced me that I should agree. But I gave him my counterarguments: I said that I was no expert in MVD affairs. I was unable to vindicate my viewpoint at that time. And it is not in the nature of a military man to persuade. It was a decision by the president, and so it was an order.

[Doronin] And how, Boris Vsevolodovich, did you settle in your new place?

[Gromov] I took over public safety. A complex business associated with the fight against crime and hooliganism and its prevention. Plus, at one time I was also in charge of the country's "hot spots"—South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh. I was also involved with the Internal Troops. Although by law it should have been Pugo. But to be candid, he did not understand this service.

[Doronin] Were you able to master the situation?

[Gromov] Overall, no. I dealt with particular issues. But they were only particular issues... Let me talk about something else. I shall have only good memories of the people from the MVD. The overwhelming majority of them are considerate, selfless, and true professionals.

[Doronin] Then came August. At the time you were in the Crimea, on vacation, were you not? And Army General Varennikov telephoned you?

[Gromov] That call was made on 18 August. And there was my trip to the Belbek airport. There I saw that the entire group had returned from Foros. They flew off to Moscow but he remained.

I had a conversation with him. In brief, it was as follows: There was a most serious situation in the country and it was essential to fly to Moscow. No explanations.

I refused. Because at that moment Varennikov had no relationship with me. I was in the MVD and he was in the Ministry of Defense.

Why did I meet with him? We had been acquainted for a long time. We were together for three years in Afghanistan. The first time, when he was leading the operations group at General Headquarters, I was subordinate to him. The second time he was there representing the Ministry of Defense, and I was commander of the 40th Army...

Varennikov is a cold man with me, but he did help me to resolve several matters in Afghanistan.

And so I met with him, not knowing either the purpose of the talk or his plans.

On 19 August I received an order from Pugo: Return to Moscow urgently.

Today I understand that they were nevertheless planning to draw me into their game. They had to have the Internal Troops.

[Doronin] Did they apply pressure to you?

[Gromov] They did. Particularly on 20 August. First during the day, and then in the evening. They had to blockade the White House.

But I understood what the Internal Troops are; they are trained to operate in the city, among enormous crowds. I therefore did everything possible to prevent "anything of the kind" from occurring. I was helped in this by the chief of staff of the Internal Troops, General Dubinyak. And later I established communications with other parts of the country and learned about the situation locally.

I also went to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Internationalist Troop Affairs, to Odzhiyev, and to Aushev—he was then head of a similar committee under the Cabinet of Ministers. They raised the "Afghan people" and asked them to work in the region of the

White House and throughout Moscow. And indeed, the "Afghan people" became involved in the affair in all the republics.

[Doronin] Boris Vsevolodovich, there you were at the apex of the pyramid of power. And it is probable that many people considered it an honor to know you and be your friend. But what about since the events of August?

[Gromov] It is painful for me to talk about this subject. But the question is a fair one.

After 22 August to sometime in mid-September my house telephone remained silent. Whereas previously it would ring six or seven times during the evening, afterward communication was literally cut off. Just like the president in Foros.

However, not everyone forgot me. I can tell you who did telephone—Samsonov, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, my fellow student at the academy. And Grachev, then commander of the airborne troops. And I also had a conversation with Rutskoy.

I am particularly grateful to Kobzon, Vinokur, and Rozenbaum. They did not abandon me in those days; it was from them that I most often heard words of support.

And now they have remembered me again, and my family. Some even rebuked me: What is this, they say, why have you been hiding yourself away from everyone?...

[Doronin] Boris Vsevolodovich, what are your present duties? Are you under the command of the minister of defense?

[Gromov] Yes, that is so. But now, I think that there is talk that my service will now be more definite.

[Doronin] If it is not a secret, has a post been suggested to you? What kind of post?

[Gromov] What kind of secret would there be? They are talking about a military district.

[Doronin] Not in the capital?

[Gromov] No. First of all, it already has a commander. But I would not want to remain here.

[Doronin] Does this mean that you will be transferred? When?

[Gromov] On the 14th.

[Doronin] To be "under orders" is probably difficult psychologically, is it not?

[Gromov] It is a condition... You know, in Afghanistan I was ill with a severe form of viral hepatitis. It was a state of waiting, and I remember those two weeks of inner feelings before the illness. It was as if everything was normal but everything is a puzzle and you cannot concentrate. Yes. Two weeks... And then in the morning the thunderbolt—I was all yellow.

Imagine it. I know that I am clean, both for myself and with respect to the law. I did everything I could, and then one fine day I found myself on the sidelines of life.

[Doronin] And has this affected your family?

[Gromov] Of course. Both my wife and my sons. And my little six-year-old daughter in first grade. They have all sensed that everything is not as it should be. They have been meek as lambs, but before that they used to full of mischief.

I am calm in myself. I am steady. And for the first time since 1986 I have been able to make proper use of my leave time, but I cannot. What has happened is always in my head. For the first time in my life I have had no business.

[Doronin] So, Boris Vsevolodovich, is this retirement? Who has dismissed you?

[Gromov] Do not look for guilty ones. I myself submitted a report to the president—return me to the Armed Forces. I wrote on 26 August, and a few days later Mikhail Sergeyevich gave the "OK" for the transfer.

When I took up my new business in the MVD I knew that I should notwithstanding return to the Army. And I have thought about that during all these months.

[Doronin] You have the weight of Afghanistan on your shoulders. The experience of a combat officer. If in some way the Ministry of Defense showed an interest in it, how would General Gromov like to see the reform in the Army?

[Gromov] Well, no one has talked to me on this subject.

As I understand it, the Ministry of Defense finds itself in a complicated situation. Sovereignization has also engendered a process of creating republic armed forces. And I believe that ambitions are still paramount in this problem. What does having one's "own" armed forces mean? It means many billions of expenditures! The training of military personnel in their own military training establishments. Their own military-scientific potential...

Well, all right, let us leave the tanks and armored personnel carriers and artillery systems for the republics, and everything else without which it is impossible to talk about a modern army. This would serve as a force for 10, maybe 15 years.... But what then? The force would have to be improved, created, tested, reproduced. Is the money available for that?

I do not believe that anything serious will come of the undertaking to "divide up the army." I think that when passions have calmed people will understand that it was created in the heat of the moment.

[Doronin] Boris Vsevolodovich, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and its readers are really interested in having your fate decided more quickly. You need the Army as much as the Army needs you.

Veterans' Committee Chief on Actions During Coup

92UM0015B Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 40,
Sep 91 p 4

[Interview with Soviet Committee of Veterans of War Responsible Secretary Aleksandr Filippovich Malov by VETERAN Correspondent I. Dynin: "A Bitter Lesson: Our Correspondent's Conversation with Soviet Committee of Veterans of War Responsible Secretary A.F. Malov"]

[Text]

[Dynin] The Soviet Committee of Veterans of War [SKVV], like the entire veterans movement, is experiencing difficult days right now. Letters are coming in to our weekly about that. Small rooms have been sealed up in some places even in rayons far removed from the events of the putsch where local veterans committees are cooped up and they are being accused of supporting the criminal GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. Just what has happened and why?

[Malov] The notorious appeal of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War, Labor, and the Armed Forces and also of our committee on support of the creation of the so-called State Committee for the State of Emergency, which was published in some newspapers and, specifically, in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, played a fatal role. I called this appeal notorious because it was not discussed at the Soviet Committee of Veterans of War, at its presidium, or even at its presidium bureau. The system for subverting democratic procedures for the adoption of such documents that had been developed over the years was set into motion. Our Commission Deputy Chairman V.A. Danilov and Committee Secretary T.M. Bychkov were invited to the All-Union Council of Veterans Presidium Bureau session. Without any authority whatsoever from the SKVV, they agreed that the name of our organization would stand under the appeal mentioned above. That was on August 19. On that same day, SKVV Chairman Marshal of Aviation A.P. Silantyev, who agreed with this proposal, was informed about the decision adopted. He, like the others accused of the appearance of this appeal, was condemned in speeches at the SKVV plenum which occurred on September 13 and in the resolution they adopted for violating our veterans organization's democratic principles of operation.

In this situation, we can talk about the position of individual officials of our committee who approved the text of the appeal and the fact of its publication. The SKVV's ruling organs, I repeat, did not discuss it, did not adopt it, and already on August 22, the SKVV Presidium dissociated itself from the appeal at its expanded session and provided a correct assessment to the events that are occurring in the country.

By the way, after conducting an investigation, the USSR Ministry of Justice did not find sufficient grounds to take

the steps provided for by the Law on Public Associations with regard to veterans organization.

[Dynin] It turns out that some of the mass media, without looking into the situation, indiscriminately accused the veterans of war of supporting the putsch participants.

[Malov] Absolutely. How can you accuse all veterans if some of them were at the barricades near the White House and others, as veterans of the front know how, just as sharply opposed the GKChP. In any case, no one came out on the street in support of the putsch.

[Dynin] Many of our readers are writing precisely about this. But some of them think that rank and file veterans were let down by their leaders. A quite steady opinion exists that the generals and marshals who have ensconced themselves in the committees do not reflect the opinions of veterans and are remote from their concerns. For example, B.A. Tangochin, chairman of the council of veterans leading organization from Tavda of Sverdlovsk Oblast, writes: "I am reading the statement of the Moscow Oblast Veterans of War Section activists meeting. Whose meeting? The activists. And who are the activists? Generals, of course! And where is the opinion of the soldiers?" How do you, Aleksandr Filippovich, as the SKVV responsible secretary, answer the author of this letter?

[Malov] If you regard this issue purely arithmetically, than the author of the letter is correct. Of the 190 people on the committee, half are generals and admirals, only 15 are junior officers, nine are sergeants, two are partisans, and only one is a former private. You can call this a dominance of generals but you can and need to understand why this has occurred and occurs. I will name those people who have headed our committee. Marshals of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevskiy, Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskoy, General Pavel Ivanovich Batov.... They were decorated military leaders who knew not only our country but also the entire world and our organization has very great international ties.

I will name one other leader of our organization. This is Aleksey Petrovich Maresyev—a man with an unusual fate. He did not become a general but he was its irreplaceable responsible secretary for more than a quarter of a century from the day the Soviet Committee of Veterans of War was founded and is now the first deputy chairman. I do not think that we need to calculate how many marshals and generals, sergeants and privates there are among SKVV members. We need to talk about who and how to work for the benefit and for the sake of the veterans movement. And here there are many problems.

[Dynin] We all know that a conversation about them took place at the Soviet Committee of Veterans of War Plenum that just occurred where the situation that

developed in the veterans movement during the putsch and after it was discussed. Aleksandr Filippovich, how did the plenum proceed?

[Malov] Of course, it satisfied far from everyone in everything but the conversation was businesslike, direct, and sharp. The situation in the veterans movement is complex as it is in the entire country. For example, P.S. Bashnagyan, chairman of our section in Yerevan, spoke at the plenum. The republic, he said, is facing a fateful situation that determines the future of the Armenian people. And in this situation veterans cannot and must not stand on the sidelines while this problem is being resolved. They are meeting with the leaders of the republic and are writing open letters and appeals to the people. Their primary concern is to preserve the peace, strengthen friendship with our neighbors, and not allow a fratricidal civil war to flare up. Our committee must also live with these concerns. But the speaker correctly spoke about the fact that the leaders of the veterans movement do not manifest aggressiveness in these fateful issues, do little to help the sections in the republics, and rarely visit local areas.

[Dynin] Let me put the question pointblank. Will there be a Union of Republics? Will the Soviet Committee of Veterans of War exist in the form in which it exists right now?

[Malov] Together we scored the victory over Fascism thanks to our unity. Russians and Ukrainians, Belorussians and Armenians, and Uzbeks and Latvians fought in the same regiment and battalion and in the same company. All of them meet, mark the anniversaries of their units and large formations, and make trips to battle sites. And it would be a tragedy for them to attempt to divide veterans by ethnic apartments, to isolate themselves and, moreover, to begin to prove who was bolder, braver, or who endured the most misfortunes. The veterans movement must be united in any situation. Many speakers spoke about this at the plenum.

[Dynin] But nevertheless the main thing was the theme of the coup that did not succeed and the discussion of the position taken by the veterans of war leadership?

[Malov] This was precisely designated on the agenda. However, the speakers rationally linked the events of the August days with the fate of the entire veterans movement. The appeal noted above inflicted enormous harm on veterans' prestige. Therefore, the plenum participants unanimously condemned those leaders who manifested hasty, illegitimate, and extremely harmful zeal, and who, practically on their own initiative, supported the creation of the GKChP and the measures they planned. And it is impossible not to condemn this. I will cite word for word an excerpt from E.B. Nordman's speech: He said: "We need to protect veterans from the political strangulation that is choking us today and from the psychological terror against veterans that is at times reduced to loathing. And I understand those people who call lucky those people who died at Stalingrad because they did not

live to see the shame which we are compelled to endure. It was extremely difficult in 1941 but we lived with faith in victory and today, 50 years later, we have been robbed of this faith.... This is a concealed but clearly overlooked attempt to dump the guilt on the veterans and ensure the revanchism of the Banderovites...."

I will not comment on the speech, I will only say that these thoughts are not appearing by chance. Some of the mass media has pounced upon the veterans too much in concert. Someone wants very much to remove the veterans of the front from the political arena. Their principled nature and frankness suit far from everyone.

[Dynin] Aleksandr Filippovich, it is difficult for veterans today?

[Malov] It is not only difficult to live but also to leave life. Sverdlovsk Representative A.I. Malyutin said that 22nd Army Veteran and Veterans Council Chairman Aleksandr Petrovich Sirotin, a distinguished and respected man in the city, died at the end of August. They sent an obituary to VECHERNYY SVERDLOVSK newspaper but they refused it saying that the veterans supported the putsch participants. They accepted it only after the persistent attack of the deceased's wartime friends. These are the problems that we currently have to resolve.

[Dynin] And despite this, the plenum participants were in a fighting mood?

[Malov] This is the nature of the veterans of the front. The more difficult the situation, the more friendly and close-knit they are. I liked the thought expressed by V.I. Sinchilin, the representative from Belorussia. While speaking to the plenum participants, he literally said this: "We did not hide during the war years and all our lives we have proved our devotion to the people and we will remain such until the end.... We are obligated in this difficult time to apply all of our strength to help the country emerge from the crisis situation and first of all to assist our replacements—the generation that is growing up." Perhaps we can call this our program statement. The majority of veterans think so.

[Dynin] And what tasks will the committee resolve in the near future?

[Malov] Our tasks were quite precisely defined at the plenum. Marshal of Aviation A.P. Silantyev stated in his report that this year the country will mark the anniversary dates of many important events of the Great Patriotic War. Proper attention has been given to the feat of those who fought in the Brest Fortress, the 50th anniversary of the first Katyusha salvo has been noted, and the bravery of those who defended Moscow and Leningrad, Stalingrad, Odessa, Sevastopol, and other cities will not be forgotten. We are attempting to mark these dates in a businesslike manner, without the previous pomp, and with the involvement of young people and school students, bearing in mind the noble goals of patriotic education.

Right now we are conducting preparations for the impending conference of the Organization of Soviet Veterans of War. We need to discuss the draft charter of our veterans organization and elaborate the issues for improving mutual relations of the councils of veterans of various levels and regions while considering the realities of today.

But the most important thing is that we must strive to efficiently resolve the problems of social protection of veterans of war while considering all of the difficulties of the shift to a market economy. We need to strive to make "No one has been forgotten, nothing has been forgotten" a vitally effective slogan, not just a holiday slogan. Much is already being done in pursuit of this goal. Odessa Chairman N.F. Stafeyev, for example, said at the plenum that the city invited, and the city major warmly welcomed, more than 500 veterans of the front during the holiday on the 50th Anniversary of the Heroic Defense of the City of Odessa. And the city council allocated 300 rubles to each participant in the defense who lives in Odessa and did not complain about the R500,000 required to do this.

This is the kind of concern and assistance that we can only welcome. We all know that today pensioners are turning out to be the most impoverished people and society must not permit those people who saved the Fatherland during severe times and who defended the Homeland from the Fascist invasion to end up among the destitute.

Actions of Naval Personnel During Gorbachev Detention

92UM0079A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent A. Kosulnikov under rubric "Versions": "How the Flight to Foros Could Have Ended"]

[Text] Let me remind you: a special session of the Russian Supreme Soviet opened at ten o'clock in the morning on 21 August. B. Yeltsin informed those present that he had spoken with Kryuchkov that night by telephone and the latter had suggested setting off to Foros together to save President Gorbachev. The debates lasted around a half-hour and as a result Yeltsin was not allowed to go to Foros. This became clear closer to eleven in the morning.

At nine in the morning on 21 August Major-General Romanenko, commander of Red Banner Black Sea Fleet Coastal Units, summoned Colonel Kocheshkov, a naval infantry brigade commander, and assigned him a combat mission to seal off Belbek Airport and with the appearance of an aircraft attempting to make an unauthorized landing, to detain the aircraft and destroy it if there was resistance.

Translated from military to general civilian language, this means that the fate of an aircraft which had not yet taken off from Moscow had been predetermined.

Of course, other versions also are possible. For example, theoretically it is not precluded that the people at Belbek were expecting an airplane with commandos of some foreign state who had decided to stick up for the USSR President, or something of this sort. It is true that no one has as yet come out in favor of this version.

Investigators from a Russian Procuracy investigations team are working in Sevastopol and they will have the last word, but already today one can assume that there also was another plan in addition to an assault on the "White House." Arranging a slaughter in the very center of the capital really would not have been too wise. It was enormously more convenient to lure that same Yeltsin and someone from his party as far as possible from Moscow and there take them quietly. Belbek is a very advantageous place from this standpoint. It is far from the "White House." It was close to Gorbachev, who could be informed of what happened immediately and then given whatever demands you like. If someone raised questions, all the blame could be shifted to those who carried it out, 18-year-old children in black berets with Kalashnikov assault rifles in their hands—not one written order had been issued.

While Rutskoy and Silayev were readying to go to Vnukovo and were getting an "aircraft" for themselves, here is what was happening in the Crimea.

Forces—a company of the naval infantry brigade's 1st Battalion and then a reconnaissance battalion—were being drawn up to Belbek. Not lightly armed, of course—six banana clips for each assault rifle, seven armored reconnaissance vehicles, eight APC's, several boxes of grenades, and a loudspeaker on a truck to converse with the air space violators. Command tables were handed out; for example, the signal "Akula" [Shark] signified that it was the very time to open fire for effect.

CinC Fleet Admiral M. Khronopulo arrived at around three in the afternoon. At approximately that same time it became known that an aircraft with Yazov and company would land first.

A second aircraft appeared 30-40 minutes later—empty, as we now know. The assault riflemen at the airfield began getting nervous, but there was no command to attack.

Then followed our usual case of missed signals. The airport commandant came to Major-General Romanenko and handed him an order of the commandant's superiors to pack up and leave. It turned out that Belbek was subordinate to the Odessa Military District command and had nothing to do with the Black Sea Fleet. Romanenko protested and declared that he would not remove his people until a command came from his immediate superior.

While the chiefs were wrangling, the aircraft with Rutskey and Silayev already was flying south at top speed, clarifying en route where it was better to land—at Belbek or in Simferopol or at some other military airfield.

According to some information, three helicopters had been readied for the delegation in Simferopol to get it to Cape Sarych as quickly as possible.

And in Belbek people were seriously preparing to execute the command "Akula."

True, not without trepidation, since a television set was in good working order in one of the buildings on the airport grounds and many officers already had guessed what aircraft they would have to fire on. And everyone positively knew that it would take no more than ten minutes to turn the IL-62 into a blazing sieve. Moreover, there was no doubt that if just one shot came from any direction, the well-oiled mechanism would be triggered and the naval infantrymen would demonstrate in fact that which they usually demonstrated brilliantly in exercises.

By seven in the evening, when tension already had reached its peak, an order came by radio: "Remove everyone!" This meant that the strip was to be unblocked and the people hidden. The naval infantrymen concealed themselves. It was well that it was already fully dark, so Rutskey and Silayev, who landed 20 minutes later, noticed nothing suspicious. They had a word of greeting for N. Bagrov, chairman of the Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet, who already had been sitting for a long while in the airport headquarters shack, then settled into vehicles and quickly drove off. Naval infantry brigade scouts also returned to barracks.

Subsequently the entire operation was called "providing security for the Russian government delegation which arrived in Belbek Airport." To commemorate this, the brigade received an honor scroll from the CinC Fleet. Well, commendations too, as appropriate.

I was told about the events of 21 August by various people. Quite various—Sergeant Filippov, who at that time was a member of the brigade commander's security team; Captain Baranov, who commanded a special company of the reconnaissance battalion; and also Brigade Commander Colonel Kocheshkov himself.

It is interesting that while coinciding in the important point, the stories differed substantially in the details. For example, Gena Filippov disclosed that Kocheshkov planned to arrest all airport employees when they decided to unblock the airfield. And Andrey Baranov asserted that by no means all officers awaited the doomed aircraft's arrival with a natural shudder—some were ready to open fire, understanding full well at whom the barrel was directed. Colonel Kocheshkov denied this, noting quite correctly that his people performed their primary mission excellently. The defense of a strategically important installation had been organized in a

quality manner. For who knows who would be brought into the Crimea aboard an unidentified aircraft at such a troubled time?

Echoes of the August events can be heard to this day, especially in Sevastopol, where units which took part in the Belbek operation are stationed. Sergeant Filippov cannot get off details following the interview by the SOVETSKIY SPORT correspondent. Captain Baranov swore on his honor at an officer meeting that everything was just as he told it, but his comrades did not believe him. As a result the company commander, as he asserts, was reduced in pay to the level of a platoon commander.

Other adversities also were enumerated which came down on the heads of these still quite young people (Gena is 19 and Andrey 27), who in a heartbeat became such dissidents within their own unit. I listened to them carefully and constantly caught myself thinking that I did not at all understand: Was it really possible to bring persons to such a state of quiet hysteria, in which my companions clearly were, by such an unpretentious method?

Later I understood that it was possible.

Today it is not known who issued the order—obviously even Admiral Khronopulo was not the last link in the chain. The investigation will learn the particulars.

"The Black Sea Fleet did not take part in the putsch," said Gorbachev in his first press conference after returning from Foros. It is not known where the USSR President got such information, but to this day this phrase is quoted in Sevastopol at every step—true, is it possible to devise a better safeguard? Only one person suffered—that same CinC Fleet Khronopulo, who on the very first day of the mutiny had the imprudence to squeeze an appeal into the Fleet newspaper with a call to support the measures proposed by the State Committee for the State of Emergency.

The admiral was sent into retirement.

The present Army dissidents dream of sending at least some of those there who saluted on 21 August. Not because they are seeking cheap fame and not because they are offended; no, they simply and passionately do not wish to end up in such a villainous event once again.

Gennadiy Filippov and Andrey Baranov are resting hopes on the press for now.

...I think there is still one more person who should remember disgraced Spetsnaz company commander Baranov. On 19 August 1990 in Odessa his fighting men demonstrated their combat proficiency—they shattered vertical wooden logs and demonstratively captured something. One of the spectators liked the scouts' performance greatly and he presented Baranov as well as some of his comrades with officer watches.

The spectator's name was Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

INCIDENTALLY

According to changes in the USSR Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations proposed by the USSR Ministry of Defense, orders of a criminal nature need not be executed.

Korotkevich Discusses Missile Industry, VPK

92UM0020A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Petr Leonidovich Korotkevich by Yuri Shchekochikhin: "VPK (Bolsheviks): The Putsch, A New Version"]

[Text] His work was super-secret for three decades. A year ago, he slammed the Kremlin's door in order to cross the threshold of the White House on the night of August 19. Today, Petr Leonidovich Korotkevich, one of the creators of the "nuclear shield," will appear on the pages of the newspaper for the first time in his life.

We became acquainted quite by chance during that night—in the White House's underground radio studio. At that time, everyone was tired, tense, and therefore I probably did not understand at first what this man who had approached me was talking about. And honestly, initially I was even offended when I heard: "Yes, what is it about those secrets with which you are involved? They are really secrets!" What is that Mafia! The Mafia that I know about is a Mafia like any other Mafia.... "Just who are you? Can you tell me something?" I remember that I had asked, somewhat irritated. "Let us introduce ourselves.... Let us talk.... When all of this has come to an end...."—and I looked around the space: a young guard was sleeping in a childlike manner on the shoulder of happy Rostropovich who had become hoarse from the endless salvos of appeals to defend the White House to Sasha Poltkovskiy, the sergeant who was frozen at the doors with an assault rifle in his hands,—yes and certainly also that space which extended far beyond that almost unconverted studio for the direct air waves and beyond the walls of the White House itself, there, beyond Presnaya and Kalininskiy and beyond Sadovyy and Koltevy. There, there, in the future which suddenly, according to the will of several slightly crazy people, could once again be crossed out on one sixth of the earth's surface.

Although—but I learned about this quite a bit later—Peter Leonidovich Korotkevich had the grounds to be somewhat calmer than those who were less informed than he himself was at that hour of the night.

We met about two weeks after the putsch at his home. We talked for nearly five hours. The text, transcribed from a Dictaphone, took up more than 50 pages. I selected from it what appeared to me will provide answers to those questions which had not previously received answers: Why did the putsch begin? Why did unarmed people turn out to be stronger despite the participation in it of three leaders of departments that had weapons?

At the very least, today I have a new version.

So....

[Shchekochikhin] Petr Leonidovich, what did you think when you heard the first reports of the morning of August 19?

[Korotkevich] Who could have devised all of this? Who was leading it? Pugo? No, not Pugo. Kryuchkov? No, not Kryuchkov. Yazov? No, not Yazov. I understood that Baklanov was behind the putsch.

[Shchekochikhin] It was Baklanov?

[Korotkevich] My seven-year-old son said on that morning: "What have these fools done. And once again your Baklanov." This is how often the name of this man was heard in our home....

[Shchekochikhin] But as I recall, Baklanov was the only one who did not say a word at that press conference. I remember Yanayev's trembling hands and I remember Starodubtsev's answer to Bobin's question. But I do not remember Baklanov. I even have difficulty imagining his face.

[Korotkevich] This quiet, gray-haired man of few words knows how to keep silent. Initially, he was needed by certain circles as a minister and later they found him a job in the Central Committee Secretariat and made him deputy chairman of the Defense Council.

[Shchekochikhin] But who made him? Who prodded him to go up?

[Korotkevich] To do this, you need to go back—to Brezhnev and to the Dnepropetrovsk Group and to that arrangement of forces which existed at the end of the 1970's—beginning of the 1980's: this Kirilenko, who was simultaneously responsible for both personnel and defense, was in the Politburo and L.V. Smirnov, Council of Ministers deputy chairman and VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] chairman was in the Council of Ministers. And behind them were others who arrived from the Dnepr. You probably know a little bit about our specific conditions?

[Shchekochikhin] Only what I probably saw at military parades and what I read in newspapers articles that had passed through strict censorship.

[Korotkevich] That is understandable.... So at one time there was a State Committee on the Defense Sectors of Industry. Then its redistribution to the ministry was begun: the defense industry, medium machine industry, the aviation industry and, finally, the ministry of general machine building which was involved with a quite important matter—sea-, land-, and space-based missiles. In the 1950's and 1960's, a brilliant assemblage of remarkable designers appeared. Well, everyone knows Korolev.... Yangel (ground-based strategic weaponry),

Makeyev (all sea-based strategic weapons systems), Chalomey.... Yes and many, many more designers and major industrial leaders.

[Shchekochikhin] What was occurring at the end of the Brezhnev Era?

[Korotkevich] Cadre policy was violated.... People began to appear from nowhere, especially in cosmonautics. The more cosmonauts there were, the more of "us" there were in the Central Committee, the more stars the cosmonauts had, the more of them there were among "us" in the Central Committee's defense department. An illiterate leadership came into the Party structures which stopped listening to the advice of the experts. They looked for the people from nowhere and selected them as academicians in order to later cite the opinions of these academicians. And a profession appeared—the brother-in-law, which replaced the profession of Chief Designer.

[Shchekochikhin] Who, for example?

[Korotkevich] Semenov, Kirilenko's brother-in-law, who made a rapid flight up the career ladder and got the country involved in the adventure with SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]; Ustinov's brother-in-law who was involved with military lasers which did not, do not, and cannot exist. Shvernik's brother-in-law, Shcherbitskiy's brother-in-law [wife's sister's husband], and so on and so forth.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, the Party aristocracy began to be introduced into the holy of holies for you but, excuse me, what were you yourselves engaged in?

[Korotkevich] The prospects for development of a new generation of ground-, sea-, and space-based missiles.... And I was deputy chairman of the scientific-technical coordinating council of the ministries of industry's defense sectors and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[Shchekochikhin] And at that time, at the beginning of the 1980's, you encountered the fact that they began to place incompetent people on the Party Central Committee staff?

[Korotkevich] Caretakers arrived there. And they crushed everyone under them. The Central Committee's defense department—all of defense and the international department—all of USSR KGB.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, you want to say that the caretakers ultimately organized the August putsch?

[Korotkevich] The caretakers and the drunkards because only those people with drunken eyes can sign without reading the papers which they submitted for signature. It is these caretakers who reported to the caretakers a little higher up and those caretakers had already ordered where and in what programs to invest money. Science was not standing its ground and we understood that money was primarily needed for basic research. But the caretakers do not understand what science is. They see pieces of iron and they understand what they are but,

say, "a casualty and damage effect countermeasures system" [sistema protivodeystviya porazhayushchim faktoram vozdeystviya] is a dark forest for them. For some reason, expensive programs also arose which made no sense whatsoever.

[Shchekochikhin] Which ones, for example?

[Korotkevich] There was no sense whatsoever to develop the so-called SS-20, the medium and lesser range missile, when we had aircraft. Specific people who suited the "caretakers" secretly made the decision to develop and deploy these missiles. When Mikhail Sergeyevich says that we have reduced these missiles in Europe, he is silent about the fact that so much money was groundlessly spent....

[Shchekochikhin] And just how much?

[Korotkevich] Six hundred billion of that same money which could have been spent on the resolution of civilian tasks and on those same aircraft of which we have a catastrophic shortage....

[Shchekochikhin] Was SDI, that is, the "Star Wars" program, also a mistake?

[Korotkevich] Baklanov, at that time Minister of General Machine Building, his deputy—subsequently Minister Shishkin, Kirilenko's brother-in-law Semenov, Shcherbitskiy's brother-in-law Gubanov, and the RVPK [missile military-industry complex] leadership, relatives, etc. were behind the SDI program. Each saw himself in a new chair after SDI: Baklanov—as Central Committee Secretary, Shishkin—as the Minister, and Semenov—as a Chief Designer.

[Shchekochikhin] Explain, how was this program bad?

[Korotkevich] Only a fool could approve the PRO [missile defense] program to explode a projectile over Moscow and thereby insure a solution to the problem. But this is the main thing: do you know how many hundreds of billions of rubles were spent? For the development of a long-range missile detection system in order to have time... to warn the Politburo!

[Korotkevich] What-what? Are you serious?

[Shchekochikhin] I repeat: only so that the Politburo would have time to descend into a bunker.

[Shchekochikhin] And were you able to hinder Baklanov?

[Korotkevich] A draft, directed at developing a new concept of the development of strategic defense and that would have permitted a twofold reduction of expenditures, was submitted to the country's leadership, the General Secretary, and the Council of Ministers Chairman.

[Shchekochikhin] How?

[Korotkevich] I will not delve into technical details because they will not mean anything to the uninformed man. I will only point out that this would have allowed us to examine the entire plan for financing weaponry. What do you think, the question on the military budget has been raised to what level today?

[Shchekochikhin] The published figure is R96 billion.

[Korotkevich] R300 billion! R300 billion goes for the military-industrial complex and for maintenance of the army. And these are not simply the limits but limits reinforced with funds. We have talked about radical transformations.

[Shchekochikhin] You—who is that?

[Korotkevich] The major scholars and military leaders of the appropriate directions of the branches of the armed forces, and the commanders-in-chief. And it is these people who had joined this council in which I was deputy chairman and who, due to the nature of their activities, had access to the leaders of the Ministry of Defense and to Politburo members.

[Shchekochikhin] Excuse me, but if your program had been adopted, would it have attacked the generals and marshals who are currently in command?

[Korotkevich] Certainly. If we are talking about increasing combat effectiveness, then weapons of deterrence would have had top priority. But why do we have such a quantity of missiles which do not meet the elementary requirements of today's missions? Therefore, we need to exclude them from the weapons plan. If it is a question of creating a single strategic defense system, then the need for the existence of entire branches of troops is no longer relevant and Ministry of Defense structural changes are required.

[Shchekochikhin] Which, for example?

[Korotkevich] Yes, take that same PRO [Antimissile Defense], PKO [Space Defense], and UNKE [expansion unknown]. Take these same chemical defense troops and PVO [Air Defense] troops! Take this same civil defense! Why do we need these independent structures which are only involved with support? I am not talking about the fact that these troops are not needed but they must be presented differently today and all PVO aircraft must be transferred to the Air Force. That is precisely how our draft attacked the currently existing military districts of which there are three just in Ukraine when Belorussia gets by with just one. That is, this would be the shift of the army to a more professional level and for its reduction but not the buildup of the already enormous quantity of ground-based equipment and these iron bars. Do you understand the essence of our draft?

[Shchekochikhin] I only understand that, if I may speak frankly, that the number of generals would have been drastically reduced and I am afraid that they would not like that very much.

[Korotkevich] Not only the generals. We were arousing the entire military-industrial complex. Why would anyone become involved with conversion if the plant grinds out thirty missiles and does not know any misfortune.

[Shchekochikhin] Stop-stop.... When was your draft developed?

[Korotkevich] In 1989. At that time, they designated Baklanov as Central Committee secretary for the defense industry.

[Shchekochikhin] And he began to slow it down?

[Korotkevich] Baklanov is a product of the system, a brainchild of the military-industrial complex. But I ask you, do not confuse these caretakers with the highly-talented experts who work in our industry. They should not be accused of anything. We have become accustomed to curse the staff but they are not guilty. They are professionals, including in the KGB, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and VPK, but the CPSU Central Committee nomenklatura stood over them since the head of the directorate was already the Central Committee nomenklatura. They were former obkom first and second secretaries, instructors, and heads of Central Committee departments. This is the Partocracy elite which cannot itself do anything.

[Shchekochikhin] A caste, a class....

[Korotkevich] Yes, a caste which does not know and does not want to know anything but only carries out the order of some leader or other for whom it is one and the same thing to command this bath, this theater, or this Academy of Sciences. You certainly have met such people?

[Shchekochikhin] Sometimes it seems to me that I grew up with them since they so often flash into our lives.

[Korotkevich] Yes, that is it.... 1989, a new Supreme Soviet, which ceased being the Soviet under the CPSU Central Committee, appeared and although not a large but a percentage of people with common sense appeared who began to pose questions, why and for whose sake. They began to lie about this very R96 billion of the military budget... And our draft arose at that time.

[Shchekochikhin] In that same 1989?

[Korotkevich] Well, yes.... And how could it then be with what had already been signed and for which the resources had already been allocated? That same SDI for the Politburo? That is, what do we do with the elementary theft of state resources? We opposed: the commanders-in-chief, General Staff apparatus, and Ministry of Defense weapons directorate chief. Who began to impede the draft?

[Shchekochikhin] Certainly Baklanov, the father of SDI?

[Korotkevich] Yes, he.... The resolution had already been coordinated with everyone and approved by the State Military-Industrial Commission. And the Mafia opposed it. Yes, this very Mafia, the caretakers' Mafia, but nevertheless the Mafia. If you take billions and billions from the country and from the people every year under the guise of creating defense potential, and you make only what you need, you organize nuclear defense for yourself in order to just manage to crawl into a bunker, just who are these people? Common thieves.

[Shchekochikhin] Now I understand why it is part of this team of caretakers either ended up at the head of the putsch, like Baklanov, or supported it, like, for example, Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief Varennikov, of that same branch of forces which would have been reduced in accordance with your draft.

[Korotkevich] They did not support it. They both prepared and began it.

[Shchekochikhin] And what about Gorbachev?

[Korotkevich] It was difficult for Mikhail Sergeyevich. Proposals were coming in from various sides and various defense programs were appearing. But this Party Mafia, this junta, hung on his hands and feet.

[Shchekochikhin] But did you attempt to show him who was surrounding him?

[Korotkevich] I attempted to call him and I know that they reported my calls to him. The first time he did not answer, I got something the second time, and the third time I said that I needed to see him but later he had some sort of plenum and a congress.... In general, the man thought that he was on his own and the country was on its own.

[Shchekochikhin] You do not like Gorbachev?

[Korotkevich] It is painful for me to talk about all of this but I have many witnesses who heard and saw how I defended him in response to words that we could not expect anything good from him. I attempted to change their minds. Right now I see that they have turned out to be correct. Why did I pin my hopes on him so much? Well, because we certainly wanted to see in him what lay deep within us. We were attempting to ascribe to him what he did not have.

[Shchekochikhin] But at first, he did justify many of our hopes! At least those who wanted to hear what it was impossible to hear and to say what we were not accustomed to say?

[Korotkevich] What he did, he did, and no one will manage to diminish his contribution. He is a strategist and an unusual political figure capable of unwinding this flywheel. But there is only a five percent success rate to enter the institute. He still needs to finish the institute. And he needs other capabilities to do this. Those whose

ranks were higher could have helped him. But, obviously, he was shown that this is precisely how they began to interfere with him. Shevardnadze and Yakovlev.

[Shchekochikhin] You exclude the possibility that Gorbachev himself could have staged the putsch?

[Korotkevich] That possibility has been absolutely excluded. That is a different matter.... If the leader of a pack of wolves begins to limp, his pack will gobble him up. The strong Gorbachev became the weak Gorbachev when he replaced nationwide elections with elections of the Partocracy elite at the congress. In this, there was distrust of the people whom he planned to rule.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, the recoil occurred in 1990, at the congress, when he was elected president?

[Korotkevich] Yes.... At that time, these caretakers understood that Gorbachev was weak. At that time, I told Petrakov (he was still his assistant at that time): Advise Mikhail Sergeyevich to do what De Gaulle did.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, what?

[Korotkevich] He inscribed his name in gold letters in the history of prominent politicians when he himself established a quota for himself and if this quota was less than he had established for himself, then he would refuse to be president, even if he had been elected. Gorbachev decided that he must be elected by this, by his own congress, and then this pack of wolves began to stir. God is my witness, we attempted to help him but without seeing ourselves in the role of aides, we simply stopped going to the Kremlin, Petrakov left his office, and I founded a firm.

[Shchekochikhin] What, in your opinion, was the last drop that overflowed the cup of patience of the caretaker VPK?

[Korotkevich] It seems to me that our proposal to unite nine defense industry ministries with the Ministry of Machine Building and with the State Military-Industrial Commission, while eliminating the USSR Council of Ministers Business Management military-administration department, that is, to reduce this fanatical, unbridled Mafia to 700 people.

[Shchekochikhin] I think that both they and those generals whom we would have had to reduce, did not like it.

[Korotkevich] Naturally.... And they began to resist. The famous letter of 53 appeared. In December 1990. Analyze the names of those who signed it: Makashov, Baklanov, Varennikov, Rodionov, Semenov.... Prior to this, they had attempted to make Baklanov Premier. It did not pass. Well.... Let us find another method.... Let us demonstrate our power to the president and the Supreme Soviet.... Then specific actions occurred. The flywheel was started up and the process went on.

[Shchekochikhin] Later, after Yeltsin's election, the "Appeal to the People"....

[Korotkevich] Yes, intimidation occurred.

[Shchekochikhin] And then the putsch.

[Korotkevich] Thus, the putsch. The summit of their caretaker activities. This Mafia's first performance was on television. Yanayev, Pugo, Starodubtsev, and Tizyakov—the metalworker from the Ministry of the Aviation Industry—perform. Baklanov is silent.... He always preferred to remain in the shadows.

[Shchekochikhin] Yes, but even right now could he have been officially not part of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]?

[Korotkevich] He had to be a part of it because I think he was the primary guiding spirit there.... I worked with Baklanov for a long time and I understand all of his maneuvers and psychology.... He always told me: "You can solve all of your questions at the level of any minister, any commander-in-chief, but do not enter the Politburo".... Baklanov was accustomed to working in the shadows....

[Shchekochikhin] But this time he did not manage to sit in the shadows....

[Korotkevich] But—note—he did not say a word! And do you know why?

[Shchekochikhin] Why?

[Korotkevich] The future course of events most likely would have developed in the following manner. Blood would have been spilled for which Pugo, Kryuchkov, Yazov, and other direct executors would have been responsible. All of the guilt would have fallen on them—in any event they would have been arrested, having been accused of everything that had occurred. And then the figure of Baklanov would have emerged.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, you are nevertheless convinced that this putsch was Baklanov's affair?

[Korotkevich] If you break down this entire deck, then not even Baklanov personally, but that Party administration for which future development of democracy would be like death. Those representatives of the military-industrial complex for whom the military reform proposed by us was more horrible than war.... This putsch does not have any analogies in history. You cannot call it, say, a military coup, because the military did not want to take any kind of power. And recall Baklanov's words that were spoken to General Rodionov....

[Shchekochikhin] Which words? When?

[Korotkevich] IZVESTIYA cited them: "You," Baklanov told the general, "must take power in the country and transfer it to us, the civilians." Then he, or rather, Baklanov personally and he already knows how to be concerned about the army's needs.... For some reason at that time, on August 19, Baklanov could not remain on

the sidelines and he was obliged to be present at that press conference. Although he was silent....

[Shchekochikhin] So, on August 19....

[Korotkevich] In the morning, I called Deputy Minister of Defense Yuriy Alekseyevich Yashin. We have known each other for quite a long time when Yu.A. Yashin was still deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces. He is a very competent, serious expert, a doctor of technical sciences, and a major world figure. I drove over to see him and we discussed the situation. Our points of view coincided: yes, this is a coup d'état.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, disagreements in the Ministry of Defense leadership had already begun on the morning of the 19th?....

[Korotkevich] You recall that all of us required a certain amount of time to sort out the situation. All the more so that the information was blocked. And we had to collect our thoughts and arrive at conclusions on what was occurring and take some sort of emergency measures....

[Shchekochikhin] You—who was this?

[Korotkevich] I would say it like this. People with whom I had worked for many years and whom I infinitely trust. Incidentally, all of them were in opposition to the official military doctrine that was being pushed forward by the highly placed caretakers. The question arose, where is the president and how is he?

[Shchekochikhin] Incidentally, reports are appearing that Gorbachev had some sort of communications....

[Korotkevich] That is nonsense. I will frankly tell you.... But, there were other meetings and other conversations after the meeting with Yashin.... And now I can tell you that some of the defenders of the White House were in altogether different offices but their role in suppressing the putsch was enormous.

[Shchekochikhin] Although you yourself came to the White House....

[Korotkevich] This was already during the evening of the 19th.... I drove over, walked around, entered the Supreme Soviet, wandered through the various floors.... The situation appeared to be deplorable.... I caught sight of Kobets who was surrounded by deputies who were asking how they would take up a circular defense.... "What kind of help do you need?", they asked Kobets. "I do not know," Kobets answered. "Help however you can.".... I met with the head of Yeltsin's personal guard and with his aide, Lev Yevgenyevich Sukhanov. He was surprised to see me: "I would never have thought that I would see you here. So it is you, Petr Leonidovich!" "I waited—I did not wait, and I saw you," I answered him. Later, I went out onto the street and, do you know whom the people reminded me of as they all passed by the White House?

[Shchekochikhin] Whom?

[Korotkevich] I saw people in whose veins flows the blood of the militiamen who defended Moscow in 1941. Young people, women, children, and elderly people.... And Baklanov and company had already moved troops in echelons from all directions against them. Armored troops. With the most powerful reinforcements. Their numbers could be compared with those that were on the central axis during the battle on the Kursk- Orlov Salient. And against whom? Against the people who are going hungry themselves and who feed the army. And only one question stood before me: how to prevent and not permit this to happen? Each of us must do his own thing. I personally did not need an assault rifle. I needed a telephone....

[Shchekochikhin] Whom did you call first?

[Korotkevich] At around five o'clock in the morning, I returned home. I asked my wife to take our son and to immediately leave for the dacha.

[Shchekochikhin] Naturally, she feared for your safety?

[Korotkevich] Well, certainly, she began to object. I responded that for 30 years I have been creating what must serve the security of the state. And I will not be worthy of the rank of a man if I sleep in a warm bed. Later, I would be ashamed to look into my son's eyes.... At 5:30 a.m., I called Yazov. "The Minister is not here. He will be in at 9 a.m.," answered the duty officer. I told him to tell Yazov that I had called.... I dialed Baklanov's number so I could tell him everything that I thought about him.

[Shchekochikhin] And when did you see him for the last time?

[Korotkevich] Our last conversation on the telephone was very abrupt. I frankly told him: Where he was—there was utter misunderstanding.

[Shchekochikhin] And you managed to reach him by phone on the morning of the 20th?

[Korotkevich] Baklanov's aide told me that he was not there but the aide's voice was tense. It seems he understood what they had dragged him into.... I was once again at the White House at precisely 8 a.m. The situation had already cheered me up: there was no panic and each person was setting about his business.

A staff had been formed and professionals were running the staff. Information was constantly being transmitted about troop movements and their locations. In short, work was going on.... And work went according to the old plan: I called Yazov and then Baklanov....

[Shchekochikhin] Did they want to talk to you?

[Korotkevich] Yazov was not in. And I had a quite curious conversation with Baklanov's aide, Tsarev: "Where is Oleg Dmitriyevich?"—"In his office."—"With whom?"—"Alone."—"Connect me with him."—"He said that he will talk to you if you want to give him

some sort of information."—"What information are you talking about?". The conversation was occurring in sharp tones. Tsarev hung up the telephone. But I understood that if Baklanov was in this situation and was alone at this time, therefore, he was wracking his brain and was thinking about how to escape....

[Shchekochikhin] Petr Leonidovich, what was the meaning of your phone calls? To simply declare yourself?

[Korotkevich] They all knew me and they knew that I was their enemy. They had to understand that they had an opposition and that the opposition was quite strong.

[Shchekochikhin] But nevertheless you did not have a direct conversation?

[Korotkevich] I came to the conclusion for myself that I did not have anything to discuss with this fanatical fraternity.... By this time Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin had returned to Moscow.

[Shchekochikhin] The commander-in-chief of the Navy?

[Korotkevich] Of the Naval Forces.... This is a widespread error. Not the Navy but the Forces. Including the Nuclear Navy. I told Vladimir Nikolayevich: "How long will we endure the treachery of these caretaker-Partocrats?" How long will they make idiots of us and involve us in various adventures?" I sensed from the conversation that Admiral Chernavin completely agreed with me. There were more phone calls and conversations during the day.... In short, we all pursued the same goal.... Chernavin, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Maksimov, Air Force Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov, and Grachev from the VDV [Airborne Troops]. It is these people who ultimately determined whether or not the army would carry out illegal orders.

[Shchekochikhin] But they had Yazov, Moiseyev, and Varennikov....

[Korotkevich] You know, those people who led the central structures in the army and navy system ultimately decided the army's fate.

[Shchekochikhin] That is, one can say that they had tanks and you had—missiles....

[Korotkevich] Say.... After Gorbachev's arrival in Moscow, a version appeared that it was he who gave the order to withdraw the troops. This is a lie. On August 21 at 8 a.m., a Ministry of Defense Collegium was appointed and the collegium condemned the actions of its minister and did not obey the GKChP's orders. A decision was made at 9 a.m.: Rescind marshal law and withdraw the troops from Moscow beginning at 15:00 and report on the withdrawal by 24:00.

[Shchekochikhin] And the last questions. Can the putsch be repeated?

[Korotkevich] Well, it cannot be in the form in which it has already occurred. But it is impossible to eliminate those who were not in the forefront but were behind the scenes. The people who can lose everything that has ended up in their hands and which they do not deserve can once again attempt to use their chance. They still think that success was only temporarily lost.

[Shchekochikhin] Well, you yourself, what do you think?

[Korotkevich] I nevertheless think that everyone, including President Gorbachev, will extract lessons from the tragedy which could have occurred. Both for us and for the entire world.

[Shchekochikhin] And what will you do now?

[Korotkevich] I will help the Russian Government with all my strength

* * *

We know everything about our military industrial complex, about our VPK (that is how I want to write "VKP(b)"). That is, we do not know anything because only now, after the meeting with P.L. Korotkevich, have I understood why everything that was associated with him was blanketed in this secrecy—super secrecy! They told us: Those people across the ocean are beginning "Star Wars" and should we be any worse?! They convinced us: We will respond to their Pershings with our SS-20's! We did not ask either why or how much these thoughtless programs cost and how much we all will pay for them with empty shelves in stores and poverty in a very rich country.

We suspected that the all-powerful military-industrial complex is standing behind the August putsch. I think that the information that one of the creators of the "nuclear shield" brought to light for the first time today is an entirely conclusive version of what the all-powerful military-industrial complex did so that the putsch would fail. How paradoxical this sounds.

When I was listening to P.L. Korotkevich, a comparison from some remote, died away, and already written off era, came into my head: Right now in August 1991, the advantage of missiles over tanks has been proven just like when tank corps defeated cavalry squadrons. Although certainly this is an entirely different matter.

And they are sick of the caretakers' power. Just like all the rest of us. The actual military expenditures of R300 billion also weighed down on them—those people who also precisely saw the empty store shelves and the poverty—the only reality of socialism.

P.L. Korotkevich slammed the door a year ago. His firm Korben (the combination of two names—his own and his colleagues—hides behind the purely foreign name) proposes to become involved in purely peaceful business while using the entire rich experience of work for war.

And, in conclusion, this funny thing that happened several days ago. V. Korotkevich's firm Korben needed the firm Chayka for representation. They gave Chayka, which, as it turned out, until recently belonged to Ground Forces Commander Varennikov, to the firm. That very same person whose tanks rumbled down Moscow streets during those three insane days.

And possibly General Varennikov's Chayka caused another picture from another time in Petr Leonidovich Korotkevich's heart: Marshal Budenny's personal horse.

Moscow Mayor's Use of Military Aircraft Criticized

PM1111102591 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Nov 91 Second Edition p 3

[Lieutenant-Colonel V. Rudenko report: "Military Airliner for the Mayor"]

[Text] Many people probably recall the sharply critical articles about the use of military aircraft to transport generals, military leaders' families, and small military commissions. The articles noted in particular that, in conditions of acute shortages of fuel and people's sharply declining living standards, when the budget, including the military budget, is literally bursting at the seams, it is immodest, to say the least, to fly aircraft underloaded.

Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov and a group of people's deputies yesterday flew from Kubinka Air Base near Moscow to the city on the Neva [St Petersburg] to attend the "Vivat St. Petersburg!" festival aboard a Tu-134 (crew commander Major Isakov.) The aircrew coped successfully with the set task despite extremely adverse weather conditions. The Tu-134 landed at Pulkovo Airport after a flight lasting one hour and six minutes.

Official on Commission Proposals Abolishing Political Organs

92UM0033A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Oct 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, acting chief of the moral-psychological training directorate, by V. Semenov; place and date not given: "Do Not Ruin Someone Else's Fate"")

[Text] Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, member of the USSR Ministry of Defense commission charged with abolishing the military-political organs and creating combat training organs and structures to work with personnel in the USSR Armed Forces, answers questions from KRSNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Semenov] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, at the beginning of our conversation on a subject that, to judge from the reaction in the mail, is of concern to very many people, let me ask you a question that is largely personal in

nature: What is the post in which you have been serving since the tragic events of August?

[Stefanovskiy] On orders from the USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov I have been carrying out the duties of chief of the Moral-Psychological Training and Personnel Indoctrination Directorate. This was set up to replace the Main Political Directorate.

[Semenov] What does the range of your duties include?

[Stefanovskiy] It means nothing to say that we are up to our ears in work. We must complete the activity of the Main Political Directorate by resolving the fate of those who formerly worked in it. And also the political personnel and party workers in the various categories of the Armed Forces.

There is no doubt that at present, participation in the commission led by RSFSR presidential adviser on defense and security, Colonel General D. Volkogonov, takes up the lion's share of the time. It is a most responsible assignment. I am one of the cadre military-political workers called upon together with the commanders and representatives of headquarters and USSR and RSFSR people's deputies to shape an optimal model for the future structures that will work with personnel. So that the range of duties is multidimensional. But as the popular proverb says, adversity builds character.

[Semenov] What are the specific problems, the non-trivial ideas and approaches?

[Stefanovskiy] We must keep in view the fact that the decisive word goes to the USSR Ministry of Defense Collegium and the minister of defense, and not want to run ahead of events. But in my opinion, these are the factors that are well inscribed in the context of the present reforms. First, the need for an institution of professionals to work with personnel at the company to battalion levels, at the rank of aides to commanders. The commission members have also taken into account the fact that many junior officers from the former military-political structures could apply the energy of their minds and hearts here, naturally after re-certification. They are largely people who have neither enough service to qualify even for a miserly pension, nor an apartment. That is, the least socially protected.

The second position on which consensus has been reached, as it is customary to say, is the fate of the military training establishments. Training for psychologists, sociologists, lawyers, cultural experts, and other top-category professionals requires a fundamental recasting of the entire training system. To the point, the number of military-political schools is being significantly reduced. Only five, or even four, of the original 11 will remain. Of course, it is not a question of figures. It is of fundamental importance to exclude any buildup of theoretical or cultural ignorance to critical mass that would be felt with increasing acuity. And this means that we

must preserve the best traditions of the schools of the humanities and our intellectual forces.

[Semenov] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, it is no secret that people in various parts of the country, from the capital to the provincial backwaters, are awaiting with impatience the results of the commission's activity...

[Stefanovskiy] We are constantly aware of the concern that many servicemen are experiencing about their fate. Let me say that as soon as we give priority to common human values then we must relate to servicemen as those who have honestly served the motherland, sparing neither themselves nor their families as they carry out their constitutional duty. And I make bold to assert that this is an absolute majority. Neither is it out of place to recall that during the course of the bloody fighting in Afghanistan more than 60 percent of the company, battery, and battalion commanders who retired were replaced by political workers. They did not show the white feather but were worthy of their officers' commissions.

Unfortunately, some people in the press would like to depict all political officers wholesale, indiscriminately, as some kind of "bastion of conservatism." But this is not so. Of course, it does not fall within my competence to determine the affiliation of individual leaders with respect to the State Committee for the State of Emergency, even less their subsequent fate, before all the circumstances have been explained. That is a special subject.

But we must look at the truth squarely: There are many instances in which during the terrible days of the putsch, the military-political workers stood by the side of the units of assault troops, tank men, and motorized infantrymen, by the side of the soldiers. And they did everything possible on the streets of Moscow and at the walls of the White House to prevent the chance firing of some tragic shot. So that in that difficult hour of trial the Army showed itself loyal to the legal authorities and the presidents of the USSR and the RSFSR, and its unity with the people. Surely that must be taken into account?

Now about specific decisions of the commission. They require careful checking, an expert scientific review, if you wish. For what is occurring is a reform of the Armed Forces, and under conditions far from ideal on the economic and social planes. It is simpler just to report on how this reform is being carried out. But alas! We are sadly aware from our own history how things have turned out for the Armed Forces.

[Semenov] We have been talking about a new post—aide to the commander for work with personnel. The natural question is this: Will these officers not be a powerless and thus amorphous mass whose opinions can be heeded or ignored with a wave of the hand? Will we not have a stalemate situation in which there is too much responsibility and too little opportunity to do anything to provide guidance...

[Stefanovskiy] They are asking us these kinds of questions. What should we bear in mind? Aides, of course, will have the same rights as the deputy commanders. It is proposed, however, that under the new regulations the legislators will clearly define the functions falling within their competence. As far as duties are concerned, there are more than enough. It is will not be an easy job, that is already clear.

I would like to add something about social guarantees. The idea is to preserve for commanders' aides the staff-duty categories according to the military ranks and salaries of their predecessors. A man must have prospects and moral and material incentives for growth.

[Semenov] In some of the mass media they are making much of the subject of the transitional period in the Armed Forces. Readers of our newspaper are asking this: What kind of a period will this be, and will it not affect the fate of hundreds of thousands of line officers?

[Stefanovskiy] I suggest that in this case it is a question rather of the Army's transition to a new quality, a question of realization of the stages of military reform. Attempts to set rigid limits seem to me to be unproductive. The Americans, for example, have needed about ten years. And that is under their conditions. Will there be an officer to do personnel work in the subunits of a professional Army? Let us turn again to the experience of civilized countries. In the Armed Forces of the United States, they have two such people in a battalion, the officer dealing with social matters, and a chaplain.

[Semenov] About 80,000 military-political workers are finding themselves supernumerary.

[Stefanovskiy] If we want to be accurate, the figure as of today is 79,844.

[Semenov] What are the criteria that will be applied to define the service and professional suitability of an officer for duty in the new structures?

[Stefanovskiy] Even in our commission there are, so to speak, differing viewpoints. I believe that the dominant viewpoint should be professional training. There is more. Today, perhaps as at no other time, special demands are being made of the individual's moral-psychological and pedagogical qualities. And here it is difficult to overestimate the role of the Officers' Assembly in assessing the worth of candidates. It is perhaps the most democratic institution in our Army, and is called upon to be a guarantee against distortions.

[Semenov] How many officers will the new structures require?

[Stefanovskiy] I repeat that now it is possible to talk only about preliminary calculations, but they are being clarified. It is already quite clear that about 30 percent of the military-political workers, particularly at division level and higher, will have to be re-profiled to determine who has earned the right to a pension from the USSR Ministry of Defense, and who will be transferred to the

reserve. Three factors are being taken into account: age, years of service, and availability of housing. In each case the question is being considered on a personal basis. According to our predictions, 12 percent to 14 percent will fall in this category. After re-certification, some will be assigned to command headquarters, rear, or other duties. Those expressing a desire to transfer into the national economy will not be hampered from so doing.

[Semenov] Are you sure that all of the "former" people will find themselves in a permanent staff position with respect to service matters?

[Stefanovskiy] No one can provide 100-percent guarantees for all of them. Life itself will make a natural selection. But some of the regimental, battalion, and company elements will obviously be able to master new skills in work with personnel. It is rather more complicated with those who are higher up the service ladder. The future psychologists and social and legal experts will require a solid intellectual underpinning. It is being proposed that this be done on the basis of the USSR Ministry of Defense Academy for the Humanities and the converted military-political schools...

[Semenov] Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, could you tell us something about the reaction to the proposals from your commission among the troops?

[Stefanovskiy] The reaction is very distinctive. Judge for yourself. At first people were constantly telephoning us and writing to us. Ideas on the staff structure and the position of the new organs were being sent in from the officers' collectives at units and aboard ships, and from entire garrisons. Unfortunately, the initiative started to fade. Then they came in profusion—alarm signals about violations of legality. It is incredible but it is a fact that some leaders entertained bureaucratic ambitions and started to fulminate with thunder and lightning. Things got to the state of illegal removal to the status of "supernumerary." Salaries were withheld. Some people were removed from the housing lists...

And here I would like to emphasize the principled position of the chairman of our commission, Colonel General D. Volkogonov. We submitted proposals to the minister of defense and the chief of the General Staff. Appropriate instructions were drawn up to protect people against persecution and to prevent service or moral pressure. There have been cases in which members of the commission have traveled out to the localities and participated in the resolution of conflict situations. In particular, in the Northern Fleet. So that, by dint of circumstance, they have had to be involved not only in reform work but also to reach immediate decisions on each call of misfortune, and to put a stop to voluntarism and unlawfulness. It would be no bad thing to recall that winged phrase that says "consider the pain of others so that later you may deal with your own..."

[Semenov] In your opinion, what are the qualities that a specialist under the new formation, so to speak, should have?

[Stefanovskiy] We have already partially dealt with this problem. But I am by no means thinking about compiling some kind of register of "fine qualities." This is almost always arch. It is better, by taking advantage of the opportunity, for us to show preference for the wisdom of others, particularly since it is connected with the name of that outstanding military figure of Russia, M.I. Dragomirov, and is consonant with your question. Try first and foremost to inculcate in the soldier a sense of what military duty is, Dragomirov used to emphasize. Drill into his head the ideas of honor and honesty. Strengthen the nobility of his heart and the rest will follow. Self-affirmation is worth more than anything. It provides the strength to offer the ultimate sacrifice for the motherland.

You will agree that nothing better can be said on the subject...

Functions of Afghan Veterans Committee Explained

92UM0024A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Oct 91 First edition pp 1,2

[Interview with Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev, chairman, Committee for Internationalist Veterans Affairs Under the USSR Presidency, by A. Oliynik: "'Afghan Veterans' Must Stand Together Now: First Interview in the New Position"]

[Text] As reported in the press, Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev has been appointed chairman of the Committee for Internationalist Veterans Affairs Under the USSR Presidency by an ukase of M.S. Gorbachev, President of the USSR.

This name is well-known to our readers. There is also biographical information about Aushev in the Encyclopedic Dictionary under the title "Heroes of the Soviet Union." He is 37 years old. He was born in Kokchetav Oblast, Kazakhstan, where the Ingush who had been expelled from their own homeland were living at that time. Ruslan, as well as his two brothers Adam and Bagautdin, chose a military career upon their father's orders. Several hundred members of the ancient Aushev clan had fought on various fronts of the Great Patriotic War as enlisted men, but none of them had been an officer. And so Sultan Yusupovich advised his sons to enroll at military service schools. Ruslan graduated from the Higher General Military Command School and the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. He passed through many stages in his military career. He served twice in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. And he was wounded there.

Aushev's last place of service was the Far Eastern Military District, where he was deputy chief of the army's combat training section. In connection with his appointment to the position as chairman of the above-mentioned committee, he was assigned to the Armed Forces Reserves. He is married and has two children. Facile journalists have now dubbed him the "Minister for the

'Afghan Veterans'." But just what kind of a program can he propose with regard to the organizations of these internationalist-veterans? What will be the functions of the committee which he now heads up? It was with these questions that we began our interview in his modest office, located on the 18th floor of a building on Novoarbatkiy Prospect.

[Aushev] First of all, I'd like to mention the bitter figures indicating the losses which Soviet people suffered in performing their international duty beyond the borders of our Motherland. As you know, the fate of those military servicemen and all citizens who rendered military assistance to the people of Afghanistan was the most tragic. There were 14,454 persons who were killed in action or who died from their wounds, more than 300 missing, approximately 50,000 wounded, and 11,600 crippled or maimed. To these figures we must add another approximately 1,000 persons who fell in Korea, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola, and many other countries. That is the price which our officers and enlisted men paid in carrying out the Motherland's orders beyond her borders. Revolutionary democratic changes have finally brought nearer that hour when the society will be obligated to perform its own duty to them—to the young veterans and to those who have already become gray-haired, as well as to the families of those who have perished or are missing. And no changes in political or business conditions must cause us to forget—as some persons are already attempting to do—the magnitude of their sacrifices.

It is precisely such an understanding which defines and specifies the range of tasks confronting the Committee for Internationalist Veterans Affairs Under the USSR Presidency. And I'd like to place particular emphasis on what is, perhaps, the main one among them—working out and implementing a state social policy with regard to the internationalist-veterans. What I'm talking about here is not only the "Afghan veterans," but about all those who carried out an international mission during various years and in more than 50 foreign countries. As far as possible, our committee will likewise protect and defend the interests of veterans from the Great Patriotic War. I'd like to remark that in the future there should be a unified, integrated law concerning the interests of veterans of all wars. We will strive to achieve this.

[Oliynik] Ruslan Sultanovich, please tell us in greater detail about the functions of your committee, about its basic tasks and principal problems.

[Aushev] I've already told you about its main task. In addition to this, the committee will be providing for and working out All-Union and Union-republic programs for improving the everyday living conditions of internationalist-veterans and their family members. It will also be coordinating the activities of those state organs and public organizations concerned with developing international ties; working out and developing proposals with regard to forming new organizational and economic

structures; studying and disseminating experience, including foreign experience, in the sphere of veterans' social rehabilitation.

[Oliynik] The scope of this committee's future activity is impressive. However, won't your plans remain just something on paper...? A fundamentally new political situation has evolved in this country. With the aid of what mechanism will these plans be implemented, when nowadays there is no de facto Union, nor is it at all clear that there is even an integrated economic area...?

[Aushev] Yes, the processes now taking place in this country are also affecting our committee's activity. With growing alarm we note that during these complicated times, when some "Afghan veterans" constitute a stabilizing force, some of our other military friends—having yielded to a kind of blind, nationalistic poison and separatism—are doing just the opposite in several places; they are forming groups of militants.... Could it be possible that they have forgotten that violence and the shedding of innocent blood will not lead to anything good?

Now something about the mechanism with the aid of which we intend to form and implement a policy for the social protection of the internationalist-veterans. An inter-regional Coordinating Council is now being created within our committee; it will operate on a permanent basis. We assume that it will be a connecting link between our committee and the appropriate organs, public organizations, and associations in republics (or states) with regard to all problems of forming and implementing All-Union and Union-republic programs pertaining to everyday living conditions of internationalist-veterans.

[Oliynik] Let's turn again to the future state policy with regard to internationalist-veterans. What will it be based upon? What will constitute its foundation?

[Aushev] Our committee is not beginning its activity in a vacuum. Since 1983 this country's Supreme Soviet and government have already passed a whole series of decrees and ukases aimed at improving the everyday life of those citizens who have performed international duties beyond the borders of our Motherland. Six medical centers have been established under which sanatoriums have been redesigned. These include the widely renowned "Rus," which nowadays is the center providing prosthetic and orthopedic help to diasabled "Afghan veterans."

I consider that the Ministry of Defense should devote more attention to the problems of the internationalist-veterans. This was also stated, by the way, by delegates to the First All-Army Conference of Internationalist Veterans.

In accordance with a decision by the Second Congress of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Ukase by the President of the USSR dated 25 April 1991, this country's former Cabinet of Ministers quite recently

adopted a decree entitled "On Improving the Everyday Living Conditions for Military Service Personnel and Civilians Included in the Contingent of Soviet Troops in the Republic of Afghanistan, as well as for Participants in Other Local Conflicts Beyond the Borders of the USSR, and Also for Their Family Members." This decree has been in effect since 1 August of the current year.

[Oliynik] Are you talking about the state Union-republic program which took an unjustifiably long time to be worked out in the ministerial offices of the former Union?

[Aushev] Yes, precisely that one. Having failed to emerge for so long, it has already become obsolete in many respects. Because, of course, nowadays a new system of state relations is taking shape. The radical changes in the national-state structure require just as radical changes in the overall, future program. And our committee is specifically working just now on making sure that this program—in a considerably revised form—will still begin to function.

[Oliynik] Please tell us, if only briefly, about its basic directions.

[Aushev] This program provides for working out the status of an internationalist-veteran. Its five sections encompass the entire spectrum of the problems which are encountered by the internationalists and the families of those who perished. They comprise improving the material position, housing and everyday living conditions, setting up territorial centers for the vocational guidance and job placement of internationalist-veterans, including the disabled, and a range of other matters. Upon the proposal of the Ministry of Defense, portions were included in it reflecting the interests of those internationalist-veterans who are undergoing service in the ranks of the Armed Forces. In particular, there are plans to significantly improve their housing and everyday living conditions, medical and psychological rehabilitation, as well as instruction and job placement in connection with the reduction of the army. We place great hopes on the implementation of the present state program after the Union Treaty has been signed. Those persons who have carried out the Motherland's orders and shed their blood should by now be living in dignity; they should sense the state's constant concern for them; and this should not be after decades, as has happened in our history.

[Oliynik] And what kinds of plans do you have with regard to freeing Soviet POW's who—to this very day—are languishing in the torture-chambers of the Afghan mujahadin?

[Aushev] Our committee is taking practical steps and establishing direct ties both with the government of the Republic of Afghanistan as well as with the Afghan mujahadin leaders, with all the public organizations in our country and abroad which are engaged in this humanitarian mission. Now in the process of being

decided is the issue of setting up a presidential fund for ransoming Soviet POW's. We place special hopes on future talks with the mujahidin leaders. Because, you know, there are 306 families in this country whose sons are still missing on Afghan territory. We feel the pain of mothers' hearts just as if it were our own. And I will not breathe freely until we have ascertained the fates of those enlisted men and officers who are still missing in Afghanistan. Whether they are living or dead.

[Oliynik] One last question, Ruslan Sultanovich. Is there, in your opinion, any kind of threat to society on the part of the "Afghan veterans?" One hears this asserted more and more frequently by certain organs of the press.

[Aushev] It's a fact that these days the internationalist-veterans movement is one of the most significant phenomena in the country's public life. It possesses great political and moral authority and plays an increasingly noticeable role in those complex, sometimes critical processes which are occurring in many republics and regions. More than half a million persons, including 53,000 officers and more than 13,000 warrant officers, passed through the crucible of Afghanistan. On the Afghan land—scorched by war—they all came to know the true value of brotherhood in combat and internationalism. Under fire and in military formations nobody was overly concerned about what nationality the man next to him was, as they marched into battle. It is specifically the "Afghan veterans" in many regions of the country who have become that healthy-minded nucleus or core, around which rally likeminded persons, for whom the fate of the people and the fate of democracy are dear.

"Afghan veterans" were also in the front ranks of those who—during the anxious August days and nights—were on the barricades, protecting and defending the "White House." One of them—Dmitriy Komar—perished and was posthumously awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union." Recently, together with USSR people's deputy, Colonel General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, I became a witness to a situation in Groznyy, whereby inflamed passions almost led to the shedding of blood. It was specifically the "Afghan veterans"—Chechens, Ingush, and Russians—who played a definite role in stabilizing the situation in Checheno-Ingushetia.

Nevertheless, there are also some other alarming facts. More and more frequently now certain political leaders and specific forces in a number of regions are attempting to win the "Afghan veterans" over to their own side. Here and there they use them to form a unique kind of military fist for the purpose of achieving their own goals or to seize power. They also recruit into the ranks racketeers, the bodyguards of Mafia "godfathers," etc. We must not allow this to go on. During these times which are so difficult for the country the "Afghan veterans" must stand together; they must not yield to provocation; nor must they be influenced by political adventurers.

Our committee will wage an unceasing struggle (I'm not afraid to use that word) for the honor and dignity of the "Afghan veterans," of all those who—in various years—carried out an international mission beyond the Motherland's borders. And from time to time, as it was before, we will continually form a policy of having an attitude of respect for them in the society.

[Oliynik] Ruslan Sultanovich, in this matter KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is of one mind with you.

Military Train Unloads Near Tallinn

92UN0313B Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
31 Oct 91 p 1

[Unattributed BNS Release: "Big Shipment of Military Equipment Arrived at Klooga"]

[Text] The Soviet authorities have not notified the government of Estonia about the arrival of an echelon consisting of military equipment and personnel at the military complex of Klooga.

The echelon consisting of 54 railroad cars arrived in Tallinn at 6 o'clock yesterday morning, and proceeded from there to Klooga. Railroad traffic dispatcher Madis Oiglane told the BNS [Baltic News Service] correspondent that the train consisted of 47 platform cars with military equipment, six cars full of men, and one special car. The military unloaded the equipment at Klooga. Madis Oiglane said that the train came from the direction of Petseri or Pskov.

The word from the press service of the RE [Republic of Estonia] Police Administration at noon was that they have not been notified of any military movements. Andrus Oövel, executive director of Estonia's State and Border Defense Office also did not know anything about the military equipment arriving at Klooga. The same answer was given to the BNS by Toomas Puura, head of the State Defense Department. He mentioned that, recently, the Soviet army has been keeping the Estonian government informed of any of its moves. Ants Laaneots, deputy chief of general staff for the RE defense force, confirmed that, according to the agreement made between Edgar Savisaar and Soviet defense minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the army would have to notify the government of the Republic of Estonia of all of its moves made within the territory of Estonia. If additional military equipment and personnel were indeed brought in to Klooga yesterday, this act would constitute a violation of the agreement.

The duty officer at the Tallinn headquarters was aware of the echelon's arrival in Estonia, but refused to give any more information to the BNS. "It's a military matter" he said.

Military Forest Ownership Discussed

92UN0218D Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian
4 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Jüri Liim: "Military Forces, Get Out of the Forest!"]

[Text] On September 22, 1991, Tõnis Kaasik, Minister of Environment, and Harri Ounapuu, Economics Minister, issued regulations regarding the occupation of forest clearings on illegally expropriated lands.

Here are some excerpts from these regulations:

- To stop the occupants of illegally expropriated forest land from segregating and distributing the main forest clearing areas, except for "seisukorralangid kahjutuskolletes" [translation unknown].
- To cancel the corresponding permits for clearings.
- To stop the segregation and distribution of new light and air clearings on above-mentioned lands.
- The use of forest lands by these occupants, which is at variance with the decision made on June 20, 1991, by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia regarding the application of property reform laws and the current regulation, is deemed illegal and the occupants will be held legally accountable under current law.

* * *

This regulation should apply to all Estonian forest lands, including the areas occupied by the military. Unfortunately, however ...

On August 29, the Supreme Council passed a resolution concerning establishments, enterprises and organizations which are located on our land and which will be under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Estonia. Based on this, it was decided at the August 30 meeting of the management of the forestry bureau to form a commission (headed by Aleksander Leemet), that will take steps to bring forests, forest lands and forestry real estate occupied by the Army and Navy of the Soviet Union under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Estonia.

The commission was assigned the task of formulating written rules on the following: The forest, forest land and forestry real estate located in the Estonian territory and occupied by military forces; functions for taking over the management of forests and our control over them; future work stages; forest management system. The commission was to formulate a bilateral report by September 16.

On September 2 Aleksander Leemet telephoned Comrade Frovola, chief forester of the military forestry division No. 241 (on the peninsula of Pakri), who replied that he did not have the required authority and that he had to talk to Admiral Belov. The head of the commission asked him to do that and to come on September 6 to the forestry bureau to sign a report for future tasks. The same notice was given also to Comrade Lepilin, chief forester of the Pavlovski military forestry division (in Kõrvemaa). On the indicated date, only the latter arrived and informed the commission that he did not have any authority to respond to said questions. It was suggested that he obtain the needed authority.

On September 9, the commission sent to said organization an invitation, by certified letter, to meet on September 16. On that day it was planned to propose that they prepare documentation for handing over the areas and, also, that they cease selling lumber and other forest products until the land and property is handed over to the forestry bureau.

No one came to the meeting. On the same day, a new date of September 23 was announced by telephone message.

On that day, a letter from chief forester, Comrade Frolova, arrived at the forestry office reading as follows: "I turned to the higher organs in Moscow. They notified me that, because they have not received instructions from the Ministry of Defense to hand over military forestry division No. 241 to the Republic of Estonia, nothing can be done at the present time."

Also, the representative of the Pavlovski division of forestry, Comrade Lepilin, informed the forestry bureau that the military district of Riga had not received any orders from Moscow. He added that orders from Moscow usually reach them in half a year.

The forestry bureau commission found that their work came to naught, because there simply were no negotiation partners. The regulation of the Estonian forestry bureau cannot be implemented without the help of government. It was decided to propose to the latter that they add this topic to the agenda for discussions with the Defense Ministry of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

It is unlikely that the general public knows about the activities of "godfathers" in Kõrvemaa in sovietizing place names. We have the OSTROVNOJE, PRIMORSKOJE, PAVLOVSKOJE, DUBROVSKOJE and VISNEVSKOJE forest districts, that encompass, respectively, 7,100, 17,600, 13,700, 13,400 and 5,700 hectares. This comprises the Pavlovski forestry division. To this we should add the hectares of the separate military forest district No. 241—7,300—and we have all together 66,800 hectares.

All this land is in the possession of the military forest district. At the present time, an attempt is being made to account also for forests and forest lands at the disposal of military units of which we lack precise data. Mr. Leemet believed that, all together, more than 70,000 hectares could be at the disposal of the military.

Forests are the property of the Republic of Estonia, which were taken over by military force. The treatment of our wealth by the latter is completely unacceptable to us - the manner in which it is being cut down and carted away. Trees are being cut even on those lands which are being reclaimed by owners. I remind again the inhabitants of Kõrvemaa and other areas that the Red Army is playing master in their homes: **BE SURE TO PREPARE SWIFTLY AN APPLICATION TO RECOVER YOUR FARMS AND LANDS**, because saws are industriously whining there. Their median yearly plan foresees cutting of select trees at the rate of 6,500 cubic metres, and all trees at the rate of 35,000 cubic metres. Almost all of this will be taken from Aegviidu-Tapa range and, as usual, always thick pine trees.

A few days ago, they began to cut thick primeval trees in the forest near Oru farm (associated with the novels of

Tammsaare and from which stems the prototype of Kõrboja Anna). This was done arbitrarily by officers from the tank division.

The situation is out of control, because the Republic of Estonia and its rights are not acknowledged. The forest bureau functions almost secretly, otherwise they cannot get any information concerning this activity. With this covert action, they have discovered that 6,213 cubic metres of forest products are being exported. In this connection, it is very difficult to control the export of boards, because the military give assurances that "they are sawn from logs brought in from Russia."

We have information that the military has received licenses to export forest products. This is of interest to all - based on which friendship pact?

We must put an immediate end to this role of playing master in the territory of Estonia. The government of the Republic of Estonia must take quick and resolute action to that end. Until then, the axes and saws will be busy and trains and cars will be rolling toward the Soviet Union filled with green gold.

Problems Facing Estonian Army Draft Cited

PM1411164991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Nov 91 First Edition p 2

[Captain Second Rank V. Ivanov report: "Estonia: National Army. What Is It To Be Like?"]

[Text] Young people born in the years 1965-1973 have begun to be drafted for active service in the Estonian Army. Unlike the Soviet Army draft which is carried out over a two- or three-month period, the selection here will drag on through 1 March of next year. The plan is to draft 3,500 men to start with.

How will they be assigned to the branches of the army? T. Puur, department head at the state chancellery for the protection of the state and its borders, reckons that 1,800 people will be sent to guard the state border, 1,450 will form the bulk of a police brigade, while the remaining 250 will be sent into the rescue service.

The founders of the Estonian Army face a host of problems. Primarily, how to develop the material and technical base. Last month an agreement was concluded between the Estonian Government and the USSR Defense Ministry whereby some Soviet Army property will be handed over to Estonia. But that will only happen after the Soviet Army has pulled out. It emerges from the Estonian press that the local military occupy roughly 30 percent of military bases. Border guards in Ranniku [name as transliterated] have currently agreed to hand over their barracks. The civil defense regiment's Kohtla-Järve base will be handed over in November. Subunits of the Estonian rescue service will be based there. The military-political school in Koosa will be wound up as of 1 January 1992, but for the time being even the head of the state chancellery for the protection of the state and its

borders does not know what will happen to it: He does not know how long it will take to abolish the school, or whether the USSR Defense Ministry will sell or simply hand over its real estate.

The army and citizenship are a separate issue. It is known that there are 11,000 draftees among young men born in 1973. Roughly 60 percent of them are non-Estonian nationals. The question of these people has not been finally settled as yet.

Those who are studying at military higher educational establishments outside Estonia can return and "obtain work," since the republic needs officers. Admittedly, you will be able to hold an officer's position if you comply with at least two conditions—Estonian citizenship and knowledge of the language.

Liepaja Officers Suggest Solution to Discharge Problems

92UM0073A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 91 First edition p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "The Baltic Area": "For the Servicemen—Passports of Citizens of the USSR"]

[Text] Officers of the Liepaja Garrison offer their plan for solving the "military problem" to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Commission for Talks Between the USSR Delegation and the Latvian Republic.

The issuing of passports of citizens of the USSR to officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers is the first point in the proposals for providing them with social protection. Beyond that, service in the Baltic area should be equated to service abroad, with all the attendant legal provisions.

Release into the reserve or transfer to a new station outside the Baltic area is forbidden before the appropriate social conditions have been created for this. The priority measures proposed include transferring to the personal ownership of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, and extended-duty personnel who have served at least 15 calendar years, the housing they occupy from the housing pool of the USSR Ministry of Defense. If the housing is relinquished, however, the USSR Ministry of Defense must provide either an apartment in the area of choice or a loan for building a co-operative or separate home. The rate of compensation would be 75% of the cost for those with 15 or more years of service, a full 100% for those who have served 20 years or more.

Officers of the Liepaja Garrison also raise the issue of duty-free removal from the area of the belongings of families of servicemen, as well as retirees from the USSR Ministry of Defense and employees of the Soviet Army.

One point in the solution proposed by the officers' assembly of the garrison units states that the pay must be

increased 2.5-3-fold. If, however, an officer or warrant officer (seagoing or shore-based) announces that he does not wish to serve in the Baltic area, he should have the right to transfer to another area of the USSR or to be released into the reserve with a minimum of 30% of his pay (those who have served at least 12.5 years).

This plan has been submitted to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Commission for Talks With the Latvian Republic with a request that it be included in the document package. The officers' assembly at the Liepaja Garrison expects to be kept thoroughly informed on the course of the talks.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Wants 'Civilized Divorce'

PM0811121991 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 3-10- Nov 91 p 9

[Text] The Ukraine's Defence Ministry occupies four floors in the building which formerly belonged to the Ukraine's Communist Party Central Committee. The Ministry's staff consists of 40 men, including three Major Generals, 12 Colonels, seven Lieutenant Colonels, four Majors, and one Captain. It is hard to believe that this small ministry on the roster of the USSR Defence Ministry can really be in control of matters.

Says General Morozov: "Our ministry is tackling the task of providing prerequisites—in the spheres of law, military science and personnel placement—for the earliest possible creation of the armed forces of the Ukraine as a guarantor of the Republic's sovereignty and security. We must develop a legal basis facilitating a civilized 'divorce' from the USSR Defence Ministry. The current complicated situation in the country and the world at large proves that no sovereignty is possible without its guarantee by a potent modern armed force. Lenin was right that a revolution is worth something only when it can protect itself."

[Spektor] What are the basic principles of the future Ukrainian armed forces?

[Morozov] The Ukrainian armed forces will be at the service of the Ukrainian nation rather than a political party. In other words, the army will be free from ideological pressure. Full use will be made of patriotic sentiments and the traditions of the national-liberation struggle in the building of the armed forces. The officers must be aware of their involvement in the making of national history. I mean the officers who will remain at the service of the Ukraine, which has always been regarded as a perfect place to be stationed.

[Spektor] Who, in your opinion, will make the officers corps, and what is the expected strength of the Republic's army?

[Morozov] I predict that some of the officers of the Ukrainian army will be motivated only by the chance to remain in the prosperous Ukraine, rather than by their

Ukrainian patriotism, particularly if they can get a flat and a highly remunerative post. Such men would serve any regime, even that of Saddam Husayn. This is a regretful spin-off of the largely inadequate system of moral education in the military. We must do everything to avoid an explosion of social unrest provoked by the military's dissatisfaction at their insecure situation and changes in society in general. The Ukraine will soon receive the 50,000 servicemen to be withdrawn from Germany. Last year the Republic received large numbers of troops formerly stationed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Ukraine's Defence Ministry and the Supreme Soviet, as well as the majority of political parties and movements, are fully aware of the complexity of the problem. It is now believed that it would be wiser to suffer huge military spending for the maintenance of excessive armed forces rather than press on with the unavoidable process of cuts in the armed forces (the Ukraine's armed forces are expected to number 200,000-450,000 men and officers). Only officers who have served the required quota of years to make them liable for a good service pension and who have good flats of their own will be discharged. This option will bring least dissatisfaction.

[Spektor] Will the army have ethnic units?

[Morozov] We don't have plans for any. Everyone who wishes will be able to enlist in the Ukrainian army without much difficulty. However, it is going to be tough for the USSR army to do without Ukrainians unless the strategic defence forces are formed on the basis of consensus and the strategy of manning the armed forces is modified.

Reports on Creation of Independent Military Establishments

92P50047

[Editorial Report] The following list consists of reports published in the FBIS Soviet Union Daily Report between 14-20 November relating to efforts by various Republics, and the Baltic countries, to create independent military establishments.

BELORUSSIA

REPUBLIC ESTABLISHES MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1702 GMT 16 Nov 91
Soviet Union Daily Report 18 Nov

PARLIAMENT AGREES ARMED FORCES REQUIRED
Moscow INTERFAX in English 1759 GMT 15 Nov 91
Soviet Union Daily Report 18 Nov

UKRAINE

DEFENSE MINISTER REMARKS ON NATIONAL ARMY
Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Nov 91 Union

Edition

Soviet Union Daily Report 15 Nov

SUPREME SOVIET DISCUSSES CURRENCY, ARMY

Kiev Radio Kiev Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 15 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 18 Nov

MINISTRY REVIEWS CREATION OF NATIONAL GUARD

Moscow INTERFAX in English 1217 GMT 19 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 19 Nov

ANOTHER CALL-UP TO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE

Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2152 GMT 18 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 19 Nov

COSTS OF PLANNED ARMY EXAMINED

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Nov 91 p2

Soviet Union Daily Report 19 Nov

ESTONIA

DEFENSE SERVICE DRAFT MIRRORS USSR LAW

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 91
First Edition p1

Soviet Union Daily Report 14 Nov

LITHUANIA

ARMY STARTS DRAFT IN SILUTE RAYON 12 NOV

Vilnius Radio Vilnius Netowrk in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 12 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 14 November

MOLDOVA

PRESIDENT NATIONALIZES SOVIET ARMY PROPERTY

Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1535 GMT 14 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 15 Nov

REMOVAL OF WEAPONRY BANNED

Moscow INTERFAX in English 2000 GMT 14 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 15 Nov

PRESIDENT SIGNS MILITARY SERVICE DECREE

Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 gmt 14 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 15 Nov

GEORGIA

FOREIGN MINISTER ON RECOGNITION, ARMED FORCES

Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0200 gmt 14 Nov 91

Soviet Union Daily Report 14 Nov

NATIONALIZATION DECREED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 Union
Edition
Soviet Union Daily Report 14 Nov

**BORDER TROOPS, NAVAL PROPERTY NATIONAL-
ALIZED**

Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1010
GMT 19 Nov 91
Soviet Union Daily Report 20 Nov.

**ODESSA TO ACQUIRE NATIONAL GUARD 'SUB-
UNIT'**

Moscow Central Television First Program Network in
Russian 1300 GMT 13 Nov
Soviet Union Daily Report 20 Nov

AZERBAIJAN

SOVIET MILITARY UNITS TO BE INVENTORIED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 91 Union
Edition p1
Soviet Union Daily Report 14 Nov

ARMENIA

**PARLIAMENT DENIES NATIONALIZING ARMY
WEAPONS**

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Nov 91 Union
Edition p2
Soviet Union Daily Report 19 Nov

KYRGYZSTAN

NATIONAL GUARDS TO BE FORMED

Moscow INTERFAX in English 1838 GMT 18 Nov 91
Soviet Union Daily Report 19 Nov

Problems of Computer Viruses and Information Weapons

92UM0017A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
05 Oct 91 First edition p 3

[Article* by Capt A. Vladimirov, junior scientific associate, under the rubric "Top Secret": "Information Weapons: Myth or Reality?"]

[Text] So-called "logic bombs" [logicheskiye bomby] were installed in the French air defense systems sold to Iraq, which made it impossible to use these systems against the multinational force during combat operations in the Persian Gulf area.

An American missile went off course and was blown up at a command from ground, because a "1" instead of a "7" was indicated in its computer program.

The Soviet spacecraft Fobos reached Mars but did not carry out its mission. A single letter was omitted from the signal sent to it, which produced a false command to switch off the orientation system.

What do these three incidents have in common?

The effectiveness of electronic computers depends upon the quality of the software. Defects in the form of incorrectly written sections of programs frequently result in a complete breakdown of the systems, as we can see from the examples above. And consequently, in accidents and disasters.

Bugs in the software for the combat control of strategic missile launchings can have unforeseen consequences.

The amount of software in military systems has recently grown scores of times over, and a program contains hundreds of thousands of commands. The scientists have concluded that it is impossible to create complex programs without defects. No developing organization can guarantee (nor does any guarantee) absolute reliability of the software it provides. Does this mean that we are planning for future accidents and for losing in possible military operations?

The SDI program is a brilliant example of the influence of reliability of software on military systems. According to the most modest estimates the programs for its combat command and control subsystem will have to be up to 2×10^{11} lines long, and the number of bugs could reach 5×10^3 . The elimination of this number of defects will possibly require more time than the total required to write the programs, which will amount to 10^{10} man-hours. At the present time it is practically impossible to eliminate this number of defects, which means that the behavior of the entire antimissile defense system will be unpredictable.

Sabotage bugs substantially exacerbate the problem of quality and reliability of software. "Information weapons" [Informatsionnoye oruzhiye] are regarded abroad as one means of conducting warfare. These are systems

of specific data-base devices designed to destroy the enemy's information assets. Certain types of these "weapons" are discussed in the foreign press. The "logic bomb" is a program which is activated at a certain signal or at a preset time, destroying or distorting information. A "program virus" is even more destructive, since it can produce "logic bombs" and insert them into interacting information nets. The "Trojan Horse" is a program whose introduction provides secret access to enemy information, "a neutralizer of test programs" for revealing random or deliberately installed bugs in software. In addition, there are various kinds of deviations and bugs deliberately incorporated in software by the individuals preparing it. Certain of these have undergone practical testing.

"Information weapons" pose the greatest danger because their use is impersonalized and is easily disguised as steps to protect the copyrights and patents of companies. When a large volume of programs are prepared, it is not difficult to create sections with several commands in each, which, when the antimissile defense is operated, can be turned into any type of bug. Programs bought abroad and used in Soviet development projects can perfectly well contain such bugs. A special service called Computer Virus Countermeasures has been set up for this purpose in the USA. It engages in the introduction of bugs into the software of likely enemies. All of this makes "secret war" plans more realistic and erases the line marking the beginning of an attack, advancing the surprise factor to the forefront.

More than 150 scientific research organizations are at work in the USA to protect its own data bases. The problem is placed at the level of national security, a fact borne out by presidential directives. A directing group on security of communication systems, electronic computers and automated information systems has been set up in the National Security Agency. Specifically, the development of measures is assigned to the Security Agency and the Computer Security Center. One billion dollars is allocated annually for developing means of protecting information from various bugs (including viruses), more than 1.5 billion is allocated for technical protective means, and 2 billion is allocated for protecting data transmission nets. Losses resulting from information thefts and disruption of the functioning of electronic computers reached 3 billion dollars in the USA in the '80s and around 30 billion in Western Europe. The number of open articles on problems of reliability and security of antimissile defenses has recently been drastically reduced in the foreign press. One can conclude from this that the work is becoming classified.

An insignificant amount of attention is given to this matter in the USSR. There are no laws establishing liability for removing or destroying data in electronic computers and no state standards or other normative documents defining the necessary quality of software provided by the developers for the military systems.

The contemporary political and economic realities are further exacerbating the problem. The altered composition of the Union casts doubt upon the existence of a single strategic military territory and consequently, a single information space, which can lead to the employment of "information weapons" directly through the information nets within the nation's territory. Heightened demands will be set for the quality and reliability of those systems which remain in the arsenal following the reduction, including the software. A consistent trend to standardize weapons (a progressive undertaking from the standpoint of cost) is making software more vulnerable. All weapons of the same kind have absolutely identical copies of programs with absolutely identical bugs. Just one of them, either random or deliberate, can put out of action all weapons or command posts of the same kind.

Add to this the increasing complexity of the software and its increased presence in the latest weapons, the decline of the development system (the decline in the skills of the personnel due to the "brain drain" to organizations with higher pay and the deterioration of the tool base due to financial difficulties), and the massive importation of foreign computers and programs, which increases the possibility of the introduction of deliberate sabotage defects.

Will it not turn out that, even though we possess the most modern equipment, we will be unable to use it for its designated purpose? To prevent this from happening we need to develop and introduce a security system for software for military systems. What will this require?

We must pass a law protecting information. The need for one will become even more acute with the start-up of computer nets. We need to work out and begin producing a state scientific research program to work on problems of quality assessment, reliability and security. We need to work out a system of scientific and technical documentation governing the development, the testing

and functioning of software for these systems from the standpoint of quality and security. We must create a single state system for the protection, quality control and reliability of software with representation at the government level. We must begin building a network of state certification centers.

Some things are for the future, but some need to be done right away. One thing is indisputable, however. Today we are getting by with too few computers (according to world standards) and relying mainly on the experience, knowledge and enthusiasm of commanders. In the future, however, we shall have electronic computers at every level of command and control and in the vast majority of weapons. We shall therefore need, as much as the air we breathe, reliable programs and means of command and control protected against any kind of enemy action.

Footnotes

1. Based on articles in the Soviet and foreign press.

New Russian Defense Sports Group created

*LD1111180191 Moscow TASS in English 1743 GMT
11 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow November 11 TASS—The Russian Justice Ministry has registered, in keeping with the law on public associations, a new Russian defence sports organisation. Registration certificate number 350 was presented today to the organisation's chairman Major-General Aleksey Anokhin.

The Russian defence organisation pursues the purpose of preparing the working people, in particular the younger generation, for defending the homeland and working for the good of the country.

Tactical Use of Maskirovka, Simulation

92UMOO48A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 8, Aug 91 pp 42-45

[Article by Major General V. Krivilev, doctor of technical sciences, professor under rubric "By Way of Discussion*": "Stratagem: Maskirovka and Simulation"]

[Text] As a rule, stratagem is recalled only some time after victory, and even then people speak more about the superiority of weapons, the valor of soldiers and the perspicacity of field generals.

But an analysis of the dynamics of the most important engagements shows that success was laid down at the very beginning, when the concept was being drawn up, and the result was determined by how fully it was implemented.

Stratagem is directed toward changing the combat situation and creating the most advantageous conditions for defeating the enemy. Its essence lies in the skillfulness, inventiveness and resourcefulness of the concept and of the effect on the enemy's will and in the ability to defeat him with fewest losses for oneself.

It is common knowledge that one strives to attain the goals laid down in stratagem by carrying out a set of organizational and engineering measures.

Provisions are made here for simultaneity in fulfilling both, inasmuch as they mutually supplement each other, increase credibility, and ensure plausibility of objects or the situation.

This is to say that concepts of stratagem are realized by various procedures and methods, but maskirovka [lit. "camouflage", however, includes "concealment" and "deception"] and simulation, for whose implementation large masses of troops are used, should be considered the most prevalent.

In itself maskirovka was employed by man back in the earliest stages of his formation and development. Even in hunting animals, not to mention in armed conflict, success accompanied the one who executed procedures of concealment the most skillfully.

Maskirovka acquired a certain stableness, its most effective procedures were rehearsed and its means were improved during military conflicts.

For example, during the times of Louis XIV residents of the town of Besancon, which had been surrounded by the French, stretched wide panels over the bridge from the city to the fortress and concealed movement across it from the attackers.

Peter I deceived the Swedes and won the Battle of Poltava in 1709 by employing a multitude of stratagems, including dressing the Novgorod Guards Regiment in the uniform of new Russian Army recruits.

When withdrawing the troops after the Battle of Borodino, M. I. Kutuzov ordered bonfires to be burned all night at the positions being abandoned and thereby deceived Napoleon, who did not find our army in the morning.

Prototypes of vertical drapes appeared during 1854-1856 in the form of pieces of ship ropes with which Russian seamen and artillerymen covered the firing ports of their guns.

Later, dummy artillery batteries and other dummy objects appeared during 1877-1878 in the Russo-Turkish War.

In those same years many armies began forming engineer maskirovka subunits. Around 150 teams of maskirovka instructors were formed just in the 7th Army of Russian troops and arrangements were made for supplying them with special equipment and materials (paints, paint spray guns, smoke pots).

Subsequently the installation of flat overhead camouflage nets and creation of dummy railroad lines, depots and other installations spread. Smoke screens began to be used more widely.

Maskirovka saw further development in World War I. The upgrading of rifled weapons and increased artillery range for engaging targets posed tasks involving concealment of objects even in the depth of the defense. For example, the 1916 Russian General Headquarters "Ukazaniya po ukrepleniyu pozitsiy" [Instructions on Fortification of Positions] noted: "Everything accessible to an artillery observer's eye will be destroyed. Consequently, it is necessary to camouflage oneself." Adversaries' capabilities considerably broadened with the use of aerial reconnaissance because of its range, and troops were forced to camouflage themselves not only at forward positions, but also in the operational depth and in disposition areas of reserves and rear installations.

In preparation for the Brusilov breakthrough in May 1916, vast engineer maskirovka measures were conducted across a broad front under the direction of K. I. Velichko for concealing unit concentration areas, for maskirovka of actual artillery firing positions and for showing dummy artillery firing positions in order to deceive the enemy regarding the axis of main attack. The result was the operation's success.

Maskirovka and simulation also were given most careful attention in the first years of Soviet power. Results of the experience of a two-day maskirovka maneuver of 21-22 August 1924 executed by units of the Moscow Military District and military educational institutions in the vicinity of Moscow were generalized in one of the first writings about them.

The establishment in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of a higher school of maskirovka whose graduates

subsequently made a significant contribution to the tactics and strategy of combat operations dates back to that time.

World War II advanced the development of maskirovka and simulation to a leading place. An upgrading of aerial reconnaissance equipment permitting objects to be photographed with high resolution served as the main motive for this.

Successful maskirovka of Moscow thanks to which German air strikes had little effect could be singled out from examples of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

Successful application of maskirovka permitted considerably predetermining success in many operations. There was a significant increase in its scale here. For example, over 215,000 square meters of flat overhead camouflage nets were set up and hundreds of dummy areas were prepared just in the Jassy-Kishinev Operation.

Results of maskirovka and simulation measures carried out by the German Army also should be noted: underground plants, airfields, command posts and other installations functioned practically to the end of the war. One can also speak here of course about the high degree of protection of objects, but in a number of cases their survivability was ensured only through maskirovka measures and simulation. For example, extensive simulation work was conducted in Ploesti to preserve oil fields and oil refineries. Several dummy Ploestis with plants, unloading stations, rolling stock and even street lighting were built.

The majority of real enemy installations were preserved until the war's end despite the fact that the Allies knew about the large-scale simulation measures.

It is apropos here to direct attention to the purely psychological effect: when a pilot knows where a target is located and what its appearance and revealing signs are and when he sees something similar on the approach, although not quite situated where he presumed, he strikes the dummy target and believes that intelligence was inaccurate, especially since the decision is made under pressure from enemy anti-aircraft fire and when there is essentially no time to reflect.

The Great Patriotic War's experience in general and its successful conclusion showed that as components of stratagem, maskirovka and simulation played an important role in defeating the enemy.

In the postwar period, during the 1950's and 1960's, interest in maskirovka let up somewhat in connection with the appearance of nuclear weapons with their high destructive power. The opinion formed that with known coordinates of target locations (such as, for example, strategic missile launch silos, command and control facilities and so on) destruction was inevitable no matter how they were camouflaged.

After the Chernobyl accident and the Challenger disaster international public opinion and the most responsible Western politicians began to be inclined toward the idea of the undesirability of using nuclear weapons in combat operations. This in turn led to intensified developments of conventional weapons, and precision weapons in particular.

The scientific-technical revolution in military affairs led to extraordinary saturation of modern armies with various kinds of combat equipment. How combat operations are conducted also changed; they are distinguished by great dynamism, fluidity and high mobility. (The war in the Persian Gulf is a vivid example of this.)

In addition, there was a considerable increase in capabilities of reconnaissance equipment using radar, infrared and optical bands of the electromagnetic wave spectrum in connection with the appearance and continuous upgrading of satellites. Weapons which function in the "see-kill" mode also are being upgraded. Detection and engagement time has been cut to 15-20 minutes. Precision munitions are being equipped with dual-spectrum homing heads and get a fix on an object in the radar and infrared electromagnetic wave bands. (For example, the kill probability of a tank exceeds 0.5.)

It must be noted that the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance and target designation rose when AWACS aircraft became operational in NATO countries.

All these factors dictate the increased demands on procedures and means of maskirovka and simulation, i.e., the need for concealing not only optical revealing signs but radar and infrared revealing signs as well. Thus, an object concealed by a conventional camouflage cover will be visible on a radar screen and its heated portion, purpose and nature of functioning also will be "visible" to infrared reconnaissance equipment. Consequently, skillful maskirovka and simulation necessitates using equipment that operates effectively throughout the spectrum range.

The importance of using the terrain's concealing properties has not decreased but, conversely, has increased under present conditions. The disposition of troops and troop installations on dead ground and behind natural screens (forests, groves, residential and industrial structures) permits increasing their survivability considerably.

The terrain's concealing properties are characterized by its features of appearance, capacity to conceal, degree of cover and presence of dead ground, which should be taken into account in laying out movement routes, communication trenches, other trenches, and communication lines and when disposing equipment in the open. The signature of extended objects is reduced by disposing them on the borders of contrasting patterns, along dams, ditches, obstacles and so on. In disposing lone objects, above all it is necessary to use natural screens, keep objects from being silhouetted, and place them at a

distance from clear-cut reference points with consideration of features of relief, desirably in the shadow of local terrain features. At the same time, consideration also is given to the presence of objects' own shadows which reveal them. In this case they must be disposed so the shadow falls on local features (bushes, plantings, elements of demolished buildings and so on) and is distorted.

In assessing the terrain's concealing features people usually use concepts of backgrounds, the most prevalent of which are with vegetative cover (grass, bushes, trees and so on), without vegetative cover (mountainous desert terrain, sandy shore, bare talus, precipices), water surfaces (rivers, lakes, seas), and residential and industrial structures.

Forested, hilly and mountainous terrain is the most favorable for maskirovka. Various residential and economic objects also possess high concealing features.

Landscapes with trees and dense underbrush contribute to rather effective concealment of personnel and equipment, and cleared strips help conceal roads and approach routes to and between installations. In choosing places for disposing equipment, such as in day rest halt areas, greatest preference should be given to undergrowth, since it has a considerable patterned nature caused not only by a varying diameter of tops, but also by the dimensions and configuration of shadows cast by bushes.

Backgrounds with grassy covers and field and garden crops are less effective from the aspect of maskirovka. Backgrounds devoid of vegetation (bare soils, embankments and so on) are favorable (with the exception of level sandy terrain) because of their sharply contrasting patterns and diversity of the pattern figure.

With realization of a defensive doctrine, where areas occupied by troops will begin to be fortified immediately before or in the course of aggression, it is especially important to take advantage of the concealing features of those areas. This method of troop protection will predominate among other methods included in the overall system of engineer measures.

One of the important of the many maskirovka procedures is painting, used for the first time during the Boer War (1899-1902). Because British troops exceeded the Boer troops severalfold in numbers, the latter were forced to take maximum advantage of concealing features of terrain and to employ camouflage painting of artillery and clothing along with other stratagem procedures. Later it was used widely during the Russo-Japanese War and World War I, when khaki color appeared. Since then almost all world armies have given preference to camouflage clothing, which turned out to be most successful and is the practice in our time.

This also relates to the painting of military equipment, for which two-color, three-color and four-color painting is used. The effect of having individual patterns close in

color to the predominant background color "fade into the background" is observed in multicolor painting.

Local construction materials and coloring compounds (soil, clay, lime, cement and so on), which show high effectiveness in all working bands of the electromagnetic wave spectrum, can be used for these purposes during combat operations.

A special place is occupied by procedures for concealing troop fortifications. Just take the automatic weapon and artillery firing positions, which are the basis of a defense. They usually are camouflaged as local objects, and whether or not they will go undamaged depends on the art of maskirovka.

Work to erect troop fortifications should be done chiefly under conditions of poor visibility (night, snowfall, dust storms and so on) for purposes of maskirovka.

Experience shows that in engineer preparation of areas it is advisable to plan 20-25 percent of the time directly for maskirovka, and it must be done in stages without leaving objects uncamouflaged in daylight hours.

Special attention should be given to maskirovka of entrances to structures and connecting passages by concealing them or extending them beyond the outlines of troop fortifications. If this is not done, the enemy will see the dead-ends and will have no difficulty determining the location of objects. One also should remember that carelessness in performing maskirovka work (piles of construction debris, trampled-down places around structures) nullifies all concealment measures.

No matter how skillfully it is performed, maskirovka alone will not permit ensuring requisite survivability. Having lost an object but knowing it exists, the enemy will intensify reconnaissance and in the final account will discover it. This is why maskirovka definitely must be supplemented by simulation.

Specific demands are placed on simulation equipment considering the multifunctional nature of means of reconnaissance and of guidance systems. While World War II mockups were made chiefly of boards, plywood and even soil to show outward revealing signs in the optical band, this is not enough now. It is necessary to recreate the corresponding radar cross-section in the radar band of wavelengths and show the most heated elements (for example, the rear armor and exhaust gases of a tank). Only in this case will the mockup have the necessary signs. It is very difficult to implement in practice a set of technically rather complicated tasks, but, judging from press reports, such mockups are being successfully introduced (that was the case in the Near East conflict). They can be made to be pneumatic out of metallized rubber or plastic to increase mobility and transportability and reduce labor inputs for setting them up. This achieves a high degree of detailing and resemblance with the real object both in the optical as well as radar electromagnetic wave bands.

Thus at the present time stratagem not only has not lost its age-old importance and pertinence, but also has moved to the level of leading factors determining success in the battle and operation. Commanders at all levels must constantly remember this. It was Chinese General Sun Tsu of very ancient times who said: "The general's art must consist of keeping the enemy in total ignorance regarding the place of battle and concealing from him the supported points. If he succeeds in this and manages to conceal the smallest measures, he will turn out to be not only a skilled general, but also an unusual person..."

It remains to add only that such an art is one of the basic components of the commander's military proficiency and professionalism.

Footnotes

*VOYENNNYY VESTNIK, No 6, 1991.

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Interview with Siberian MD Commander

92UM0041A Novosibirsk SOVETSKIY VOIN
in Russian 18 Sep 91 Single edition p 1

[Interview with Siberian Military District Commander Lieutenant-General Viktor Andreyevich Kopylov by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Chiligina: "We Will Work Together: First Interview on the New Job"]

[Text] I have already had the opportunity in the past to visit the Military District Commander's office. This time some sort of feeling interfered with my boldly knocking on the familiar door. When I had overcome it, I saw the friendly face and kind attentive eyes of the new office occupant.

"Come in, sit down. Is your name Vladimir Ivanovich? What kind of questions do you have?"

Frankly speaking, I had anticipated a more official beginning for my first conversation with new Military District Commander Lieutenant-General Viktor Andreyevich Kopylov. That is what we have been used to—the higher the post a man occupies, the more inaccessible he seems to become. Fortunately, this is actually not always the case and it happens that the heat of mutual relations provides warmth in the most official offices.

What questions do I pose to the new Military District Commander? There is a fine tradition in army collectives when personnel offer their congratulations to the newly-appointed commander. Where do its origins come from? It is hard to say. But it is as if a commander whom the soldiers do not know well will have a sharper extended line [tsep] in combat. Where was Lieutenant-General Viktor Andreyevich Kopylov born, where did he grow up, where and with whom did he serve prior to his assignment to the position of Siberian Military District Commander?

Viktor Andreyevich was born on January 7, 1940 in a Khabarovsk Kray station where his father was serving at the time. The family changed its place of residence many times. After graduating from school, Viktor Andreyevich worked at a plant as an apprentice lathe operator and later as a lathe operator in Rostov.

Later, the draft into the army, soldier's service, and studies at Kharkov Tank Academy from which he graduated in 1962. Viktor Andreyevich graduated from the Armored Troops and General Staff Academies. He has served in the Belorussian Military District, the Western and Northern Groups of Forces, and in the Far Eastern and Central Asian Military Districts. His last position was—primary military advisor—advisor to the Syrian Arab Republic Minister of Defense.

V.A. Kopylov has two sons. The oldest is continuing the family tradition and serves in the rank of captain. The younger has completed compulsory military service and is now a student.

[Chiligina] Comrade Commander, you arrived in your new service position from an overseas assignment. If it is not a secret, what did your mission to Syria consist of and what is the opinion abroad about our country and recent events in it?

[Kopylov] A treaty that was concluded in 1967 links our country with the Syrian Arab Republic. Based on this treaty, we render assistance to Syria, including in the context of achieving defensive sufficiency. As a result of our work, the Syrian leadership has adopted a defensive doctrine that is similar in content to our country's defensive doctrine.

The Syrian armed forces participated in the multinational forces to stop Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

[Chiligina] And the Syrian Army is armed with whose weaponry?

[Kopylov] They have Soviet combat vehicles and weapons and they utilize them with adequately high authority. It helps the state to reliably preserve its sovereignty. This mission is extremely important for Syria if you consider that part of its territory on the Golan Heights is occupied by Israel.

The opinion of our country that the people of Syria have is based on the noble memory that it is the Soviet Union that helped Syria to preserve its state sovereignty during difficult days. As for their attitudes toward recent events in our country, I cannot describe them since I was not in Syria at that time.

I can only say that the Syrian people approve of perestroika and the democratic processes in our country. Still in 1971, having become the head of state, Syrian President Al-Asad began the so-called corrective movement. In some aspects, it corresponds to the elements of our perestroika.

[Chiligin] Comrade Commander, this is the third question I have prepared: did anything previously tie you or your family to Siberia or to the Siberians? But obviously, it no longer makes sense to pose it—everything is clear....

[Kopylov] Why? I think that any Soviet man is linked to the Siberian region. The Siberian divisions decided the outcome of the battle for Moscow and possibly the outcome of the Great Patriotic War. Right now several thousand veterans of war reside on the territory of the military district. I wish them all good health and long life from the bottom of my heart. I know that today not only their wounds from the front but also their spiritual wounds ache that they have received on a daily basis in our current complicated life. None of us will be forgiven if we forget about this and if all of society does not extend the hand of assistance to those people who fought at the front.

I also want to say that I very often have the opportunity to meet with the envoys of Siberia in all regions where I have served. I know that the soldiers from Siberia are conscientious and hardened lads. When I commanded a company, a Siberian, Yeliseyev, was the senior driver-mechanic in my tank. So many years have passed and even now I remember his very kind word. I remember that he was a native of Tomsk.

[Chiligin] Were you surprised by the USSR Presidential Decree that designated you the Military District Commander? When did you hear about your assignment for the first time—prior to August 19 or after the coup attempt?

[Kopylov] The USSR Presidential Decree on my designation was signed on August 17 and Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov's order was signed on August 24. That is what I can say in this regard. I will add that during 33 years of service, neither I nor my subordinates have ever been used against the people. I considered and I consider such acts unconstitutional and criminal.

[Chiligin] It is customary to think that if an officer has become a general, all the more so a Military District Commander, that his service ladder from platoon commander moved only steeply upward. Has your officer service always developed successfully and at what rank and where did your father end his service?

[Kopylov] Actually, the question of my officer career is very often discussed in officers' collectives. While receiving lieutenant's shoulder boards, each young officer dreams with time of earning a higher military rank. By what road do you go to attain this goal? Each person selects his own. But, alas, far from all of these roads lead to his lifelong dream.

I will not say that my service developed very successfully at all levels. It was varied, like that of many other officers. But in all of my jobs, my subunits and units attained steady positive results in training and military

discipline. I think that officers will understand what expenditures of physical and moral labors this costs a commander.

The assignment abroad was unexpected for me in many ways. I met this proposal without enthusiasm. It is no secret that advisor sometimes signifies the last level of army service. Marshal S. Akhromeyev talked with me on this issue. He explained the need and responsibility of this, as it actually turned out, quite complicated activity to me.

In what rank and where was my father discharged from the army? That was very long ago, in 1970. During the war years, my father fought in the ranks of the Urals Volunteer Tank Corps in the position of chief of intelligence. He was discharged in the rank of major-general. Now he is 75 years old and he lives in Minsk.

[Chiligin] The new Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov said in an interview that he would like his first order to normalize an officer's work day. What would you like to issue as your first order in the position of Military District Commander?

[Kopylov] I totally support the idea of the need to normalize the officer's work day. And, as the Military District Commander, I will do everything in my power so that officers and warrant officers have a guaranteed day off every week. I know that many junior officers today are submitting their requests for early discharge into the reserves because of excessive work loads and the lack of time for rest and for families.

I have already discussed this issue with officers of a unit of the Novosibirsk Garrison and I have already expressed my opinion on this score. Precise organization of the officer work week depends on many things. But no matter from which side we approach this issue, we must also deal with the problem of increasing the personal responsibility of all commanders for the state of affairs in the sector assigned to them. That is why officers in those units where there is less order and where violations of military discipline and emergency situations most often occur express more complaints about the lack of days off.

I have already had to sign many orders. They affect various issues. For example, they are about organizing the training of officers. Marxist-Leninist training no longer exists in its previous form. Right now we will make primary emphasis on legal training and on a more profound study of the foundations of teaching and psychology in the professional training of officers. It is no secret that previously studies on these disciplines were organized quite formally and were very poorly tied to the practice of officer service.

[Chiligin] Comrade Commander, it is difficult to study all of a military district's problems in several days. In your opinion, what are the primary tasks that Siberian soldiers are faced with today?

[Kopylov] There are many of them. I will begin with preparations for winter. This task is quite vast. We need to painstakingly prepare first of all available housing and all utilities associated with proving heat and light to barracks and military bases. We also need to prepare food and fuel. This issue will be submitted for discussion at the military district Military Soviet session at the end of September.

Personnel will also soon be faced with completing the training year and with passing the end-of-training-period performance evaluation. Right now we need to begin work on preparation for this important examination. We need to painstakingly plan it and to pay special attention to precise compliance with the schedule of studies in the concluding stage of the training year.

It is no secret that some units that have been withdrawn from the western groups will be deployed on the territory of our military district in the future. We need to primarily prepare available housing for their reception.

The task of strengthening military discipline and maintaining the safety of weapons and ammunition, and the lives and health of servicemen has also not been removed from the agenda. Unfortunately, there is no way commanders will be able to stabilize the situation on several parameters of military discipline. This is a bitter conclusion but it is an honest one. We know it. We also know the causes of many negative phenomena. We need to pay greater attention to people and to their needs and concerns and not permit complacency and irresponsibility. These are not general words as they may appear to be. These are the sources of many deficiencies and misfortunes in educational work.

[Chiligin] Another issue is directly linked with work to strengthen military discipline. Henceforth commanders will have to implement the process of training and educating personnel without the participation of political organs and party organizations. How should they structure this work, on whom should they rely, and will it not turn out that the graph of military discipline in the military district will soon head downward?

[Kopylov] We must not permit this. Legally, the commander has led and been responsible for the work to educate his subordinates. But some of them in practice transferred their obligations to the political workers. Naturally, right now it will be more difficult for such commanders. And I am not sure that all of them will be able to quickly restructure or that they will ultimately be able to remain in their positions.

How do we prevent this? I think we need to make our goal combining personnel training and education into a single process in our practical work. Unfortunately, we could not in any way solve this task in the past. And, in my opinion, this was one of the primary causes of the decline of military discipline in the Armed Forces on the whole.

I think that the change of the information and legal training of officers which will replace the system of political training will have a positive impact on the results of military discipline. I have already recently prepared an appropriate directive on this issue. It also stipulates totally using the educational work experience of the former political workers who will perform service in the new army structures.

[Chiligin] But, Comrade Commander, besides purely service issues, today officers are increasingly interested in the problems of housing and many are experiencing uncertainty in tomorrow. How will you solve these problems in the future?

[Kopylov] These are problems not only of our military district but of all of the Armed Forces as a whole. What will we specifically do in the Siberian Military District to resolve them? First of all, of course, develop our own construction facilities. Military builders will construct 931 apartments for military district needs. This is nevertheless quite a bit.

Beginning in Spring 1992, we also plan to begin construction of housing through self-help. First of all, these are dormitories for junior officers and homes for young families.

The housing problem is most acute in Novosibirsk Garrison because just during the last year local Soviets did not allocate a total of more than 400 apartments to the military district. I had a conversation on this issue with Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Chairman V.P. Mukha and Representative of the RSFSR President for Novosibirsk Oblast A.N. Manokhin. Both Vitaliy Petrovich and especially Anatoliy Nikolayevich assess the situation that has developed with understanding. We will hope that the city will find the capability to help us to resolve this problem.

The problem of stabilization of cadres is also very acute in the military district. Indeed, this year comparatively fewer junior officers than last year have expressed the desire for early discharge from the army. I have not signed a single petition for early discharge for any officer without personally talking to him beforehand. Unfortunately, I have already had two such conversations.

[Chiligin] Comrade Commander, the last question. The coup attempt revealed the absurdity of the command-administrative system for managing the mass media. The Military District newspaper SOVETSKIY VOIN is the organ of the military district's Military Soviet. What are your requirements for the work of our editorial collective and your desires for our region's mass media.

[Kopylov] In accordance with the Law on the Press, the newspaper's editorial staff is an independent organization in a professional sense. I think that the journalists themselves well know what issues concern people and interest readers most of all.

If I talk about my own desires, then I would like for military district servicemen and those people who are interested in how they serve and with what concerns Siberian soldiers live to read SOVETSKIY VOIN with interest. I would also like to more frequently meet with the region's mass media workers. And not only in my office but on the territory of district military units and on the firing ranges. I think that these meetings will occur in the future.

As for the attempted coup d'etat, I think that this was an illegal, unconstitutional act. And I think that today we must increase the legal education of servicemen so that each man with a weapon in his hands finely senses the

boundaries of our Constitution and the boundaries of our laws and will never step across them under any circumstances.

[Chiligin] Thank you for the interview. And now the Military District Commander asked in conclusion—tell me about yourself, where were you born, and where have you served?

I have recently had the opportunity to meet many officials. And perhaps this is the first time that I have heard this question posed to me....

COYPRIGHT: "Sovetskiy Voin", 1991

Chief Designer Discusses MIG-31

92UM0061A Moscow *TEKHNICA I MOLODEZHI*
in Russian No 5, 91 pp 30-31

[Interview with MIG-31 Chief Designer, OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan Deputy General Designer Anatoliy Alekseyevich Belosvet by Engineer Lazar Egenburg: "MIG-31 in the Air!"]

[Text] While adhering to the long-standing tradition of acquainting our readers with new models of native military equipment, we discussed the item from OKB [Experimental Design Bureau] imeni A.I. Mikoyan—the MIG-29 fighter aircraft (see No 2, 1989) and about how it completed takeoffs and landings on the latest aircraft-carrying cruiser (see No 5, 1990). Now it is the turn of the aircraft that was considered to be secret until quite recently—the MIG-31, but before we do that, we will give the floor to this aircraft's Chief Designer, Deputy General Designer Anatoliy Alekseyevich Belosvet who has politely agreed to answer several of our correspondent's questions.

[Egenburg] With what goal was the new fighter aircraft developed?

[Belosvet] The MIG-31 is a defensive weapon and is primarily intended for PVO [Air Defense] aviation. Its crew must intercept the probable enemy's strategic bombers, cruise missiles, reconnaissance aircraft and tactical aircraft. While utilizing and exploiting the traditional advantages of native Air Defense systems—high power-to-weight ratio and high automation guidance level, we have developed a new system in which the MIG-31 is an integral part and which L. Egenburg has discussed in adequate detail in his article. This aircraft differs from the MIG-25 in equipment and weapons and can carry out a much broader range of missions. Specifically, it has the capability to operate in a group.

[Egenburg] It would be interesting to know how much time was required to develop this aircraft and will it be kept in the inventory for a long time?

[Belosvet] The operating cycle for this aircraft and the system it is used in averages 8-10 years. It will serve another 10-13 years and consequently will remain in line units at the beginning of the 21st century.

[Egenburg] And do they have similar fighter aircraft in the West?

[Belosvet] There is no such aircraft with these combat capabilities. We were the first to use an apparatus in the MIG-31 that permits the crew to simultaneously conduct surveillance, escort, and interception of several targets in a wide range and to also conduct fire on four of them at once. For the time being, this fighter aircraft is only in the inventory of our Air Defense and, as far as I know, is not subject to "reduction" within the framework of the well-known disarmament agreements....

[Egenburg] Could you share OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan's plans with *TEKHNICA I MOLODEZHI* readers, including those affecting work under conditions of conversion?

[Belosvet] We intend to continue working on combat aircraft that correspond to the doctrine of defensive sufficiency and, moreover, which outstandingly represent the image of the interceptor of the year 2000. Furthermore, we are thinking of utilizing the enormous potential of our OKB's designers to develop aircraft for the national economy. Specifically, elements of MIG-31 technology may find application during the development and production of civilian and administrative aircraft. It is this that we are involved with right now within the framework of conversion.

Recently, the new MIG-31 Soviet combat aircraft has begun to be increasingly mentioned in the Soviet and foreign press. Thanks to glasnost, information about the aircraft that was still top secret yesterday has become common today on the pages of newspapers and magazines and they are even using its likeness to decorate wall calendars.

Already in January 1989, each country's personnel and weapons data was attached to the Warsaw Treaty participants Ministers of Defense Committee Statement "On the Ratio of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and North Atlantic Pact (NATO) Armed Forces Strength and Weaponry in Europe and Adjacent Territories." Specifically, our combat aircraft were listed, including the fact that the MIG-25 and MIG-31 Air Defense interceptor aircraft were openly mentioned for the first time. Four months later, on Air Defense Forces Day, a striking picture of the new interceptor aircraft was published in a central newspaper and the words of the Commander-in-Chief of this branch of the Armed Forces were cited: "Today, PVO Fighter Aviation has the fourth generation MIG-31 and SU-27 aircraft at its disposal" (see *TEKHNICA I MOLODEZHI* No 8, 1989), and the story from the aviation subunit stressed that "this flying unit flies the MIG-31 2-seater aircraft which Hero of the Soviet Union A.V. Fedotov tested at one time and in which he and Navigator V.S. Zaytsev laid down their lives exactly five years ago. People in the regiment knew the Mikoyan test pilots and they will remember Fedotov...."

So, what is this aircraft which was considered secret and was kept behind lock and key until recently? OKB imeni A.I. Mikoyan experts had already begun to design it in 1970, having taken the MIG-25 series production interceptor aircraft as the basis for it. The MIG-25 had been developed in the 1960's in response to the appearance in the United States of high-altitude supersonic reconnaissance aircraft and bombers. Like the MIG-25, this was a welded aircraft from special alloys. Initially, the aircraft was even called the MIG-25MP. General Designer R.A. Belyakov headed overall management of development and testing.

The MIG-31 was intended for interception and destruction of airborne targets flying both at high, and also at medium and low altitudes (in the background of the earth); in the forward and rear hemispheres; in simple and complicated weather conditions; day or night, and when the enemy uses maneuver and active and passive radar jamming and thermal decoys.

Outwardly, it reminds us very much of the MIG-25—two tails and two rectangular air intakes along the sides of the fuselage. But differences begin later, and quite substantial ones. The first thing that strikes your eye is that there is a second cockpit behind the MIG-31 pilot's cockpit where the MIG-25 was a single-seater. Operation of the aircraft with a quite impressive takeoff weight at ordinary airports forced them to change the landing gear design: two-wheeled landing gears in which the wheels were positioned in so-called "spread-tandem" were used for the first time on a fighter aircraft which reduced pressure on the surfacing of the takeoff and landing strip.

The aircraft's power-to-weight ratio has been increased by installing two modified, highly efficient, D-30 turbojet by-pass engines, each of which is rated at 15,500 kilograms with afterburner—nearly one third more than on the MIG-25. In contrast to other interceptors, the MIG-31 is capable of being refueled by tankers several times in flight which significantly increases range and flying time.

The new fighter aircraft is equipped with an antijam protected system that provides reliable interception of airborne targets. It consists of an on-board radar with a phased-antenna array (used on an aircraft for the first time in the world), a thermal direction finder for forward hemisphere and a tactical situation display. A navigator-weapons system operator has been added to the crew since it has become more difficult for the pilot to simultaneously fly the aircraft and control the weapons system and the sighting-navigation system.

There is a data transmission system on the MIG-31 which is designed to coordinate groups of four aircraft in flight, for target designation, and for attack coordination. It permits the aircraft to track up to 10 targets simultaneously and to conduct guided missile launches against four targets at once.

As we all know, the aircraft's combat effectiveness depends on the composition and capabilities of its weapons systems. On the MIG-31, it is selected depending on the specific features of the target and the combat situation. Weapons composition may consist of four long-range missiles with semi-active radar homing, these same missiles and two medium-range heat-seeking missiles; four long-range and four short-range missiles (close-range dogfight missiles). It is noteworthy that the designers have placed them so that they offer two-times less air-flow resistance. Furthermore, a 23-mm cannon with a combat load of 260 shells has been mounted in the center-wing section. They have employed a cannon with

an enormous firing rate of several thousand rounds per second for the first time on a MIG—the MIG-15 fighter aircraft's cannon of the same caliber lagged behind in this regard by more than 1.5 times!

And there are no aircraft in our country or in the world that have similar combat capabilities to those of the MIG-31. Judge for yourself: the fighter aircraft crew can, of course, operate singly but its primary mission is to operate in groups of four aircraft under the command of the aircraft leader and, in so doing, automatically exchange information between them and the ground-based automated guidance system, and all tasks associated with target search and group coordination are resolved using on-board systems that continuously receive data from the ground and from the interceptor aircraft interacting in the group. By the way, it can also operate without assistance from the ground while exercising control of the enormous air corridor being protected.

As for a single aircraft, it is capable of simultaneously intercepting several targets which are flying at various altitudes, along various courses, and at various speeds. Although the MIG-31 is not a dogfight aircraft, it executes all advanced aerobatic maneuvers.

This is the new combat aircraft that was developed at a traditional fighter aircraft design bureau whose history began more than 50 years ago.

In August 1975, a crew—Test-Pilot, Firm Chief Pilot, and Hero of the Soviet Union A. V. Fedotov and Lead Engineer S. G. Polyakov (currently director of a test plant), and Mechanic V. N. Kichev—were assigned to the MIG-31 test prototype. On September 16, Fedotov flew the aircraft into the air for the first time and comprehensive flight testing was begun. Later, Pilots P.M. Ostapenko, B.A. Orlov, A.G. Fastovets, V.E. Menitskiy, and T.O. Aubakirov and Navigators V.S. Zaytsev and L.S. Popov joined them, and L.I. Sviderskiy and E.K. Kostrubskiy (currently—technical leader of the theme and deputy chief designer) were the lead engineers for experimental fighter aircraft.

MIG-31 flight testing took several years and confirmed the validity of the engineering decisions set forth in it. Unfortunately, it did not occur without accidents—on September 20, 1979, an accident occurred and Ostapenko and Popov had to bail out. It is no secret that test-pilots leave their test aircraft only in extreme cases when there is no chance remaining for a safe landing and they are just able to safely leave the doomed aircraft in time. And they do not always manage to do this....

In April 1984, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA printed the following obituary: "On April 4, prominent Test-Pilot, Lenin Prize Laureate, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major-General of Aviation Aleksandr Vasilyevich Fedotov died... having set 18 world aircraft speed, altitude, and time-to-climb records, a number of which have not been exceeded at this time."

We can add that, having begun flying in 1951, Fedotov took off in various types of aircraft 8,998 times and spent more than 5,000 hours in the air. And one more detail—the OKB chief pilot flew at supersonic speed, soared into the stratosphere, flew a glider in his free time and drew splendidly. In his youth, he even intended to enter an art school; however, his love for aviation overpowered him....

Many OKB workers remember Fedotov's comment on the new aircraft: "The MIG-31 has the greatest capabilities of all the aircraft which I have had the opportunity to test!" And during that last flight when the instruments disappointed and the pilot did not have enough altitude to save the aircraft, Navigator Valeriy Zaytsev was in the second cockpit. At one time, French Pilot and Writer A. de Saint-Exupery said: "He who dies for the sake of advancing our knowledge serves life by dying...." It is as if these words were written especially about Fedotov and Zaytsev.

Series production of the MIG-31 began in 1979. Since that time, it has been improved, modernized, and adapted to perform new combat missions. The great reserves set forth in its design create the certainty that the MIG-31, like its famous predecessors the MIG-15, MIG-17, and MIG-21, is destined to have a long life in aviation.

The MIG-31's Tactical-Technical Specifications:

Takeoff weight in tons	41
With two belly tanks	46.2
Maximum speed in kilometers per hour near the earth.....	1,500
At altitudes above 17,500 meters	3,000
Flight ceiling in kilometers	20.6
Time to climb to an altitude of 20 kilometers, in minutes.....	7.9
Ferry range in kilometers.....	3,300
Maximum flight duration with one aerial refueling, in hours.....	6-7
Length of takeoff run, in meters.....	1,200
Length of landing run, in meters.....	800
Landing speed, in kilometers per hour.....	280
Maximum operational G-load	5

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AIR DEFENSE JOURNAL Looks at Desert Storm

92UM0049A Moscow VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 8, Aug 91 pp 60-64

[Part Two of article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Manachinskiy and Lieutenant Colonel V. Chumak based on foreign press materials, continued from No 7, Jul 91, under rubric "In Foreign Armies": "Echoes of 'Desert Storm': Some Results of the War in the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] The completeness and high reliability of intelligence (see VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY, No 7, 91) permitted the headquarters of the multinational forces to plan in detail allied actions in the operation, which in turn helped make the very best use of strong points of various weapon systems. This is easily seen in the example of U.S. Navy ships which took part in the war.

Thus in accordance with the operation plan it was decided to deliver Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile [SLCM] strikes against a number of Iraq's well hardened targets which had strong air defense. The following basic advantages of this weapon were taken into account here: covertness of deployment in the combat mission area; long range (up to 1,500 km) with high accuracy of delivery to targets (the circular error probable for launches against ground targets does not exceed 30 m, and against surface targets it is around 5 m) and impressive destructive capability of the warhead; and low vulnerability to the fire of air defense weapons as a result of a low-altitude flight configuration and insignificant radar cross-section.

A missile battle group including 2 battleships ("Wisconsin" and "Missouri"), 9 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 6-10 submarines was formed from Tomahawk-armed ships during preparation for the operation. That decision permitted achieving precise coordination of operations from the sea and rationally distributing SLCM's as they delivered the following kinds of strikes:

Mass strikes from several directions (strikes were delivered by submarines from Mediterranean waters) against ground targets with strong air defense. There were 125 missiles launched from the battleships against these targets in the very first 24 hours of the operation;

Pinpoint (so-called "surgical") strikes against Iraq's most important military and industrial targets such as command posts, airfields, ammunition, chemical weapons and fuel depots, oil refineries and nuclear centers;

Strikes against individual air defense targets (command posts, radar and SAM system positions, fighter bases).

While foreign sources cite various figures regarding the number of Tomahawk SLCM launches (from a little over 300 to close to 700), the opinions of experts concerning

the effectiveness of their employment are similar: the number of targets hit by the missiles was around 90 percent.

There is no question that neither the operation's detailed planning nor the well conceived redistribution of efforts and coordination of mixed forces and equipment would have been so effective had stable command and control of allied operations been absent. It is difficult to overestimate the role played by the aforementioned satellites included in the command and control system. Because of them, continuous communications free of interference—the basis for adequacy of the decisions being made and for confident direction—was ensured in all elements of the multinational forces, from staffs at various levels down to and including battalions. And at the same time the enemy was given the unenviable role of extra—his command and control system was thoroughly disorganized by the coalition's massive use of EW equipment, committed 24 hours before the beginning of the operation and essentially functioning continuously until its end.

U.S. President G. Bush officially commenced the war at 2000 hours on 16 January 1991. From that moment the planned operation to liberate Kuwait began to be called "Desert Storm." But in fact the Americans' shift to active operations can be considered 0300 hours 16 January, when ground jammers were turned on against Iraqi Army command and control nets.

Desert Storm began at 0100 hours 17 January with an offensive air operation which was carried out in full conformity with modern views of NATO military specialists and which was the first phase of the air-land operation. Operations from the air were planned in the form of three massive strikes delivered at a 3.5-4 hour interval against a large number of military and industrial targets (a total of around 4,000) on the territory of Kuwait and Iraq. The primary goals of the operation were to suppress the Iraqi air defense system, inflict decisive destruction on Iraqi ground force groupings, and disorganize the system for command and control of forces and weapons. Attainment of these objectives was supported by accomplishment of the primary mission: winning of air superiority by the multinational forces' aircraft.

Judging from foreign press reports, to execute this mission it was planned to deliver massive strikes in order to reliably suppress enemy air defense weapons and keep the bulk of his aircraft from taking off.

By the beginning of combat operations the multinational forces had 1,532 combat aircraft, of which 1,018 were American (679 of U.S. Ninth Air Force and 339 of Naval Aviation), 380 were from the Arab states alliance, and 134 from Great Britain and France (76 and 58 aircraft respectively).

The U.S. Air Force had 36 B-52G strategic bombers, 62 F-111 fighter-bombers, 44 F-117A Stealth fighters, 321

F-4G Wild Weasels, 24 F-15E's and 72 F-16C/D's, as well as A-10 Thunderbolt attack aircraft.

U.S. Navy air attack weapons were represented by deck-based aircraft (A-6E Intruder attack aircraft, F-14 Tomcat fighters and F/A-18A Hornet fighter-bombers) as well as Marine Corps aircraft (AV-8B Harrier, A-6E Intruder attack aircraft, and F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombers).

The British and French air forces had Tornado and Jaguar fighter-bombers.

E-3A AWACS and E-2C Hawkeye long-range early warning command and control aircraft, EF-111A Raven and EA-6B Prowler jammer aircraft, RC-135, TR-1 and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft as well as EC-130E and EC-135 airborne command posts and KC-10A, KC-135 and KA-6D tanker aircraft were used to support operations by the air grouping.

Up to 600 aircraft in a three-echelon alignment took part in the first massive strike (lasting around 3 hours). A strike was delivered by SLCM's (a total of 52 missiles) in anticipation of actions by penetration elements. They engaged air defense targets, air bases, surface-to-surface missile launchers at launch positions, the most important state and military command and control facilities, the residence of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and concentration areas of Regular Army and National Guard troops. Judging from press reports which followed, up to 90 percent of the targets planned for the Tomahawks were hit.

Penetration elements suppressed the air defense system in two ways: by jamming radar equipment and by destroying air defense systems with fire. Jamming was provided by EF-111A and EA-6B EW aircraft operating from combat air patrol zones outside the penetration corridors of the main forces. In addition, up to 10 percent of aircraft in the first echelon had EW equipment. Communications channels in command and control nets were suppressed from EC-130H aircraft.

Fire was delivered by mixed groups of offensive air weapons consisting of F-117A, F-111, F-16 and F-4G aircraft, with their employment of HARM and Shrike antiradar missiles, Maverick guided missiles, and guided bombs with laser homing. Operations by the air defense penetration element lasted 25-30 minutes, with more than 150 aircraft active in them.

Aircraft whose external stores accommodated powerful guided and unguided weapons—F-111's, F-15E's, A-[6]E's, F/A-18's—were included in strike elements which operated one after the other at short time intervals. Saudi A-10 attack aircraft and combat helicopters delivered strikes against firing positions of 120-mm and 155-mm guns near the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. B-52G long-range bombers based on the island of Diego Garcia played a special role in the strike elements; they performed "carpet" bombing against considerable areas and pinpoint bombing with 900-kg

bombs from altitudes of 5,000-8,000 m against well fortified point targets. The duration of operations by strike elements was one hour for the first and 50 minutes for the second.

A second massive strike lasting one and one-half hours was delivered four and one-half hours later by forces of up to 400 offensive air weapons against targets newly detected or that had escaped engagement in the first strike. Its alignment was similar, but there were small changes in the makeup of strike elements. B-52G bombers were absent; their base was a great distance from the combat operations area and they were incapable of replenishing their ordnance payload and being refueled in a timely manner.

Three hundred aircraft, including up to 30 deck-based attack aircraft from the carriers "Midway" and "Ranger," took part in the third massive strike delivered four hours after the second.

In the first 24 hours of combat operations a total of up to 1,300 sorties were flown and, according to some estimates, there were up to 100 SLCM launches resulting in 800 targets being fully or partially destroyed on the territory of Iraq and Kuwait (including the residence of President Hussein and the Defense Ministry building, up to 20 airfields and air bases, 2 missile bases, up to 10 headquarters and communications centers, 14 chemical weapon depots and bases, nuclear and biochemical centers, 5 plants for production of toxic agents and 9 oil refineries). The foreign press reports that the Iraqi Army suffered losses of up to 15 percent in personnel, up to 500 tanks and 150 artillery pieces; its Air Force lost 300 aircraft; and the air defense system essentially was totally paralyzed. After they executed the three massive strikes, aircraft of the multinational forces were short four aircraft: one each F-117A, F-4G, F-16 and A-6.

The intensity of the allied command's use of offensive air weapons rose even more on 18 January. From 0030 to 0236 hours they delivered a fourth massive strike made up of 400 aircraft of the United States, Great Britain and France and 80 SLCM's. Around 30 fighter-bombers operated from Turkish airfields.

At daybreak the multinational forces delivered concentrated air strikes one after the other against the enemy, with up to 6-8 B-52G's and up to 180 deck-based aircraft active in each strike. During these strikes strategic bombers pressured Iraqi troops while tactical and deck-based aircraft and SLCM's delivered strikes against small mobile targets, air defense weapons which showed activity, television towers, communications relay facilities, communications centers, the residential complex of the Ba'ath Party leadership, and a compound of Baghdad Republican Guard units.

Special attention was given to detecting and destroying Scud operational-tactical missile launchers. Thus, following Iraq's launch of these missiles against Israel (two operational-tactical missiles were targeted for a strike against Tel Aviv and two against the city of Haifa),

B-52G strategic bombers purposefully bombed presumed Scud battalion locations in the western part of Iraqi territory, with 6 of 11 complexes destroyed as a result. The first combat test of the new American Patriot air defense antimissile system occurred that same day. Its interceptor missile knocked down an Iraqi operational-tactical missile in flight.

According to data cited in the foreign press, during the second 24 hours aircraft of the multinational forces flew some 2,000 sorties and executed more than 80 SLCM launches (in 40 hours of combat operations there were 196 Tomahawk BCM-109 SLCM launches, 176 of which hit assigned targets). Air losses of the multinational forces were seven aircraft: one each A-6, F-18 and F-15 of the United States, a Kuwaiti A-4 Skyhawk and three Tornados, of which two were British and one Italian. In addition, Iraqi air defense weapons also shot down 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles.

A fifth massive air strike was delivered basically against Iraqi troops on Kuwaiti territory from 0220 to 0415 on 19 January. Eighteen B-52G bombers were employed in this strike. In addition, 25 F-15, F-16 and F-111 aircraft from Incirlik Air Base delivered strikes at night against strategic targets in the north of Iraq and 38 aircraft did so in the morning. Subsequently 45 aircraft operated from Incirlik Air Base, their flight lasting 3 hours with aerial refueling. Strikes against air bases continued to be delivered by Tornados using JP233 suspended clusters loaded with concrete-piercing bombs, and ALARM antiradar missiles delivered strikes against SAM systems and radars.

Over 1,500 sorties were flown just in the third 24 hours of combat operations, including 29 by strategic bombers, and 196 SLCM's were launched, of which 29 were shot down.

Judging from information received on the concept of the operation, its first phase was completed by the end of the third 24 hour period. Losses of forward Iraqi troop units reached 25-30 percent. Also destroyed were 310 aircraft, 12 operational-tactical missile launchers, up to 640 tanks, and 270 field artillery pieces, MLRS's and mortars.

Since the headquarters of the multinational forces' leadership believed it had not succeeded in completely accomplishing the mission of winning air superiority in the first three days of the offensive air operation, mission accomplishment continued until the middle of February in the form of systematic operations by offensive air weapons. In parallel with aircraft and SLCM's, efforts were made to further reduce the combat potential of enemy ground forces inasmuch as, in the conclusion of American military specialists, the level of Iraqi troop losses which had been achieved did not allow shifting to committing the ground component to the operation.

In the course of systematic air strikes, the Americans tested new weapon systems under actual combat conditions and rehearsed technical procedures for their

employment. Thus, GBV-15 guided bombs with laser homing heads were employed to hit targets in shelters; there was a shift to wide use of tactical aircraft all-weather sighting and navigation equipment (285 LAN-TIRN equipment pods were delivered promptly to the conflict area); two sets of the JSTARS reconnaissance and weapon guidance system from the JSAC reconnaissance-strike complex were used aboard E-8A aircraft for reconnoitering small mobile targets and guiding tactical aircraft against them.

As a result of air strikes against command posts, communications centers and lines of communication, by mid-February Iraqi Army formations and units stationed on the territory of Kuwait and Southern Iraq were out of reach of Baghdad's operational instructions. In the words of pilots of the multinational forces, Iraqi air defense fire became so listless and ineffective that it no longer hampered them in performing combat missions with small groups of aircraft, or even alone. And the total absence of coordination between adjacent Iraqi air defense subunits became typical. They no longer assisted each other with antiaircraft fire, as had been the case previously, but were concerned only with their own safety.

Such transformations in the enemy's behavior largely were linked with changes in operating tactics of the multinational forces' offensive air weapons. They marked off the territories of Iraq and Kuwait into so-called "total destruction zones" of around two square kilometers in size. The greatest density of targets to be engaged was noted in these zones based on intelligence. Air strikes were delivered in succession against Iraqi troops, tanks, artillery and air defense weapon firing positions, and command posts in the zones. After all targets in one such zone were totally destroyed, bombing shifted to the next planned sector and so on.

In the opinion of the allied air force command, that tactic proved extremely successful inasmuch as the bombing carpet, which covered a rather large area, did not leave the Iraqis the slightest chance of moving combat equipment out from under fire. In addition, bombings of such high intensity had a depressing effect on the minds of Iraqi soldiers and crushed their will to resist.

Allied aircraft stepped up their operations on 18 February by shifting to participation in a so-called "preoffensive fire preparation" together with artillery. In its course B-52's dropped 900-kg bombs from altitudes of 5,000-8,000 m on fortified enemy positions, engineer structures, rear installations, Euphrates River bridges near the city of Basra and lines of communication. With their strikes, F-15E and F-16 fighter-bombers and A-10 attack aircraft disrupted lines of communication and destroyed materiel depots, bridges and trestles on axes leading to the enemy's southern group of forces. Thus, considering the mission of winning air superiority to have been accomplished, the allied command essentially engaged in isolating the area of ground force combat operations.

The second phase of Desert Storm began on the night of 23/24 February—the offensive operation by joint ground forces of the anti-Iraq coalition and U.S. Marines with the close support of tactical, army and deck-based aircraft.

Aircraft of the multinational forces dominated the air and A-10, F-15E and F-16 aircraft destroyed Iraqi Army tanks and IFV's almost with impunity, since measures were taken in advance to detect and destroy air defense equipment of Iraqi divisions, above all the ZSU-23-4's which, by admission of the air command, were the weapons most dangerous for aircraft. It must be noted that the air war did not end with the beginning of war on land. It did not even let up; conversely, the number of combat sorties on 26 February reached a record level (over 3,000).

The primary goal of the air raids was to give maximum assistance to successful development of the progress of the operation by ground forces. Therefore the main burden fell on A-10 attack aircraft, which operated at low altitudes. They destroyed 270 Iraqi tanks in the first 36 hours of combat operations.

Operation Desert Storm was suspended on 1 March 1991, exactly 100 hours after the beginning of the land offensive and 6 weeks from the moment war was declared. The process of peaceful settlement began.

(To be continued)

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Abandoned Equipment Pilfered From Former Military Airfield

PM1411110191 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2100 GMT 12 Nov 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Report from Petrozavodsk by S. Nikulin and A. Zakharov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [Nikulin] We have already told you about this airfield near Petrozavodsk. This spring its former owners, military airmen, left it. Hangers, equipment, and some military hardware were left unattended. A few days ago the militia once again stopped a truckload of stolen property here. People's Deputies Ivan Chukhin and Sergey Belozertsev are at the scene.

[S. Belozertsev, identified by caption] Property that was left abandoned here with virtually no guard on it is being stolen. Everything that can be is being stolen. I think that even the runway will be stripped soon. The Military Prosecutor's Office is as corrupt as the Karelian Republic Prosecutor's Office. That is why no proceedings have been instituted and everything is covered up straight off.

[Nikulin] Have deputies asked about this?

[Belozertsev] Of course they have. Several times.

Lt-Gen Skuratov on Threat From Sea-Launched Tomahawks

92UM0062A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 6, Jun 91 (signed to press 19 Jun 91)
pp 33-36

[Article by Lt Gen I. Skuratov, chief of the Naval Coastal Troops, under the rubric "Questions of Theory": "The 'Tomahawk': A Threat From the Sea"]

[Text] *The events in the Persian Gulf have shown yet again the true reason the leadership of the United States is reluctant to negotiate cutbacks in its naval forces. Their navy, after all, and first and foremost the carrier-strike and operational-missile groups (AUG and ORG), amphibious forces and Marines, are one of the main components of the armed forces used for operations in any regions of the world's oceans, even the most remote.*

The United States and its allies, as is well known, concentrated more than 150 various ships, including six aircraft carriers, two battleships with powerful armaments (Tomahawk cruise missiles and artillery up to 406-mm in caliber) and a large detachment of amphibious forces, including the most modern assault transport craft (Tarawa, Wasp and Whidbey Island classes), in the waters near Iraq in order to use them against forces and targets there from the sea.

Groups of naval forces varying in purpose constantly took part in combat operations to this or that extent in both stages of Operation Desert Storm. Shipborne aviation inflicted strikes both against military and industrial targets on Iraqi territory in depth, and against groupings of ground forces immediately in the defensive belt on Kuwaiti territory. The battleships "Wisconsin" and "Missouri" were the core of the ORG, striking at important military and industrial targets on Iraqi territory at a distance of up to 1,000 km [kilometers] with Tomahawk cruise missiles during the course of aerial operations. The battleships conducted methodical shelling of amphibious-landing defensive targets (PDO) immediately in the coastal strip for quite a long time prior to the offensive operations on land (before the landing of Marines). The ships were 10-12 miles offshore, which ensured the high effectiveness of fire of their guns to the entire depth of the amphibious-assault defenses (the Iraqi divisions occupied them in one echelon). The field artillery of the Iraqi ground forces could not fire on the battleships at such a distance from shore.

Amphibious forces carried out the Marine landing and fire support for the assault. The transfer area for troops and equipment from the assault transports to the landing craft, including aerial ones, was located not very far from shore, but also beyond the reach of Iraqi artillery. This ruled out return fire from the PDO against the assault ships in the transfer areas and, at the same time, provided for the necessary pace of landing and unloading of equipment on shore.

Iraq did not have modern shore-based missile and artillery systems able to strike at moving naval targets selectively or with high accuracy at distances comparable in range to the weaponry used by enemy surface vessels. The strikes by the U.S. Navy against Iraqi shore targets and troops thus met with virtually no return fire. The maneuvering of ships along the coast was disrupted only by mines.

The Iraqi coastal defenses thus did not hinder the strikes against the coast, thereby not fulfilling their purpose. The quite large groupings of ground forces, including the field artillery of five Iraqi divisions, near the coast also did not accomplish this task.

What conclusions follow from this? What is necessary today to ensure the guaranteed defense of the coast against possible strikes from sea?

There is no question that this task must be accomplished in integrated fashion, through the joint efforts of the various branches of the armed forces with a leading role for the navy. The navy can in turn cover the coast against strikes from the sea, including industrial and military facilities, populated areas and lines of communication located in the broad coastal strip, through the integrated efforts of all of its manpower and equipment and, immediately in the coastal region, the operations of shore-based troops.

It is opportune here to recall how much attention was directed toward coastal defenses by the Naval Narkomat [People's Commissariat] before the Great Patriotic War. It had fixed and mobile artillery batteries from 100-mm to 356-mm in caliber by the start of 1941. The first fascist combat vessel—a sweeper—was sunk namely by a coastal battery of the Northern Fleet. The German naval command took the combat capabilities of the Soviet coastal artillery into account. Its might was among the factors that did not permit the enemy to take the risk of conducting major operations by surface vessels against forces on our shores in any of the maritime theaters. Not one attempt at landing a major naval assault was made over the whole war. German ships, knowing or assuming the positioning of the shore batteries, as a rule did not enter their zones of fire, substantially restricting the area of their operations along our shores.

The development of coastal defenses was continued after the war, but mainly through equipping them with missiles. Attention toward the development of coastal artillery lessened, and some of the batteries were eliminated. The first "Sopka" coastal missile system, with the S-2 subsonic antiship cruise missile and having a range of 80 km, began arriving in the navy at the end of the fifties. The "Sopka" was not intended to fire against ground targets.

The Soviet Navy was a pioneer in the assimilation of shore-based antiship cruise missiles, and was for a long time alone among the navies of other countries around the world in this realm. The quantitative composition of the coastal missile units, however, was insufficient to

cover reliably the whole coastline of the USSR against strikes from surface vessels at sea. The coastal missile and artillery troops (Navy BRAV), in the face of the priority of the development of submarines, surface vessels and naval aviation, have by and large been created within the overall fleet according to the "whatever's-left-over" principle in recent decades.

The Sopka system was in service until the middle of the 1970s. It was later replaced by an improved second-generation missile with a range of about 250 km. The BRAV was getting a "longer reach" in its confrontation with the surface vessels of a potential enemy. The effectiveness of the missile units with these systems was quite high in those years.

The capabilities of the BRAV to fight them, however, gradually declined to the extent of the development and improvement of anti-aircraft defenses and EW equipment for surface vessels in the West. They also lost the advantage of the "long reach" with the appearance of the Tomahawk-class cruise missiles, with a range of 550 km against surface vessels and up to 1,200 km against shore targets in non-nuclear configuration.

The qualitative and quantitative development of the American Navy and its operative strategy of "forward naval lines," envisaging bringing the areas of the combat utilization of forces closer to the territory of the USSR, requires a reconsideration of some of our views as well. Under contemporary conditions the U.S. Navy, as was demonstrated by the events in the Persian Gulf, has the potential capability to land a major naval assault while providing support for it with powerful groups of surface vessels, including aircraft carriers, in areas many thousands of miles removed from its own borders. This circumstance also forces us to seek measures to strengthen the protection of our coast via augmentation of the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of the coastal troops.

The opinion exists that these tasks will be accomplished not only and not so much by the BRAV as by, first and foremost, submarines, naval aviation and surface vessels. All of that is correct. But the strike forces themselves need cover. Shore-based naval aviation, in accordance with the Paris Treaty of 1990, is subject to significant cutbacks in all three of our European fleets. The USSR Baltic and Black Sea fleets have moreover ceased to be part of any coalition as the result of the events that have transpired in Eastern Europe and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. The correlation of surface vessel forces in the Baltic and Black seas has been altered to a certain extent, and not in our favor, either. It would scarcely be advisable from an operational point of view, and would be quite expensive economically, to compensate entirely for these changes through the augmentation of Soviet groups of surface ships. The most optimal route under these conditions, it seems to me, is raising the capabilities of the BRAV groups of the fleets, since shore-based and artillery units require less spending for bases, are better covered by the air-defense

system and are protected against strikes from aircraft and surface vessels by the natural contours of the terrain.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War and local wars, as well as recent events in the Persian Gulf, confirms the necessity of having artillery, as well as missile systems, available in the naval system of coastal defense. Who today can rule out for certain a case where, as the result of an altered military and political climate, the American battleships turn up off our own shores? A precedent already exists, when the battleship Iowa entered the Baltic Sea in 1987. With what manpower and equipment could we oppose the actions of such powerful ships, aside from submarines, aircraft or surface vessels? Our forces, after all, will be actively performing other tasks.

I assume that we today require coastal artillery with the combat specifications close to those possessed by the guns of the surface vessels of the United States and the other NATO countries, with modern systems for detection, target designation and fire control. We have the capability to create such hardware, in my opinion, despite the trend of constant cutbacks in the spending for the navy, since the expenditures required for the BRAV are in any case only a small share of the overall funds appropriated for the development of the fleet and cannot have a substantial impact on the fulfillment of the shipbuilding program.

The United States kept battleships in mothballs for several decades and upgraded them in the 1980s, preserving the artillery and fitting them with cruise missiles and modern electronic equipment. Their navy thereby obtained combat vessels possessing high firepower and able to perform a broad circle of tasks as a result. The expenditures for the repair and overhaul of the equipment were moreover several times less than would have been required for building new vessels in that class.

The combat operations in the Persian Gulf were a convincing demonstration of the combat capabilities of such ships after their upgrading. Do we always behave so sensibly?

The naval BRAV has 152-mm, 180-mm and 305-mm fixed coastal artillery manufactured in the 1940s and 1950s, of a turret and semi-turret type, in reinforced-concrete revetments. Its range with conventional shells is 30-40 km. The batteries cover the most important stretches of coastline and ship basing areas. The guns are still in good condition and could serve for a long while yet. But the fire-control instruments and electronic equipment is obsolete, and the engineering service lines and systems are becoming unfit. It would be wasteful to disband these batteries. That is not, it seems to me, a proper state approach. It is more sensible to invest not so very much money in upgrading them, obtaining a palpable incremental increase in the system of defense for the regions they cover from strikes by surface vessels. It could otherwise occur that we could once more confirm

the saying that "the miser pays twice" when, by economizing with the artillery batteries, we spend several times more for the creation of new military hardware for the same purpose.

And last. The arming of NATO surface vessels with Tomahawk cruise missiles, able to strike at coastal facilities from long range, has posed another problem—keeping the enemy ships from approaching our coastline to the missile launch line. This can be solved if a new operational antiship missile system with a range comparable to the capabilities of the Tomahawk missile is created here.

Such systems, placed on mobile launchers and maneuvering freely along the coast, should be able to hit surface targets on the approaches to those lines. And they, in combination with other shore-based missile systems and artillery, will be the foundation of a highly effective system for action against naval targets, making it possible to increase return fire to the extent the enemy vessels approach the coast.

The battleships and other combat vessels of the multinational forces would scarcely have been able to feel so secure in the Persian Gulf had the Iraqis had such weapons. One could also object, true, that this solution to the problem is not part of the framework of the treaty on intermediate- and short-range missiles, under whose provisions fall land- or air-launched cruise missiles with a range over 500 km.

But first of all, the treaty is discussing the cruise missiles of ground and air forces able to strike ground targets. Second, nonsense can clearly be discerned here! The NATO countries arm their surface vessels with cruise missiles with significantly greater range that are able to strike at ground targets as well. Are we really deprived of the right to create the corresponding defensive measures? Naval coastal systems with long-range cruise missiles, for instance, intended only to hit naval targets. They are, after all, defensive rather than offensive weapons in such a configuration! It is intended not to threaten the coast and ground facilities of other countries, but only to protect one's own. It otherwise obtains that unilaterally advantageous conditions are being created for the navies of the capitalist nations.

The potential danger that arises with the appearance of the Tomahawk to the coastal sectors of the country insistently demands of us the taking of steps to give the defensive means of the navy capabilities comparable to those of the attack navies of the capitalist countries. That includes strengthening the navy's coastal troops, and their refitting and upgrading in timely fashion.

Only by resolving on that task can we be sure that no surface vessels will be able to shell the Soviet coast with impunity.

There is, naturally, a second way as well—the conclusion of a treaty to reduce strategic naval arms and cut back navies. That way is preferable and safer, both for us and

for most of the countries around the world. Whether that opportunity is realized today depends on the stance of the United States.

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Visit to Nuclear Submarine Fleet Academy

92UM0016A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
05 Oct 91 First edition p 5

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank V. Maryukha, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "We Are Telling it for the First Time": "The Nuclear Fleet Academy"]

[Text] The residents of this provincial Russian town guessed long ago that navy souls were concealed beneath the khaki uniforms worn by the officers and enlisted men who trod the paths leading to the complex of buildings behind the blank wall each day. They said something else aloud, however—that an atomic reactor was concealed there, behind the fence, and this was dangerous, of course.

The firm behind the fence, whose presence was not manifested in any way in the life of the town, was also the object of close scrutiny by all sorts of Western intelligence agents, who occupied spots where the pickings were good in the surrounding area. This facility was concealed not just in the past, however. Its status is the same today. I am the first journalist to get a fairly good knowledge of it and to tell what secrets the Navy is protecting here, in the Russian interior.

A Nuclear-Powered Submarine a Long Way From the Sea

After some monotonous pitching in gale-force waves the nuclear-powered submarine, slightly down by the head, began the descent to its assigned depth. The arrow on the depth gauge began oscillating at the 40-meter mark and, along with the control room deck, which suddenly disappeared from beneath the feet, the nuclear submarine swept forward, "racking up" the meters of ocean expanse overhead. "Horizontal rudders jammed!"—the boatswain's report literally still hung in the air, when the alarm bell broke in: "Damage-Control Alarm!" Making an effort to remain on my feet, I recorded on my dictaphone the terse orders and reports from the control room crew. The submarine slowed its swift descent into the abyss. Now it was trimmed by the stern and we were surfacing. The depth gauge showed another 100 meters to the surface, but I went over the guard rail... of the simulator and stepped onto the concrete "dock" of the training room. The illusion I had experienced did not pass for a long time, however, so realistic was the sensation of submersion and the emergency, even though there was neither submarine nor ocean abyss. It was hundreds of kilometers to the sea....

The simulator on which I "went to sea" was built by the clever fellows at the Navy's training center, an institution in many ways unique, fundamentally different from

all the others long known to us. Like other establishments which maintain a false front to protect the military and state secrets without which it is still inconceivable for a single state to exist, the nuclear fleet's training center has continued to exist as a legend for more than a single decade. In photographs touched by the yellowing of time I recognized well-known admirals, commanders of nuclear submarines and forces, some still on active duty and others retired, wearing khaki uniforms and military overcoats. This was also part of the center's history. When the masquerade was finally abolished and the sailors appeared on the town streets in all their glory beneath the blue and white Navy flag, humorists commented on the situation with a mundane anecdote. An old woman, they said, immediately asked a gallant captain: "Dear, how do I get to the sea from here?..."

Humor is humor, though, and is of no harm to the service, but the fleet cannot get along without the training center either now or in the future. Officially it goes back to 1956, but it all began a long time before then. A few years before the center was established, specialists from the electrical and engineering division of the nuclear submarine *Leninskiy Komsomol* trained at one of the first Soviet nuclear power plants. The second crew of the nuclear fleet's first-born also trained there. Academician A. Aleksandrov was in charge of the submariners' training during those years.

When nuclear submarines ceased to be a unique phenomenon in the fleet, the need arose to train not individuals but scores and hundreds of officers, warrant officers, petty officers and seamen, who would be charged with handling the nuclear submarines in the ocean depths. Since then the three frame-and-panel barracks, which were at the same time laboratories, classrooms and housing for the first students of the navy's new sciences, have been replaced with modern buildings pierced by pipes, electric wiring and computer links. This is what makes the training center resemble a giant submarine.

Computer to the Attack

"To be more precise," I was told by Capt 1st Rank V. Katomin, the center's deputy chief for training, "there are several nuclear submarines within these walls. In other words, that equipment which is actually on modern nuclear submarines and which is set up here at the center, the simulators put together out of it and the computer training systems enable us to train several crews simultaneously, both newly formed ones and crews undergoing advanced training between cruises."

Vladimir Fedorovich and Capt 1st Rank (Reserve) Ye. Zolotarev, who headed the training center until recently, were my guides through the intricate arrangement of training compartments and simulation rooms. The explanations, however, were provided by training course chiefs, instructors, technicians and laboratory assistants, most of whom had either created these "guts" of the

training center with their own hands or assembled industrial models. The tens of millions of rubles invested in the equipment, simulators and training programs would never have paid for themselves a hundred times over if the center's main staff were not truly devoted to their work. Practical Experts with a capital E and infinitely devoted to the fleet, they would not let me leave without showing me at least a small bit of the capabilities inherent in the equipment used for the training. It included that control room built by center specialists out of materials at hand, where I had experienced the vicissitudes of an underwater "accident." Warrant Officer B. Krivopisha had eagerly turned the rocking device from a simulator for training helicopter pilots into the most realistic simulator of ocean rocking and trim. An industrially produced simulator of the same kind is still at the depot because assembly parts were never delivered and due to its incredible size.

The training center also has the reactor compartment from a nuclear submarine. Fears of the town residents that it is dangerous are far-fetched, however. The processes occurring in the "nuclear" reactor, around a meter in diameter and slightly more than 2 meters deep (the simulator also makes it possible to look inside it, into the very center of a nuclear inferno, which not a single operator of a nuclear power plant will ordinarily see in his entire life), are modeled in the readings of numerous instruments and on graphic control charts by the "brain" of an electronic computer.

Capt 1st Rank V. Komissarov told about another simulator.

"The simulator cost 5 million rubles in 1977 prices, the year it was built. It pays for itself in just 4 months. The simulator is designed for training three command teams simultaneously. The instructor can operate against them, acting as the enemy and using the enemy's tactics (we ordinarily conduct these exercises near graduation). One feature of the simulator is that it can simulate a situation covering a large area and vary the size of the "battlefield," with simultaneous tracking of 16 targets and simulated employment of weapons and electronic equipment. This sort of high-intensity situation cannot be created in the fleet, not to speak of giving the commander of a nuclear submarine the opportunity to practice employing the weapons. Consider this fact. A large-scale exercise involving various forces can cost several million rubles. The coefficient of similarity to realistic operations is only 0.1. The simulator, with a degree of similarity of 0.5-0.7 and the possibility of performing a considerably greater number of missions, takes none of this money out of the fleet budget. Furthermore, the commander using a simulator is not constrained in his decision-making and can improve his skills by trying all sorts of tactical innovations. This is particularly important, since the Navy has significantly reduced the amount of training at sea.

A Cracked Door to the Future?

The existence of this extensive assemblage of simulators with its great processing capability is easy to explain. The nation's first simulator for developing skills in working with a nuclear power plant (YaEU) was built at the center when it was just coming into being. Today, however, when the center has switched from training power-engineering specialists to the comprehensive training of nuclear submarine crews, the "assortment" of simulators has been enlarged significantly and provides not only for training the narrowly specialized individual for a specific nuclear submarine but also for running an entire crew through any kind of hypothetical situation. The training center as it is today is therefore, figuratively speaking, the academy of the nuclear fleet.

Both the center and the crews trained there understand this. Also important is the fact that those in charge and the activists at the center receive the support of the fleet's command element. Incidentally, many of the fleet's leaders themselves completed this unique academy, including the current commander in chief of the Navy.

When I met with Vice Adm A. Kuzmin, the navy's chief of combat training, prior to departing on assignment for the training center, he told me that I just had to visit the laboratory for the adoption of computer technology in the Navy's combat training system.

"The Navy's future lies in these developments," Anatoliy Aleksandrovich told me. "This is the next step in the process of eliminating computer illiteracy."

The laboratory, which has been in existence since 1989, is headed by Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Zolotarev. Primarily heads of courses and instructors from the training center who have been released into the reserves work there.

"The laboratory works in several areas simultaneously," Yevgeniy Nikolayevich told me. "We have already prepared more than 100 programs for performing special computations in the combat training and the day-to-day activities, and training programs for so-called intelligent (conceptual) simulators, for the information support system for main command posts, and others."

A. Nesterov, an associate in the laboratory, demonstrated for me several man-machine training dialogues, which are no less entertaining than computer games and at the same time incomparably more cognitive. The author of the programs was undoubtedly aided in their development by many years of service to the navy on nuclear submarines and at the center, and the experience embodied in the achievements of scientific thought is now accessible to many future generations of submariners. Incidentally, I was already familiar with one of the various programs, in which the trainee had to prevent the loss of a submarine with jammed hydroplanes (I observed this operation in the "rocking" simulator). And although I did not specially memorize the commands, by

trial and error (and the machine for mastering the subject makes this possible) I was perfectly capable of saving my nuclear submarine, "sinking" on the computer screen. For the professional this would certainly not be difficult, and the skills are acquired without any risk to a real submarine or its crew, and every action is fixed in the mind in the form of visual images.

As Long as the Navy Exists?

It is not very easy in a magazine article to tell about all that I saw at the nuclear fleet's training center. There are more than 200 simulators alone, and each of them deserves a separate discussion. And so many other interesting conceptions, so many training systems designed and built by the people there. At a time of overall shortages this is far from easy to do. The political instability is also leaving its mark on efforts to improve the training process. For example, work has been halted on an extremely complex simulator for conducting two-way exercises for ten nuclear submarines simultaneously. This has resulted from a failure to deliver assembly parts from Armenia. And what about the financial aspect? The training center's chief is allocated a total of only 400 a year as incentives for scientific research. How can this be balanced against the multimillion-ruble return from the introduction of simulators and computer training systems?

There are also other problems preventing the training center from fully living up to its "academic" purpose.

There has been almost a total turnover of the teaching staff in the past 4 years. The vacancies are filled by people with extensive experience in the service: squadron specialists, commanders of nuclear submarines and heads of command departments. It takes 5-6 years, however, for them to become experienced instructors. Three or four years later their service term elapses, and they are released into the reserve. Is this a positive thing for the state?

It is a very simple and easy matter to break up a training facility and destroy a school which has been developed. It takes decades, however, to build one. Furthermore, it is not just the Navy which needs this "academy." Despite its secrecy, its developments could come in handy also to civilian seamen. Only at first glance does this appear impossible.

Nor has the training center escaped the social and personal service problems existing for the entire navy: poor housing conditions for the crews, a shortage of housing for the instructors and the need for essential goods and food items. The center is not washing its hands of these problems, but it is more concerned about something else: that those things without which the fleet cannot exist not be destroyed in the overall passion for the declassification and destruction of all former structures. There are already examples of this. A future training center in Estonia is in jeopardy. This center has already had "outside visitors" and there are specific missions the mechanical transfer of which to other

training centers is not so simple. This training center for nuclear submariners is just as unique.

Visitors from other military departments to this fleet academy, far from the sea, could only marvel at the scope of the training process and dream of having something like it for themselves. Nor would such a center be rejected by other submariners, who are experiencing difficulties with the training at their bases. More than that, comprehensive training for the fleet is simply inconceivable without such centers. The future lies with them.

Commercial, Foreign Partners Should Recover Naval Scrap Metal

*92UM0112A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Nov 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Captain Third Rank V. Maryukha, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "About Rusty 'Gold' and 'Aqua Regia'"]

[Text] Vessels struck off the Navy's rosters, living out their lives in peculiar cemeteries in the vicinity of many seaside cities, were referred to as gold sitting underfoot by the authors of some articles published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. This comparison has only become possible because in the world market, naval metal scrap is valued at tens of millions of dollars. Alas, on closer examination, it turns out that the illusory gold "melts" in solvents less potent than "aqua regia" which has always been used to determine whether the precious yellow metal is genuine.

Recently, the Navy broke a contract, which had not yet taken effect, with a company which proposed to sell a small segment of scrap metal from the "reserves" accumulated by the Navy. A low rate of profitability for the Navy was the reason. However, these profits are low if the tons of scrap metal are converted into American dollars. Actually, this process is far more complicated. The world scrap metal market formed a long time ago and it is not all that easy to find a profitable niche in it. So, one has to trade at lower prices. However, the state charges quite high taxes on these lower prices as well. We could resign ourselves to this: After all withholdings, a profit in foreign exchange will still be made. However, one needs a license to sell scrap metal abroad in order to generate this profit. The license "costs" a lot. For example, a contract to sell scrap metal abroad may specify that the company must prepare the same amount of retired ships and vessels to be melted down for the domestic market as it does for export. This is what renders all operations to utilize ship cemeteries economically disadvantageous.

Anatoliy Anatolyevich Yakimov, a representative of the Konek Company with which the Navy did not agree on price, told me: "If a vessel is afloat the work on its pre-sale preparation (conversion) and towing to a foreign port costs an acceptable amount of money. The subsequent breaking of the ship to commonly accepted scrap metal standards is the customer's problem. To deliver

scrap metal to the domestic market, we need to have a special or adapted production capacity for breaking ships which neither the Navy nor the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry have. But if they had such capacities this would not solve the problem: The cost of a ton of scrap metal in the country is well below the cost of cutting it. This difference 'devours' foreign exchange profits."

We should add to this the cost of efforts to prepare retired ships for cutting. This has to do with the fact that quite a few of them are not afloat. For example, in the Pacific Fleet alone, the cost of lifting ships resting in numerous cemeteries is estimated to be 15 million rubles [R] in 1989 prices. This "gold" is getting rusty; its particles are dispersed by sea currents for many miles around, poisoning more than just our territorial waters. It is altogether absurd to hope that the state will come up with funds for yet another social program, given a multi-billion budget deficit. Independent economic operations by the Navy in this sphere are likewise very much in question: The available auxiliary resources are insufficient to even maintain the vessels which are in the order of battle. Naturally, the aging of combat vessels and a reduction of the Navy will exacerbate the problem still further. However, yet another, more painful blow will be dealt to the Navy budget even before this happens. A resolution of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, which introduces procedures for utilizing natural resources at a fee, will take effect on 1 January next year. The Navy budget will hardly suffice to pay for damage inflicted on Russia, to say nothing of lawsuits by foreign states to whose shores the tentacles of poisonous traces from the ship cemeteries are reaching. Will the Navy will be forced not only to sell scrap metal without profit to itself, but also to pay extra for somebody deigning to assume responsibility for taking care of the retired ships and thus saving the environment? This is far from a rhetorical question: Alas, this is a real threat.

Where is the way out? Where is the 'aqua regia' which will truly reveal whether gold is hidden in the semi-submerged hulls of ships which have done their jobs? Paradoxical as it may be, the market which has presented the Navy with a great many problems may help us extract profits from the patently unprofitable program to utilize naval scrap metal. How? Here are the pertinent thoughts of E. Mansurov, general director of the Scientific Technical Progress Association for Business Cooperation With Foreign Countries (ASTEP).

Eduard Rashitovich said: "We should proceed from the fact that we will not cope with the utilization of retired ships without partners in Western countries. This is due to the backwardness of technical equipment in the ship-breaking industry, a shortage of funds for its development, and our limited potential in the world scrap metal market. Without the world market, getting rid of ship dumps which have been accumulating for years is altogether out of the question because any endeavor to

utilize the ships is bound to be unprofitable without selling the scrap metal abroad."

We may understand the state, which is concerned about metallurgical combines experiencing an acute shortage of scrap metal. This explains the strict quotas for scrap metal collection which are assigned to the Navy. Because of these plans, sailors sometimes engage in stripping retired ships which are still afloat instead of towing them to some foreign port for sale before they sink. However, the issue of charging blast and open hearth furnaces may be solved even without these plans. To this end, we need to introduce a production chain for which the Association for Business Cooperation is offering calculations. The essence of it is in selling manufactured rolled goods rather than scrap. Given the severance of centralized relations, it is more economically advantageous to sign direct contracts between the Navy, the enterprise utilizing the ships, the metallurgical combine, and the foreign customer. In the process, an entire set of acute problems will be solved: cleaning up the bodies of water, breaking ships into scrap metal, providing work for metallurgists and shipbuilders (the latter will inevitably encounter unemployment when the Navy is cut back), and generating convertible currency profits. Besides, quite a bit of metal will not "sail" abroad; there will be something left for the domestic market.

Of course, at first sight, the Navy's profit will decrease abruptly given this approach to business. However, this is so at first sight only, because nobody has seriously calculated the imaginary advantages of the monopoly ownership of the ship cemeteries. Western entrepreneurs have long understood that their desire to make money should go hand in hand with the same opportunity for others. This presupposes cooperation with a clear-cut division of mutual commitments and, accordingly, a share of profits. Even industrial giants do not neglect cooperation with small companies if it makes sense economically. For the Navy, the chain proposed by the ASTEP Association may indeed become the "philosopher's stone" which turns rusty metal into gold.

N. Rybakov, chief of the association's department of production, research, and development, told me: "We have already entered into a business relationship with the Navy, and on a mutually advantageous basis at that. Three submarines were utilized at a ship repair enterprise in Kerch by using technology we proposed."

In the pictures Nikolay Viktorovich produced, it was easy to track how a submarine turned into neat blocks suitable for smelting. In the process, only about a week is needed for work in the dock; cutting is effected by means of pinpoint blasting. "Grandfather's" blowtorches, which are still the main tool at ship repair enterprises, are used only in the final stage when the cut blocks need to be "reduced to fragments."

N. Rybakov commented on the pictures: "Any structures may be cut in this manner, from ships to tanks and shells. The fact that we intend to seek a partnership with

foreign investors while we have this modern technology is due to our backwardness in techniques for cutting scrap metal into small pieces and the need to have an agent in the world market who would represent our interests. Italians or Dutch could become such partners. They have already made such proposals..."

At present, many companies are offering their services to the Navy. As a rule, they begin by promising formidable dividends. Alas, many of those making promises have already hastened to retract their words. The ASTEP Association does not intend to promise anything.

E. Mansurov said: "We cannot replace the state, which has left the Navy to its own devices as far as utilization of retired vessels is concerned. Let other companies work on this problem too. We will not interfere with each other, and there will be enough work for all. Time will tell who succeeds in making gold from rusty metal."

Is this to say that only time may be an indicator which distinguishes gold from rust? What will the Navy get as the ship tombs are cleared out? No net profit is expected in this case right away, but something no less valuable is. First of all, Navy men will cease to be viewed by society as "nature wreckers." Second, human resources released during cuts in the Armed Forces will be able to find a niche within market structures. After all, the utilization of naval scrap metal may be performed by setting up joint stock companies and small enterprises. Work will be found for vessel specialists in utilizing the retired materiel; new jobs will appear at ship repair enterprises which are not enjoying the best of times. Scrap metal for the domestic market will return to the Navy in the form of spare parts, and timely repairs and modernization of line vessels. Ultimately, new entities willing to invest in naval programs will appear. Ultimately, we may very well come to norms commonly accepted in the world, according to which care for the ship, from laying down the vessel to utilization, is entirely the responsibility of the supplier company. This is advantageous both for the Navy and the shipbuilders.

I would not venture to assert unambiguously that this is the way it is going to be: Market trends will change, new laws will be adopted, and a new solution to the problem will be found. However, at present this path, the path of businesslike cooperation with state and commercial structures and foreign partners, is much more preferable than attempts by the Navy to get rid of the burden of retired vessels on its own. The point is not to miss the proper time. The rusty metal will never turn into gold otherwise.

Northern Fleet Official on Winter Food Supplies

*92UM0120A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Nov 91 First edition p 2*

[Interview with Northern Fleet Food Service Chief Colonel L. Tikhomirov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Non-Staff Correspondent Captain-Lieutenant I. Babenko: "The Seamen Will not Starve"]

[Text] Northern Fleet Food Service Chief Colonel L. Tikhomirov is convinced that seamen will not starve and he stated this during an interview with our non-staff correspondent.

[Babenko] Lev Pavlovich, the campaign to purchase food supplies for the fleet for the winter is coming to an end. How did it progress?

[Tikhomirov] I will begin with the fact that today the fleet's requirements for potatoes have been 90 percent satisfied, for the remaining vegetables—30 percent, and for fruit—50 percent. And let me say we have a complete supply of onions. The greatest concern is caused by the supply of carrots and beets—by way of illustration, Ukraine, our main supplier, has only shipped to the fleet a third of what was promised.

The situation is complicated by the fact that cold weather will arrive in the Polar Region any day now and even if the vegetables and fruit arrive, the produce may turn out to be slightly frozen. And then the rail cars will have to be equipped with "Burzhuyks" [small iron stoves made from improvised materials]; it is a good thing that we have the experience, but maintaining the temperature required for a state of preservation entails considerable additional expenditures. On the whole, summing up, we will basically complete the vegetable purchasing campaign in two weeks.

As for other food supplies, they have been provided to us within established standards. Indeed, at present there is a shortage of fish supplies, but only because we do not want to take mackerel which seamen complain about a lot and we are waiting for the arrival of perch, cod and hake. They have under-supplied us with canned fish but I think that these supplies will be replenished by the end of the year.

[Babenko] This fall, for the first time, a comparatively large number of naval personnel and vehicles are taking part in laying in vegetables. How are the people working?

[Tikhomirov] This is really the first time in many years that the command authorities have paid so much attention to the vegetable supply. Since September 1st, nearly 1,000 North Sea Fleet seamen and more than 200 vehicles have been involved with this in 11 Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian oblasts.

According to our data, fleet purchasing teams are working intensely and conscientiously and the local response has been very good. Everyday they detail seamen to carry out the work and they will be paid the money they earned in kind at the end of the harvest.

[Babenko] But how is your service's cooperation taking shape with the now already sovereign republics?

[Tikhomirov] Unfortunately, there are problems enough here. For example, military sovkhoses in Odessa Military District raised 2,000 tons of grain for the Northern Fleet. But republic authorities have banned the export of

food. And if we get the vegetables within the limits of the state order from Ukraine without difficulty, then we cannot purchase either meat or butter on their territory. We will end up buying the products in Belorussia and in the Baltic Region (except for Estonia), although prices are also higher there. But we will have to pay, otherwise we will be left without meat or butter—in adequate quantities in any case.

[Babenko] Food prices have substantially increased compared to last year. Is fleet food service still able to pay?

[Tikhomirov] We need to get used to the new prices and we are no longer amazed why, by way of illustration, potatoes cost one ruble and 30 kopeks in Brest Oblast, but the cost is R2.50 in Smolensk. Prices are also high for other food groups, nevertheless we have no special problems with paying bills; the Central Food Directorate adequately finances us.

[Babenko] It is good that, judging by everything, the fleet will be completely supplied with food for winter. But is there a guarantee that the supplies will last until summer?

[Tikhomirov] Unfortunately, many storage areas that exist at naval garrisons do not meet modern requirements. But nevertheless food service unit and large unit workers have tried to prepare storage areas to insure that vegetables and fruit are preserved until the following harvest. Inspections have revealed that some that were worse than the others were prepared for winter vegetable storage by some fleet construction directorate units. At the end of October, we will once again inspect the quality of vegetable storage.

[Babenko] Lev Pavlovich, as far as I know, this procedure has already existed in the North Sea garrison for several years; the experience of the best managers is widely disseminated....

[Tikhomirov] All of that is true. And we prepare food service heads of other garrisons for this same work. This is already the second year that we have gone over to storing potatoes by using vermiculite, i.e., puffed mica. Experience has shown that losses in this case are significantly reduced. And if we bought one rail car of vermiculite last year, we will buy two now.

[Babenko] Considering the food problems in the country, now might be the time to start thinking about what to feed the fleet next winter. In your opinion, how attractive does the concept appear of creating fleet military sovkhoses in the middle strip and expansion of facilities of already existing fleet sovkhoses?

[Tikhomirov] We think this is a very timely idea and we are now conducting practical analysis. Let us say that we are examining the question of creating military sovkhoses in Volgograd Oblast to provide fodder for fleet private farms. Fleet food service will do everything necessary to do that.

Missile Forces Commission to Abolish Political Organs

92UM0092A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
01 Nov 91 First edition p 2

[Article containing statement by Strategic Rocket Forces Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Combat Readiness Colonel-General Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major A. Dolinin: "A Thousand Vacancies"]

[Text] Structures that have been established in the branches of the Armed Forces, local organs, and the Ministry of Defense Commission for Management of Military-Political Organs are involved in similar work. Our correspondent was at this commission's last session at the Strategic Rocket Forces central staff.

Strategic Rocket Forces Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Combat Readiness Colonel-General Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev heads its work and this is what he said about his appointment to the commission:

Our task is primarily creative. Party and political organs already no longer exist and we have to create new structures for work with personnel. We are not simply replacing the signboard or transferring people according to staff "squares" but filling the work with new content. The fates of thousands of people are being decided.

The committee's composition includes people with a great deal of life experience and time in service, experts in their profession: scholars and officers from the troops. Working groups have been established: on cadre issues, analysis and realization of complaints and applications, and others.

A work procedure has been developed. The working groups develop their own proposals while considering local proposals on the eve of the discussion of specific issues.

As of today, more than half of the officers have been recommended in an efficiency report. The absolute majority of former political workers want to serve in the new structures for work with personnel. The desire to occupy command, engineer, headquarters, and rear services positions is welcomed. Dozens of such appointments have already occurred. Right now there are more than 1,000 vacancies that are suitable for former political workers in the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Major-General A. Nikolayev delivered the latest analysis of statements and letters. No such complaints have come into the commission during this entire period—the commission members' personal and direct contact with people locally excludes written appeals.

The novelty of the situation is compelling the commission to make non-standard decisions. By way of illustration, we proposed that all political workers, regardless of age, undergo a military-medical commission on the eve of certification: The military-medical commission's conclusion was needed to individually approach each person's fate. The commission's decision was interpreted differently in the troops due to the stereotype that has developed (people undergo a military-medical commission prior to discharge into the reserves) and it offended many people. As a result, the need arose to explain the commission's position in written form.

Publicity about its work is lacking in the troops. The missileers do not have their own press and not everyone will read the official telegram. At times, unneeded questions and incorrect interpretations arise due to a lack of information locally. Right now commission members are preparing operational information on the results of each session and the specific decisions made.

Introducing Armed Forces to Market Economy

91SV0089A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "The Fleet in the Stormy Seas of the Market—Or, When Will the Sails of Nevikon Be Filled by the Wind?"]

[Text] Last year a group of specialists from the Ministry of Defense developed a draft of a conceptual framework for the entry of the armed forces of the USSR into the market economy. Most of the "market" proposals (both those that became part of the draft and those that went "overboard") were submitted by naval sailors. They concerned first and foremost a concept that is new to more than many servicemen alone—commercial activity. But the realities of our life are such that even the most progressive ideas sometimes lose their novelty and attractiveness before, rather than after, their realization gets started after a multitude of consents and hashing outs. How many pencils were broken, for example (this was written about in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA as well), for the sake of attaining the right for military units to sell off their own used equipment and matériel without intermediaries in the person of the commercial center of Gosnab? And what of it? Today the unit commander has the right to trade independently with civilian organizations and offer services at contract prices, but... The question of material vested interest of servicemen in the results of commercial activity was resolved literally just the other day.

"If the terms for the sale of unsalable items and equipment that has been written off had not been dictated to us from the very start," said the deputy chief of Naval Rear Services, Rear Admiral I. Vasilyev, in a conversation with me, "then we could have supplemented the budget of the fleet with a sum of roughly 40 million rubles. And that is after paying over the complete residual value of the matériel to the state budget. That income would have allowed us to resolve the program of housing construction in the fleet in five years.

"You will agree that practically every other officer, warrant officer or petty officer in need of housing or an improvement of living conditions in the fleet has a vested interest in such business. It is not worth it in general, in my opinion, for we military people to sit with our arms folded and wait for a roof over our heads, when it is entirely possible for us to earn the funds independently for housing, for the pension fund and for the social-protections fund for servicemen."

True, you won't whip up much capital in the forms of commercial activity that have already been permitted and are being practiced.

"The Navy, for example, has been permitted the short-term lease of auxiliary vessels," Capt 2nd Rank S. Ulayev related to me, heading the group for the sale of military and technical matériel that was created in the

organizational structure of the Naval Rear Services last year. "Our ships, however, do not conform to accepted international standards for freight shipments. We thus have to seize on any offers, at knowingly low prices, just so as to earn something. These chance earnings will not allow us to finance any program, not even the repair of ships in the same auxiliary fleet..."

The most acceptable version for the entry of the fleet into the market, they feel at Naval Rear Services, would be a joint-stock company. The main thing, with the presence of several founders, would be to hold a controlling block of stock so as to direct the activity of the company into the necessary channels. There will be no contradictions whatsoever therein between the ban on servicemen holding dual jobs and their vested interest in the end results of the activity of the joint-stock company—no one will have to take it into their heads to accuse an officer or warrant officer of getting a large winning for a lottery ticket. And the stock is the same as a lottery.

And such a joint-stock company (AO), which has received the name of Nevikon, has actually been created and registered. It already has several dozen proposals without even having started commercial activity yet, including some from foreign firms. Why such attention toward it? Because the Navy is one of the most stable state structures, with its own means of transportation, berthing space, warehouses, yards and landholdings, which in and of itself facilitates the development of business. One plus to all this is the guarantee of the precise observance of the terms of contracts.

The former minister of defense, canceling out the year-long labor of Capt 2nd Rank S. Ulayev, wrote in July of this year on the documents for the Nevikon AO that had been submitted, "Everything could be sold off this way." Other cares evidently did not allow him to understand that the discussion here did not concern selling off at all, but rather accumulation through intelligent management of additional funds for the development of the "peaceful" programs of the Navy.

"Take just the question of the use of ships that have been written off," Sergey Aleksandrovich Ulayev shares plans based on specific proposals. "They could be sold for scrap (some intermediary organizations, by the way, sometimes propose such variations, but even with the observance of profits for the Navy their profits reach eight dollars for every ruble invested. And that is at a time when a dollar costs more than 20 rubles on the black market. That's how it could work!) But the ships could also be given a second life, which is economically much more advantageous. Landing ships, for example, could become excellent ferries in places where there are not well-equipped berthing facilities and there is a need for shipments by sea. The written-off ships of the Navy, in other words, could make up a whole new shipping company, under the flag of Nevikon, able to bring in a

high and stable profit. And that is just one of the many areas of activity that are defined by the charter of the joint-stock company."

The funds received could be directed entirely toward providing the fleet with food—the kolkhozes and sovkhoses today are clearly in no hurry to fulfill their deliveries of, for example, potatoes at a price of 85 kopecks a kilogram when they are getting eight rubles for them even in the state retail system. The fact that some of the fleet rear-services structures that exist today will be 'laying down' their authority quite painlessly will be, in my opinion, an entirely natural phenomenon. The officers that are freed up therein could take jobs in the joint-stock company and the affiliates and small enterprises it is creating. Sergey Aleksandrovich, by the way, demonstrated to me the product of one of these small enterprises created for the future structures of Nevikon: rigging pendants manufactured from the by-products of production and, at the same time, 200 times stronger than analogous steel ones. The cost of one meter of these pendants on the world market is 5-12 dollars. They will also sew sailor's undershirts here; even with a regard for procurements of raw materials on the commodities exchange at contract prices, the cost of the shirts will not exceed two rubles—in the face of a state price of 27. The products for sailors include very light insulated suits for disaster victims. They will be several times better than foreign models, with all other basic data being identical,

including their heat-retention properties. There are exclusively military products as well—fabrics that are impervious to radio that are able to alter the image of a ship to make it unrecognizable. And once again at low prices, high quality, in any needed amount and in the shortest possible time. Isn't this an example of assiduous management under market conditions? And what can you say about a brick plant that is putting out its products before its walls are up?

And Nevikon is also, rather, a prototype of its future structures. I, along with my interlocutors at the Naval Rear Services, was also puzzled—why future? It is clear even today, after all, that a joint-stock company would not only be simply advantageous for the fleet, but would also make it possible to resolve even those issues that have been insoluble for decades in the corridors of state power. There is no official ban on such forms of economic management, either. But there is no permission either, and that, in my opinion, is the chief misfortune of all of our good undertakings. Can it really be more seemly to beg for budget increases with outstretched hand than to earn the money honestly?

I think that not I alone would invest money in shares of stock of Nevikon if presented with the opportunity, since that form of organization would make it possible to feel more confident in the elements of the market. It is only unclear when its wind will fill the sails of Nevikon.

Interview With New Civil Defense Chief

92UM0064A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Oct 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with Col Gen Boris Yevgenyevich Pyankov, USSR civil defense chief, by Lt Col I. Sergeyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "There Might Not Be a War, but Then There Are Accidents and Disasters..."]

[Text]

First Interview in the New Position

In this article we are introducing to the readers Col-Gen B. Pyankov, who was fairly recently appointed civil defense chief of the USSR. Boris Yevgenyevich was born into a large working-class family in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in 1935. Prior to entering the army he worked 2 years as a lathe operator at a plant. He served his regular 2-year term and the following year entered the Far East Tank School, from which he graduated in 1959. He served in all the command positions. His last position before his present appointment was commander of the Siberian Military District.

His wife is a medical worker.

His son is a senior lieutenant and a company commander in the Turkestan Military District. His daughter is married to an officer.

He likes historical novels and fishing.

[Sergeyev] Boris Yevgenyevich, you assumed this position at a tense and troubled time for the nation. What problems have you encountered, and what matters have to be resolved first?

[Pyankov] The situation is indeed a tense one. As the republics separate they are declaring ownership of Union property, including civil defense headquarters, military formations and motor transport. Even in this situation, however, our mission remains the same: to maintain the combat readiness of the civil defense units and formations at a level which enables them to perform their duties in emergency situations.

[Sergeyev] And is this spontaneous division of property in the republics subject to any control? Is it being directed in any way?

[Pyankov] Right now we are finding compromises and mutual understanding. The minister of defense of the USSR recently signed an agreement on the transfer of civil defense headquarters and units to the jurisdiction of the governments of the sovereign republics. Specifically, the Baltic republics. They are now within the structure of the kray security department. The fate of those officers who do not wish to remain to serve there is being decided.

[Sergeyev] And what about those who want to remain?

[Pyankov] This is also an interesting matter. It will be a different state, after all. This means that those officers must first be released from the Soviet Army and only then transfer to their department. This is theoretical. How everything goes in reality remains to be seen.

[Sergeyev] Do you believe that mutually acceptable alternatives will be found which will make a civil defense "divorce" possible without any scandal?

[Pyankov] I believe so. But this is not the main thing. Will the republics which separate be capable of performing the missions involved in mopping up after accidents, disasters and other emergencies? Will those republics want to make the major outlays for civil defense, and will they treat it seriously?

[Sergeyev] Excuse me, but why should this be a headache for you? These are now their problems.

[Pyankov] In a way that is so. But let us look at the situation from a different perspective. The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is located in Lithuania. Should there be an accident (God forbid, of course) like the one at Chernobyl, it would affect everyone, including Russia.

The world understood long ago that accidents at nuclear power plants cannot be localized. They affect distant areas, and people must unite to combat the effects. We are doing the opposite and splitting up. And in the process destroying all those things which are of vital importance to each of us.

[Sergeyev] But you still hope that common sense will prevail over the eagerness to separate and you will be able to preserve the civil defense structure in its present form?

[Pyankov] We will be able to talk about preserving the structure or some variation only after it becomes clear what form the Union will take. I recently visited Belarus. I held preliminary talks with the republic's leaders, in which we expressed a mutual desire to preserve the civil defense forces intact. We have not reached this kind of mutual understanding with all of the republics, however. And one can already see in certain breakaway republics a tendency to reduce the civil defense forces to a minimum and economize on civil defense. Nothing good can come of this. The consequences of such moves can be bad. We could find ourselves tomorrow without the first line of rescue forces. Despite this, however, we shall seek ways to interact and preserve a unified civil defense system.

[Sergeyev] And ahead lies a major reduction of the military. To what extent do you think this will affect the civil defense forces?

[Pyankov] To a significant extent, I am afraid. And I do not want this to happen. Not at all because I am afraid of becoming a "general without troops." Yes, the danger of war has been reduced and we no longer have a "likely

enemy." Our blemishes—sloppiness, negligence and a low level of labor and technological discipline—remain, however.

Not a day goes by without a report from some part of the nation on some accident, large, medium or small. Just this morning I received a report that a pedestrian bridge at a railroad station collapsed during the night right onto some fuel tanks. The fire covered an area of 2 hectares. A civil defense staff and regiment were the first and main forces mopping up. In our unstable—to put it mildly—situation it is at the very least irresponsible to reduce the civil defense forces.

[Sergeyev] Perhaps it would make sense in this situation to remove the civil defense forces from the armed forces, remove the semiautomatic rifles from the soldiers and send "alternative-service personnel" to serve there. This idea, incidentally, is being discussed. Has the time not come to implement it?

[Pyankov] I agree. This would be a prudent move, to remove civil defense from the armed forces. Even the current USSR defense minister has expressed that very thought. The problem, however, is that it has not been determined who will then be responsible for civil defense, for its status and combat readiness.

[Sergeyev] Why you would be, but now with the authority of a member of the government and of the deputy state minister for civil defense, as is the case in other nations which are ordinarily called civilized.

[Pyankov] Yes, but that sounds more like a fairy tale. At one time a state commission for emergencies was set up under the USSR Council of Ministers, which directed civil defense forces in mopping-up operations following accidents, natural disasters, and so forth. "Mopping up," you see. That is, after something had already occurred. No one wants to assume responsibility for maintaining the civil defense forces and facilities in a state of combat readiness between emergencies, however. And no one wants to change the situation.

I feel that this situation will only last until the first real thunderbolt strikes, though, after which, as we know, the Russian peasant starts to cross himself. The body governing the mobile civil defense forces should not include excess intermediate elements between a few echelons and a multiplicity of chiefs, and it will come to that without fail.

[Sergeyev] I too do not want that to happen. But the republics are now becoming autonomous and taking over many Union functions for themselves. What, in your view, should remain with the center, with the civil defense headquarters of the USSR, if the republics want to remain within an All-Union civil defense structure?

[Pyankov] The training (in civil defense courses and in the department at the academy), equipment orders based on requisitions from the republics, the coordination of

international contacts, the dissemination of know-how, scientific developments at the civil defense institute, and certain other functions.

[Sergeyev] You mentioned the civil defense institute. Your officers complain that they receive no developments or recommendations from the institute. Just what does it do, they ask. Have you already acquainted yourself with it, or have you not gotten around to that?

[Pyankov] No, I have already visited the institute. I listened to the administration and section chiefs. I have an idea of the direction they are taking in their work, and it seems to me that they are working on fairly significant projects. Including classified projects. Perhaps this is why we do not hear about them.

The institute also has plenty of problems, however: low salaries, poor financing. You do not get good science for pennies. It is now switching to economic accountability in its operation, to be sure. It is accepting orders for research projects from sectors of the national economy. This commercial trend could divert it from the main job, however. Now an attempt is being made to take away the new building. They have been in wooden barracks for so long, and just when they are about to move they are told no. Some Moscow authority has taken a fancy to the new building....

[Sergeyev] The institute is not the least important element in the civil defense structure, of course, but also not the most important in saving people. I would like to hear your opinion of those rescue detachments being set up at enterprises and in production associations. Are they in some way linked to your department?

[Pyankov] It is essential to set up such detachments. Their skill and courage deserve every kind of support. As the forward echelon, familiar with the specific circumstances of the specific production facility, they ordinarily perform well. But what happens if a heat and electricity plant blows up near their enterprise? They are narrowly specialized, after all, just for their own enterprise: gas field rescue workers, mining rescue workers, and so forth. And then not every enterprise will be able to set up these detachments.

[Sergeyev] And what is the situation with respect to setting up rescue detachments using the mechanized regiments?

[Pyankov] The deployment of rescue detachments is proceeding. Five of the units have been formed. Ideally, according to all the calculations, there should be at least 40 of them for all the regions. But we cannot indulge ourselves... If we can form at least 10 brigades, they can scarcely cover the regions which will still be a part of the Union.

One might argue as to whether the regiment or the brigade is better. At this time, however, the brigade structure is the optimal version. The brigade is a powerful, mobile first line of rescue forces capable of

reaching the area of an accident within 30-40 minutes and conducting rescue work until reinforcements arrive.

[Sergeyev] Could you say a few words about international contacts?

[Pyankov] They will continue to be developed as before. Right now we need one another. We need their equipment and gear. They need our bitter experience in dealing with accidents and combatting the effects.

Mismanagement of Radar Construction in Khabarovsk Kray

92UM0080A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Oct 91 Union Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "USSR President M. S. Gorbachev Instructed That an Investigation Be Begun Based on an IZVESTIYA Article"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA (No 249) published an article by our own correspondent for Khabarovsk Kray Boris Reznik "Secrets of a Dead Site." It was about scandalous facts of mismanagement by the USSR Ministry of Defense and USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry in the construction of a "supersecret" antenna for surveillance of outer space in the vicinity of the settlement of Bolshaya Kartel, Khabarovsk Kray.

As the correspondent wrote, this was a metal structure codenamed "Krug" [Circle]—an antenna about a kilometer in diameter and in the middle a three-story building crammed from basement to roof with electronics. Military builders had spent over R50 million in prices of those years erecting this site, but the cost of its gear just remained a deep secret.

The antenna was morally and technically obsolete by completion of construction, although they erected it in just two years. The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Radio Industry decided to remove the "Krug" from the operational space complex and transferred it for use for scientific research purposes to a defense enterprise located... in the Ukraine. But it too did not need this complex.

Finally the ownerless site ended up without security or attendant personnel and began to be plundered. Village boys—or perhaps not just them—were the first to penetrate to the site, as our correspondent presumed. But a fact remains a fact. In the enormous rooms of the complex people began breaking open the metal cabinets crammed with electronic boards, picking out diodes, triodes, transistors from them and, as later would be written in the record, pulling out "low-voltage (switching) gear of special technical equipment and set-making parts of technological gear having assemblies and parts in their makeup made with the use of precious metals."

Just how much precious metal all told was stolen from the "Krug" complex? An investigation should give a precise answer to this, but it is known that 35 km of cable containing silver were run in the building itself. A lot of dismantled, obsolete gear was sent to industry enterprises from a similar complex situated several dozen kilometers from the Bolshaya Kartel site, and the accompanying letter stated that "1.3 kg of gold, 219.8 kg of silver, and 102.3 kg of platinum amounting to over R10 million" was missing.

The investigation presumes that enormously more precious metals were stolen at the Bolshaya Kartel "Krug."

By the way, as our correspondent wrote, personnel of the Far East Military District military procuracy and representatives of USSR Gokhran [State Depository] who arrived to investigate the incident were not allowed into the site. Colonel Mukhamedzhanov, commander of the adjacent air defense unit who was assigned to "look after" the "star" compound, believed that the authorizations for access to secrets presented by the inspectors were insufficient.

"I will not admit you without Moscow's permission."

The personnel of the law-protection agencies waited a week for authorization from the Air Defense Forces Main Staff. Finally an order came from there: "Admit to site for external inspection. Do not show documents."

"We were astounded and shocked by what we saw on the site grounds," Captain Yevgeniy Loskutov, a military procuracy associate, told our correspondent. "Folders stamped 'Top Secret' were scattered around on the floor in the dirt. We found and confiscated the Plan for Layout of Technological Equipment and Specifications." Everything was destroyed, mutilated, and dirtied..."

The paradox is that the district procuracy ended up at the site accidentally, as it were. It should be serviced by military lawyers from the military unit located in Solnechnogorsk near Moscow, but the local militia and Special Department associates only registered facts of the apprehension of individuals engaged in stealing supplies located in the building of the "Krug" article and... took no steps.

Last year, then Commander in Chief of Air Defense General of the Army I. Tretyak and First Deputy Minister of the Radio Industry V. Kurochkin appointed a commission to investigate just what remained, nevertheless, after so many years of the "Krug" being pillaged. But it found property subject to being written off, only R3.4 million for the Ministry of Defense and R2.5 million for the Ministry of the Radio Industry; the rest was ordered to be dismantled and distributed to surrounding units. But no one even thought of carrying out the order.

In the spring of this year, following a visit to the site by I. Tretyak, the "Krug"... burned down.

That was the sad story about scandalous mismanagement related in IZVESTIYA by our own correspondent for Khabarovsk Kray.

USSR President M. Gorbachev responded to the IZVESTIYA article. On 22 October he sent instructions: "To comrades N. Trubin, Ye. Shaposhnikov and V. Bakatin. I request you to look into this matter thoroughly and institute proceedings against those guilty, considering that, as now is known, this is not the first and probably not the last instance of boundless mismanagement."

Roundup of Winter Potato Shortages for Troops*92UM0071A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 91 First edition p 2*

[Article by Maj A. Stasovskiy under the rubric "Not an Idle Question": "How Will We Get Through the Winter?"]

[Text] The nation has a very difficult food situation today. Every person faces the problem of getting food. The state stores have practically nothing to offer, and the markets are becoming more expensive by the day. The effort to obtain at least something for themselves and their families takes a lot of time for officers of the army and navy. All of this is unquestionably leaving its mark on their performance of their service duties. The problem is no longer purely economic. It is also acquiring a political aspect, one might say.

Our correspondent contacted servicemen of various ranks from various regions and asked them a single question: "What provisions have you been able to lay in at home for the winter?"

Col N. Lazorenko, team leader in a combat training section in the Siberian Military District:

Unfortunately, we have had a poor potato harvest in Siberia, and potatoes have been and still are our main food item. I still managed to acquire three sacks, however. I bought 80 kilograms of cabbage for pickling. I have a small amount of rice. Sugar is a real problem. It was not available during the summer, and we were therefore unable to make jam. There is still no sugar.

Maj I. Timokhin, chief of the section for the preparation of draftees for the service and their induction into the Armed Forces of the military commissariat in the city of Zhukovskiy:

These are our supplies: four sacks of potatoes, a bucket of pickled cabbage and around 10 jars of canned fruit. We could have had more of everything, had the ispolkom satisfied our request for it to allocate plots of land. Many people today are feeding themselves from their vegetable gardens, after all.

Col Gen I. Rodionov, chief of the General Staff Academy:

To be honest, I simply have no time to work on the food problem. Right now I have a sack of potatoes and some kind of groats at home.

Capt V. Petrov, chief of staff of an air defense battalion:

In general, no one in Belarus goes without potatoes. I just happened to get my hands on a couple of kilograms of buckwheat groats. We will stretch them out and give them only to the children. I have two. It would be nice if

we could also pickle a couple of jars of cabbage. If we could, I don't believe there should be any special problems.

Col Justice V. Natychko, Moscow:

The house is bare. There is absolutely nothing. I might still be able to lay in at least something.

Maj V. Grunev, adjutant at the Kiev Anti-Aircraft Missile School:

I could buy potatoes, of course. But I have nowhere to store them. You buy a sack, and it rots in a week or two. One has to have fruit to make jam. Where am I going to get it? Prices at the market are sky-high.

Lt A. Stenishchev, Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs:

I have only a couple of jars of jam. My parents gave them to me. I have nowhere to store produce. A sack or two of potatoes and a few jars of pickled cabbage, and we can make it through the winter. Potatoes are the same as bread, and cabbage—at least they contain some vitamins.

Such was the rainbow of answers. Or can they be called a rainbow? More like solid gray. It seems that to be completely happy our servicemen need only some cabbage and potatoes. And this has long since become the norm. But this fall the situation is bad even with respect to these items. We do sometimes receive aid, to be sure. Even from abroad! How could one forget the recent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article which told how Soviet units received rations from Bundeswehr soldiers. Their expiration date had passed, to be sure, but even that is apparently acceptable to us. Our soldiers are already used "to overcoming hardships and deprivations." Even when it comes to something to eat.

In the meantime the situation is becoming more and more critical. It is clear from reports from the districts that the servicemen frequently do not even receive their pay. Upon discharge the soldiers do not even have the money to pay for the trip home. This occurred in Yekaterinburg.

We could grasp at straws and permit the unit commanders to engage in commercial activities. Their boundaries are not regulated, however, and the rights of the servicemen are not defined. As is so often the case with us, from all indications half-measures will be the undoing of a good undertaking. To be sure, some people have washed their hands of the service and gone into commerce in earnest. Unfortunately, however, military property—even more alarming, weapons and ammunition—are more and more frequently the items involved in the commercial transactions.

We therefore have to repeat the question: "How Will We Get Through the Winter"? And just how will our unsettled state answer this question?

Uzbek Draft in Line With USSR Defense Ministry

*PM0711122391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Nov 91 Union Edition p 2*

[Andrey Orlov report: "Only Son Not Drafted"]

[Text] Tashkent—Almost half as many young men as in previous years will be drafted into the Army in Uzbekistan this fall.

The number of draftees has been set by agreement between the republic government and the USSR Defense Ministry.

The only people not to be drafted this time will be only sons, younger sons—if the elder brother is already in the Army—and shepherds. The approach to the young men's state of health will be tightened up—the sickly and weak will be weeded out by a medical commission. To monitor the operation, additional Uzbek and Karakalpak deputy health minister posts have been created and extra staff provided for health care departments.

Young men from Uzbekistan will not serve in "hot spots" or in the Far North (generally not north of the 60th parallel).

Belorussian Supsov Objects to Military School Closure

92UM0075A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Col P. Chernenko: "From Minsk: Passions Surrounding a School"]

[Text] A year ago the Minsk Higher Combined-Arms Military Political School celebrated its 10th anniversary. Now, however, the republic's Council of Ministers has decreed that the school be closed and the physical plant turned over to Belorussian State University.

The news, coming like a bolt out of the blue for the personnel, upset the people. Officers and cadets, blue- and white-collar workers were angry that their lives were being treated this way.

Just a month ago the school's area of specialization was changed. It became a military pedagogical school.

"Closing the school would be a mistake both economically and politically," said Maj Gen Bamburov, its director. "Belarus will certainly have a need for military educational institutions in the future. Our school can train officers for tank and combined-arms subunits for the republic's ground troops, retrain specialists and prepare officers for other republics. We can train foreign servicemen, as in the past, and earn a considerable amount of money, which will go into the Belorussian budget. It would be easy to tear down the school, but who can guarantee that we will not have to spend hundreds and hundreds of thousands of rubles to restore it tomorrow?"

"We shall defend our school and our right to work," announced Lt Col V. Nikolayenk, chairman of the Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen.

From the editors: After the article had been readied for publication it was learned that the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus had suspended its decision to close the Minsk Military Pedagogical School. Common sense had triumphed. But for how long?

India Seeks USSR Role in Arms Export Program

PM1211104791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Nov 91 Union Edition p 6

[IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Paklin report: "India Sells... Soviet Weapons"]

[Text] Delhi—India is fully determined to displace traditional arms suppliers from other countries from the international market. It intends to do that with the help of... our country, which is itself—or has at least been hitherto—a major arms supplier.

Indian Defense Minister Sharad Pawar initiated the new avenue in Indian exports. On his insistence, the defense industry has been tasked with raising annual arms exports to the level of 10 billion rupees (this year's planned shipments total 800 million rupees). "India is the Third World's fourth largest arms producer, but it is not one of its exporters," India's influential STATESMAN writes. In order to rectify this situation, a group of Defense Ministry experts have already begun a comprehensive study of arms markets. Experts noted that 45 countries on four continents have Soviet weapons in their arsenals. However, of late these countries have had difficulties in obtaining spare parts and ammunition since the Soviet side supposedly requires payment in hard currency. So, these countries are increasingly frequently asking for help from India, which produces various kinds of combat hardware under Soviet license. In the opinion of India's specialists, a unique opportunity is opening up for India to gain access to these countries' arms markets.

India has already asked us to authorize it to supply weapons, spare parts, and ammunition produced at Indian defense enterprises to third countries. J. Singh, director of Delhi's Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, reckons that there are extensive opportunities for selling MiG-21 aircraft to Third World countries.

J. Singh also sees rosy prospects for India on the tank market. He thinks that if Third World countries will buy a slightly modernized old Indian tank modeled on a

British tank, the modern T-72 tanks that India is starting to produce under Soviet license will meet with demand from all quarters. A similar situation is also developing with sales of artillery mounts abroad. India has already supplied Yugoslavia, Vietnam, and certain other countries with field guns.

However, on its own India can by no means produce all the components for modern weapons, including those produced under Soviet licenses. It is therefore suggesting that our country organize joint production of a number of kinds of arms within the framework of joint enterprises. It is willing to sell some of the military output to third countries. Some of our arms manufacturers, whose potential is becoming increasingly limited due to the economic disorder in our country, are also interested in cooperating with India. It is no coincidence that the Indian side received a tempting offer from us to take part in the completion and modern production of a total newcomer to the field of military aircraft building—the multirole VTOL [vertical takeoff and landing] Yak-141. There are also other proposals of this kind.

Soviet military specialists working in Delhi in principle advocate continuing close cooperation in defense with India. However, they reckon that our country should primarily act in its own economic interests.

UAE Planning To Buy Soviet Fighters

LD0811204691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program
Radio-1 Network in Russian 1700 GMT 8 Nov 91

[Text] The term "great power", one might note, is used more and more rarely in the world with relation to our country. It is therefore even more gratifying that UAE Defense Minister Shaykh Al Maktum used precisely the term "great power" in relation to the USSR, although admittedly with regard to military aviation.

The point is he liked the Soviet MIG-29, MIG-31, SU-25, and SU-27 fighters, which took part in the "Dubayy-91" air show. There are reports that the United Arab Emirates intends to buy up to 40 Soviet military aircraft.

Scientist Criticizes Progress in Converting CW Plants*924P0017A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 10 Oct 91 p 4*

[Article by V. Mirzayanov, doctor of chemical sciences, under "Politics" rubric: "Inversion"]

[Text] **Key workers of the military-industrial complex love to talk about conversion. It is a fashionable subject. In fact, however, the huge monster continues to gobble up the economy. Chemists call this process something else—inversion.**

When our press reports on the successes of enterprises of the military-industrial complex in conversion and about the great advantages that it promises us, this is often reminiscent of analogous reports in the recent past about successes in the century's construction projects. It is good thing that no one then or now checked into this and it is hardly likely that anyone will. They simply will not allow it and that is all there is to it.

Who? That same elite of the military-industrial complex, which has by no means been rendered harmless. All-powerful directors with their loyal crews still rule in the direct sense of the word at the head of numerous enterprises and research institutes without control by anyone. So just as before, they take revenge for initiative and dissent.

Even today, the first, second, and third sections are headed by KGB officers and exercise continuous control over workers. The same barbed wire along the fence, entranceways with ensigns, special procurator's office, special police, special court, and center for listening in on telephone conversations with obedient trade union committees dependably ensure the unlimited power of directors, who with any attempt to show independence or dissent will always find the necessary kompromat for the moral destruction of the undesirable worker. And when they throw him out, the unfortunate person will not find any profitable work in the country and especially not abroad, for they will not let him go on account of his knowledge of secrets.

With the coming of B. Bakatin to the KGB, there was no change in the position of workers at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex and it hardly seems likely that there will be. I can assert this using the example of my own "mail box," which was located practically in the center of Moscow and is a secret facility more for those naive Muscovites who for decades did not suspect that it was killing them with real toxic substances and is still a deadly danger today. A for the West.... In connection with the organization of the first exhibition of abstractionist artists in the USSR in the fall of 1967 in the club "Friendship" that belonged to this "mail box", the radio station BBC called the enterprise a factory of death.

In the sixth year of perestroika, when the convention on the banning of chemical weapons was practically ready

and the United States and other countries had ceased to develop them, the press initiated a full-scale campaign for conversion and our director, V. Petrunin, declared at the end of 1990 that the "nature of capitalism had not changed, our potential enemy remains the same, and therefore it is our duty to continue to strengthen defensive might."

I am not naive enough to think that his opinion is an exception. No, those like him are a disciplined people who hang on every word of the authorities. That is a characteristic feature. It is said that at the former enterprise a certain semifinished article just could not be obtained under his glorious guidance and he forced all the employees, including candidates of science, to synthesize it in laboratory retorts. Let the slaves work. Well, in a few months they obtained the quantity that the industrial facility should have produced in a day or two. But the director was "on his horse." Would anyone really look into how the "success" was achieved?

It is not surprising that he sought to be "on his horse" in Moscow as well. He imitated conversion in every way, said nice words about cost accounting and self-financing, and even organized training but he remembered the "beastly nature of capitalism" very well. Meanwhile, negotiations were under way in Geneva and a plant was being built near Chapayevsk for the destruction of chemical weapons (for which the state wasted more than 300 million rubles), which was ultimately closed for not meeting the basic safety requirements of people after mass demonstrations of the inhabitants of the city.

Not a single hair fell for this failure either from the head of our director or from the heads of his bosses. And for what? They had, after all, unswervingly carried out a different but basic course of the military-industrial complex that was aimed at taming this same "beastly nature." They were working to the utmost to develop a more perfect kind of chemical weapon and there were full-scale tests of it at an open test range in one of the most unfortunate regions ecologically.

Finally success was achieved and in April of this year the director and his chiefs received Lenin Prizes. And the heroes of the military-industrial complex are hardly bothered at all by the fact that more than 70,000 tons of dangerous chemical substances lie in depots, representing a huge danger. And the state is simply unable to finance their disposal because of its own poverty. So it is hardly likely that they will be disposed of in this century. There is, however, hope that perhaps the West will help.

The people of the military-industrial complex have now begun to assimilate the West intensively, not being ashamed of their own status as supersecret persons, for they know very well that a regime of secrecy is for slaves, to intimidate them and make them obey. For this reason, they simply go on trips to the United States, England, the FRG, and other countries. This fact itself would be meaningless if we did not know the true face of the military-industrial complex and its representatives. No,

it is not specialists who go to the West. They, as a rule, are not especially well trusted. It is the director and those close to him who go, people who are not much like specialists, even if one has a lot of imagination. Such persons go to negotiations in Geneva, attempting once again to put one over on their Western partners. I think, however, that they already know very well with whom they are dealing.

Today it was the director himself, who was a member of the bureau of the CPSU RK and a permanent member of the party committee, who left the party. This is to his advantage today. But it was literally just a month or two ago that he assembled the laboratory heads who had left the party and branded them as traitors. His order on a contract with the party committee, in which he obligated himself to provide transportation, premises, and other things in exchange for educational work, sounded blatant and shameless.

Presenting himself as a true patriot, our director was prepared to resort to any falsification. Here is a typical instance that I myself encountered in 1988. At one of the plants then in operation, I discovered an emission of chemical substances into the atmosphere and sewage that exceeded the standard more than a hundred fold and that later accumulated near a densely populated region. The director prohibited me from reporting this to the higher authority.

One asks why we are once again deceiving the West. After all, the true power of the military-industrial complex is concentrated in its enterprises that do not want to convert, for this is not desired by their directors with their numerous cronies. Rather they are waiting for their hour and simply delaying things. Chemistry has a term—inversion. This is when one and the same substance, without changing its chemical formula, changes imperceptibly from one form to another. This phenomenon can be detected only with the help special instruments. But sometimes inversion may be reversible. So are we not dealing with something similar in our so-called conversion?

If this, fortunately, is not so, then one can more easily suppose that the delay with conversion is the prelude to the creeping privatization of enterprises of the military-industrial complex by its elite. One gets this idea from the fact that a few days ago the Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry drove eight brand-new Mercedes to the garage of our enterprise. Two of them were turned over to our director. And all of this happens when the country lacks the means to acquire food and medicine and the chemical industry itself is in a deep crisis because of a shortage of imported raw materials.

How long will we put up with this?

Record-Breaking Light Plane Is Fruit of Conversion Program

PM1411105991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 7 Nov 91 First Edition p 8

[Sergey Nagayev report: "The Mountain of Conversion Has Brought Forth a Mouse, but What a Mouse!"]

[Text] This little one-seater airplane has commenced its promising career in a sure and even audacious manner: Flown by test pilot Mikhail Markov of the Air Research Institute, it broke the world record for gaining height.

But whereas it is customary in aviation to consider it a real advantage to to have exceeded world bests by as little as a few percentage points, in this case this improvement was of the order of almost one third. The International Aeronautical Federation has confirmed the record—the airplane "Aviatika MAI-890" (this is the plane in question) gained 3,000 meters in 13 minutes as opposed to 18 minutes set in the previous best by the Americans.

And the reason is simple. Such respectable firms as the "Znamya Truda" plant, which produces the famous "MIG-29," the Moscow Aviation Institute (to be more accurate its design office which K. Zhidovetskiy heads), and the Air Research Institute named for M. Gromov, which possesses splendid testing apparatus including the best takeoff and landing strip in the world, were "brought in" to create the "MAI-890." As a rule airplanes like the "MAI-890" are used for pleasure flights abroad. However, this model has a much wider range of possible uses. Strictly speaking the airplane was conceived as a basic design from which 12 variant models will be produced (with a minimum number of modifications): for agricultural work, still and motion-picture photography for the militia...

Variant models intended to meet the requirements of recreational flying have been set aside in a special category.

In short, the airplane has turned out to be reliable, and what is important, competitive. People have taken a serious interest in it abroad. Of 20 machines which have already been assembled, nine are now plying the skies above Europe. Foreign flying clubs and private individuals are prepared to buy it, and in addition there are more than 200 firm orders. Because the price is not very high, practically the same as that of an ordinary car (not a Soviet one of course). The airplane will be sold for the same price within the country as well—for rubles (about 300,000).

Heck, it would seem that we can be proud: In a period when our country's economy is generally collapsing people have managed to create something new and remarkable. But...

"If from 'MIGs' Russia slides into producing airplanes like the 'MAI-890,' this, in my view, will be evidence of a crash," Igor Pyankov, president of the joint-stock

company "Aviatika" says. "Ill-considered conversion squanders all the military industry's experience and achievements. You see the 'MIGs' which people are now prepared to acquire abroad (and you can yourself appreciate this is at a price which is incomparable with the price of the MAI-890), are being taken out of production. But what will replace it? Just our biplanes. I think it would be much better to find an opportunity to combine such programs. Various aircraft are necessary. As far as our work is concerned, 'Aviatika' is releasing the machine on the widest possible scale as early as January of 1992. For the moment, however, this is not for the ears of the press..."

International Cooperation in Military Conversion Sought

92UM0111A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Nov 91 First Edition p 4

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Dolgikh, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Yet Another Foundation—For Conversion"]

[Text] I do not believe I would be mistaken if I said that today the word "conversion" is one of the most fashionable. As "acceleration," "glasnost," and "perestroyka" were in their day... And what are they? Nothing, really. To this day we are unable to explain exactly what these words mean. And for that reason any of us can declare himself to be a "perestroyka-er," an "accelerator," etc. This is by no means the first year conversion has been underway here (so they say), but ask specialists just what the word means and you will get a different response from each. It is this kind of confusion in concepts that causes chaos in both the production and social spheres while at the same time enabling "business" people to "make" money. It is no secret that we have functioning among us right now a few dozen associations, concerns, etc., in whose titles the word "conversion" appears. However, they often have no connection whatsoever with the defense industry.

Prior to beginning some undertaking, therefore, it would not hurt to define our position regarding certain concepts. At the very least for ourselves, but also for those with whom these associations and concerns intend to cooperate.

A press conference was held a few days ago at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the capital's Zubovskiy Boulevard, conducted by A. Ananyan, president of the International Conversion Foundation. Yes, we now have such an organization. I do not know how productive its role will be in restructuring our industry, but those who established the foundation defined their basic position all the same—they developed their concept of conversion and promulgated it. Now all who share this point of view may boldly join this organization. If they first contribute a certain amount of money, naturally.

Generally speaking, the plans of Mikhail Arsenovich and his comrades are grandiose. On the world level. In their view, it is impossible to conduct conversion "in any one country taken individually," that if not the whole world, at least the most developed countries must join in this process. In this regard, the experience which has been accumulated here and there in this sphere must become common property. The International Conversion Foundation plans to engage in generalizing and propagating this experience. In addition, it will apparently become a unique kind of transmission link between the creators of scientific-technical ideas and their users. This is quite a complicated matter, incidentally, not only on the global scale, but even just within the confines of our country.

The foundation was organized just over a year ago but has already managed to establish its own branches in the United States, Argentina, Austria, Italy, and Bulgaria, as well as in dozens of cities in our country. It even intends to become accredited under the United Nations in the near future. All this may well give it enough prestige and opportunity to carry its basically sound ideas through to implementation. But there is a field of activity for each of us here.

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